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ABSTRACT
THE TURN TO THE NEIGHBOR: EMMANUEL LEVINAS’S CONCEPTUAL
AFFINITIES WITH LIBERATION THEOLOGY

By
Alain Mayama
December 2007

Dissertation Supervised by Dr. Marie L. Baird, Ph, D.
My dissertation establishes some conceptual affinities between the philosophical
project of Emmanuel Levinas and liberation theology. I analyze Levinas’s work by
comparing it to two important liberation theologians, Gustavo Gutiérrez and Jon Sobrino,
whose work, like his, needs to be brought into greater contemporary debate about the
subject’s encounter with the other. I argue that fundamental to Levinas, Gutiérrez, and
Sobrino is the fact that they all bring forth one major characteristic: the dimension of the
divine opens forth in the human face. For Levinas, Gutiérrez and Sobrino, commitment to
the neighbor is the necessary context for “understanding” God. They posit the human
other as the possibility of the subject’s subjectivity. To be human is to act with love
toward one’s neighbor.
Using an analytical-comparative method and without claiming a perfect matching
between Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology, my dissertation demonstrates that
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the dialogue between these two approaches addresses the insufficiency of the modern
philosophical turn to the subject to appropriately address the question of the nonrecognition of the human other in history; I also assert that their unwavering commitment
to the human neighbor reveals something of postmodern sensitivity defined, in this study,
in terms of otherness and difference, relationality and interdependence. I contend that
Levinas’s transcendental ethics provides liberation theology with a viable philosophical
framework that is compatible with the truth of Christianity: the concern for the neighbor.
On its part, liberation theology’s conversion to the neighbor bears witness to Levinas’s
ethical responsibility in the real time of history. In order to show the relevance of
Levinas’s philosophy for Christian theology in general, I discuss three Christian scholars,
Enrique Dussel, Jean-Luc Marion, and Michael Purcell, who, while challenging some
aspects of Levinas’s philosophy, still see its significance for Christian theological
anthropology.
This dissertation concludes by proposing Levinas’s philosophy and liberation
theology’s turn to the neighbor as significant for addressing contemporary sub-Saharan
Africa socio-political and ethnic conflicts. I also point out a couple of concrete historical
examples of this turn to the neighbor which, if followed, could lessen the degradation of
the human other in sub-Saharan Africa and in the world in general.

v

DEDICATION

To the victims of human’s inhumanity to humans
And to those whose daily life is an enduring turn to the other/neighbor
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Introduction
The purpose of this dissertation is to show how Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy
shares some conceptual affinities with liberation theology – as represented by Gustavo
Gutiérrez and Jon Sobrino. It will articulate a possibility to read Levinas’s transcendental
ethics of responsibility as a revalidation of one of the truths of Christianity: the concern
for humanity of every human person as expressed in Christian theology in general and
liberation theology in particular. By looking at Levinas’s conceptual affinities with
liberation theology, this work hopes to be a modest contribution to the ongoing dialogue
between Christian theology and postmodern philosophy. The Christian theological
tradition has a long history of finding in some philosophers genuine valued dialogical
partners. This dissertation finds in Levinas a valued dialogical partner whose work could
benefit Christian theology in general and liberation theology in particular.
What is most essential for Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology is that
they both bring forth one major point: the dimension of the divine opens forth in the
human face. God’s transcendence emerges in love of one’s neighbor but not in the hatred
of the human other. This dissertation will demonstrate that the dialogue between these
two approaches, based on the turn to the neighbor, will prove fruitful in addressing the
inadequacy of the modern philosophical turn to the subject to properly deal with the
questions of poverty, violence, and oppression in today’s world.1 It will also argue that

1

Although Levinas himself refuses to make the Holocaust the subject of his thinking, we would argue with
Jacob Meskin that “there can be no doubt that both Levinas’s life and his philosophy were deeply shaped
by the trauma of Nazi genocide.” See Jacob Meskin, “The Jewish Transformation of Modern Thought:
Levinas and Philosophy after the Holocaust,” Cross Currents 47, 4 (1997/1998): 507. Thus, it is our
contention in this dissertation that both Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology can be read as a
response to the tragic legacy of an unchecked twentieth century ill-treatment of the human other.
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Levinas, Gutiérrez, and Sobrino’s commitment to the neighbor reveals something of
postmodern sensitivity defined, in this work, in terms of otherness and difference,
relationality and interdependence.
In Descartes, Kant, Husserl and Heidegger, as well as in the philosophical
tradition, the question has been almost entirely about how the human subject knows the
existence of the other person and how the other person enters into the consciousness of
the subject.2 This philosophical discourse, governed by the primacy of being, forces
every other discourse to validate itself before philosophy.3 Thus, the turn to the subject,
as well as the belief in sameness that characterizes the modern era, was embraced by
modern thinkers as the “ideals in modernity’s working out of its unique history.”4 This
was the beginning of an exceptional awareness about the self and the world around the
self. Most twentieth century works in philosophy and theology have been based on the
heritage of the eighteenth and nineteenth century transcendental and ontological tradition
that privileged and celebrated the uniqueness of the thinking subject and the primacy of
being;5 the development of the fundamental task of theology testifies to this fact.6

2

Robert J. S. Manning, Interpreting Otherwise than Heidegger: Emmanuel Levinas’s Ethics as First
Philosophy (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1993), 182.
3
Emmanuel Levinas, “God and Philosophy,” in The Levinas Reader, edited by Séan Hand (Cambridge
MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 167.
4
David Tracy, “Theology and the Many Faces of Postmodernity,” Theology Today 51, 1 (1994): 104.
5
Immanuel Kant is the central figure in the philosophical tradition on the issue of the thinking subject. This
tradition was initiated in the West by Francis Bacon and René Descartes. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of
Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965); Prolegomena to
any Future Metaphysics (Indianapolis/New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc, 1950). Some
twentieth-century philosophers and theologians influenced by Kant: Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Joseph
Maréchal, Karl Rahner, Henri de Lubac, Jean Daniélou, M.-D. Chenu, Yves Congar, Lonergan, and
Edward Schillebeeckx.
6
For a helpful discussion on the development of the fundamental task of Christian theology, see Joseph A.
Komonchak, “Defending Our Hope: On the Fundamental Tasks of Theology,” in Faithful Witness:
Foundations for Today’s Church, eds. Leo J. O’Donovan and T. Howland Sanks (New York: Crossroad,
1989), 14-26. Marie L. Baird’s remarks with regard to the influence of Greek thought on Christian
theology are helpful here. She writes, “The extent to which Christian theology is rooted in Greek
philosophical assumptions and conceptual categories is the extent to which such theology also reflects the
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Contrary to this trend, the examination of conceptual affinities between Levinas’s
philosophy and liberation theology will show that the turn to the other/neighbor, which
runs through their respective work, emerges as “a resistance to the same unquestioned
sameness of the modern turn to the subject, the modern over-belief in the search for the
perfect method, the modern social evolutionary narrative whereby all is finally and
endlessly more of the self-same.”7 Here the Cartesian ego that influenced the disciplines
of philosophy and theology, which systematically incorporated numerous individual
human beings in a process that consumed their individuality, seem unbearably
inappropriate in the face of the extreme degradation of human dignity in history. This is a
failure of thought to grasp or comprehend the other, a failure to see the unthought in the
history of philosophy and theology – that knowing takes place always within the context
of the intersubjective relation. Our “free-thinking” culture is often suspicious of anything
that might impose itself on our lives or threaten our individual freedom. We like to stay
in “control” of the world as critical, independent, self-empowered subjects, and we refuse
to reach out beyond ourselves toward the degradation of the dignity of the other in
history. In this new trend of thought, the subjectivity and uniqueness of the subject is not
about free-thinking, self-empowerment, and individual freedom; it is rather a turn to an
infinite responsibility for the other prior to being for oneself. In some sense, this issue of
an authentic self-other relation provides an invaluable purpose for the present study,
because it suggests finding “some way to use rationality and reflection to take the
Cartesian ego beyond rationality and reflection, leading it to register or recognize

primacy of ontology as the conceptual basis for the Christian theological project.” See her article,
“Revisioning Christian Theology in Light of Emmanuel Levinas’s Ethics of Responsibility,” Journal of
Ecumenical Studies 36, 3-4 (1999):341-351, especially 344.
7
Tracy, “Theology and the Many Faces of Postmodernity,” 108.
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another, oscillating, enigmatic sort of ‘ethical’ truth”8 that constitutes a central response
to the question of human existence and authenticity.
Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology, each in its own right, by positing
the human other as the possibility of the subject’s subjectivity, invite humanity to situate
the other/neighbor at the center of the definition of human subjectivity. To be human,
therefore, is to act with love toward one’s neighbor. While not denying the suitability of
the subject’s identity, unique conscience and sanctified dignity, it only finds its existential
and fundamental meaning, this dissertation will argue, through love, relationship and
solidarity with other humans. Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology find in the
turn to the other, who is both God’s mystery and the face of the neighbor, a promising
avenue for the radical re-imagining of the world.
Chapter one focuses on the ethical relationship in Levinas’s transcendental ethics.
It will begin with an examination of the advent of Levinas on the scene of Western
philosophy. It will show how Levinas takes issue with Husserlian and Heideggerian
phenomenology for not giving a satisfying account of intersubjectivity and responsibility
for the other. Specifically, we will examine why, for Levinas, ethics should replace
metaphysics as first philosophy by analyzing the major concepts of his philosophy: the
encounter with the other, the face, the trace, substitution, proximity, sensibility,
responsibility, hostage, vulnerability, principle and anarchy, the Saying and the Said, and
the third party. Since Levinas held that philosophical thought was rooted in prephilosophical experiences, and recognized the place of Jewish history as part of his life,
this chapter will also examine Jewish aspects in Levinas’s thought, especially the

8

Meskin, “The Jewish Transformation of Modern Thought: Levinas and Philosophy after the Holocaust,”
510.
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influence that the Torah, the Talmudic tradition, and the Holocaust have on his
philosophy. We will show the philosophical stirrings, subtle or overt, in his work, which
will serve to put his position in dialogue with liberation theology’s perspective.
The second chapter will be in two parts. The first part will provide core elements
of Gustavo Gutiérrez’s theology of liberation. The second part will address Jon Sobrino’s
theological approach. This chapter will examine both theologians’ social, cultural, and
ecclesial background and theological perspectives. It will also show that for Gutiérrez
and Sobrino the human person, the poor, the stranger, the widow, the oppressed, the
homeless, etc is the place for a possible revelation from God. Since Gutiérrez and
Sobrino analyze the human person in the light of the Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ,
this chapter will discuss their anthropologies, as inspired by their Christologies and the
experience of their social locations. It is in the works of justice, in loving one’s neighbor,
that transcendence is encountered.
The third chapter is the pivotal chapter of the dissertation as it focuses on the
affinity between these two approaches. It will seek to establish that Levinas’s philosophy
and liberation theology both view the turn to the other/neighbor as a power of genuine
love, opening new avenues for the radical re-imagining of the world. They respond to the
degradation of the human person’s life in history in a comparable way; search for the
divine transcendence in a life of commitment to the other human person; find in the
Judeo-Christian wisdom a distinct way of thinking of the subject-other relationship; and
call for love of neighbor and justice. While calling for a redefinition of human
subjectivity in terms of love of neighbor, these two approaches present also some
divergences, which we will argue, offer an opportunity for dialogue. Levinas’s
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philosophy provides liberation theology with a viable philosophical framework that
would enrich its theological anthropology. Liberation theology, on its part, bears witness
and historicizes Levinas’s philosophy in terms of conversion to the neighbor. In the end,
this chapter will argue that the turn to the neighbor in Levinas and liberation theology is a
precondition for peace, justice, and good social order.
The fourth chapter will discuss how such similarities hold up in the view of some
Christian scholars who have dealt with Levinas’s philosophical project. Three respected
contemporary scholars have been selected: Enrique Dussel, Jean-Luc Marion, and
Michael Purcell. These scholars, although interpreting the relevance of Levinas for
theology along divergent lines, outline the basic themes of Levinas’s thought and the
ways in which it might be deployed in fundamental, practical and philosophical theology
of liberation. Dussel, Marion, and Purcell will helpfully serve the goal of this dissertation
because they see the importance of Levinas’s philosophy for theological anthropology.
Chapter five will bring together arguments of the previous chapters. It will
propose Levinas’s thought and liberation theology’s turn to the neighbor as critical for
addressing contemporary sub-Saharan Africa socio-political and ethnic conflicts. Sociopolitical and ethnic conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa are mostly due to the struggle for
political and economic power for one’s own self realization and/or one’s ethnic group.
Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology’s redefinition of human subjectivity as the
one for the other is pertinent to the issue of excesses of political power, poverty, and
frequent ethnic conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. It is an invitation to all sub-Saharan
Africans to rise beyond socio-political and ethnic boundaries and build unified nations.
For the purpose of fostering an appreciation of the potential that Levinas’s philosophy
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and liberation theology’s turn to the neighbor offer to sub-Saharan African society, this
chapter will point out a couple of concrete historical examples of this turn to the neighbor
in the sense of Purcell’s being otherwise or of what we would describe in this dissertation
as affective responsibility. This chapter will suggest that Levinas’s philosophical project
and liberation theology are significant for dealing with the sub-Saharan Africa sociopolitical and ethnic situation. The emphasis here is on the ethical engagement with the
human other that makes the subject fully human.
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CHAPTER ONE
Emmanuel Levinas’s Transcendental Ethics of Responsibility
Introduction
Regardless of what one thinks, the fact remains that everyone thinks and speaks
within some particular context which shapes one’s thought process, and contributes to the
conclusions one articulates. Emmanuel Levinas is no exception to this contextual
characterization of all human thought. Since this is an acknowledged part of our
understanding of knowledge today, the task of this first chapter is to understand – not
only the context from which Levinas’s philosophy developed – but also the originality of
his method as he attempts to transform philosophy and move it beyond the borders of the
conventional ways of reasoning.
In order to achieve a clear understanding of Levinas’s philosophical project, this
chapter will begin by situating Levinas’s thought within the phenomenological tradition
of Continental philosophy. It will give an overview of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s
occupation with ontology, and show how Levinas takes issue with Husserlian and
Heideggerian phenomenology for not giving a satisfying account of intersubjectivity and
responsibility for the other. This chapter will also examine Levinas’s transcendental
ethics of responsibility in order to illumine his enduring concern about the primacy of the
ethical relation to the other person.
Specifically, this study will examine why – for Levinas – ethics should replace
traditional metaphysics as first philosophy by analyzing the major concepts of his
philosophy: the encounter with the other, the face, the trace, the infinite, transcendence

1

and time, the Saying and the Said, and the third party. The encounter with the other calls
the ethical subject to responsibility to the point of substitution, proximity, obsession,
sensibility, hostage, vulnerability, maternity, etc. Since Levinas held that philosophical
thought was rooted in pre-philosophical experiences, and recognized the place of Jewish
history as part of his life, this chapter will also examine Jewish aspects in Levinas’s
thought, especially the influence that the Torah, the Talmudic tradition, and the
Holocaust had on his philosophy. This work will show the philosophical stirrings – subtle
or overt – in his work, which will serve to put his position in dialogue with liberation
theology’s perspective. In the presentation of this material this study will rely on
Levinas’s own texts as well as on a number of secondary sources.
I. Situating Emmanuel Levinas within the Metaphysical Tradition
Emmanuel Levinas has been acknowledged as one of the most significant
European philosophers of the last few centuries. This can be attributed – not only to his
radical critique of Husserl, Heidegger and the entire Western philosophy for their oubli
de l’autre or égologie – but most especially, to the momentum he was able to give to
philosophical thought in explaining its metaphysical and ethical structures. This is
demonstrated by fact that he has been the topic of numerous articles, books, and
dissertations around the globe.1

1

Roger Burggraeve, Lévinas: Une bibliographie primaire et secondaire (1929-1985) avec complément
1985 -1989 (Leuven: Peeters, 1990), 11. Burggraeve’s book gives an excellent primary and secondary
bibliographical resource on Emmanuel Levinas up to the year 1989. For a comprehensive primary and
secondary sources on Levinas to the present, see data base online at http://www.uvh.nl/levinas/

2

Elements of his biographical details2 tell us that he was born on January 12, 1906
in Kovno, Lithuania. He was raised in a Jewish family and his parents were committed
members of a significant Jewish community well-known for its inflexibility in the
practice of Judaism. During the First World War, his family was forced to immigrate to
Kharkov, Ukraine, and then back again after the German defeat. Levinas’s intellectual
career began with his studies in philosophy in Strasbourg, France in 1923. From that
moment his entire life was connected to a number of French intellectuals of the twentieth
century such as Charles Blondel, Henri Carteson, Maurice Halbwachs, Maurice Pradines,
and Maurice Blanchot.3
Between 1928-1929 he made a research trip to Freiburg, Germany, and studied
under Husserl and later under Husserl’s successor, Martin Heidegger. Having obtained
his license in philosophy, Levinas began his study of Husserl’s Logical Investigations,
and wrote his thesis on La théorie de l’intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl
(1930). Martin Heidegger, however, had a great impact on Levinas through his teaching
and work, especially Being and Time. He placed Heidegger in the ranks of Plato and
Kant; even though in his first essay, “De l’évasion,” published in 1935, he will attempt to
distance himself from Heidegger’s notion of Being.4

2

For a full-length biography of Emmanuel Levinas, see Salomon Malka, Emmanuel Levinas: la vie et la
trace (Paris: J-C Lattès, 2002) and Marie-Anne Lescourret, Emmanuel Lévinas (Paris: Flammarion, 1994).
The bibliographical notes presented here are representative of works consulted from the following sources:
Emmanuel Levinas, “Signature,” in Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, translated by Seán Hand
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990), 291-295; Adriaan Theodor Peperzak, Beyond: The
Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1997), 1-6; Michael
B. Smith, Toward the Outside: Concepts and Themes in Emmanuel Levinas (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 2005), 1-16; Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi, eds, The Cambridge Companion To
Levinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), xv-32.
3
Peperzak, Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, 1.
4
Peperzak, Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, 1-2.

3

Both Husserl and Heidegger can be seen to have influenced Levinas's first two
major publications: Existence and Existents (1947), and En Découvrant l'existence avec
Husserl et Heidegger (1949). Furthermore, Levinas became influential in France for his
translations of Husserl and Heidegger into French. It is widely agreed that he was
responsible for the introduction of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenology to France.
Following his marriage and naturalization as a French citizen (1930) – and after
his military service in Paris – Levinas worked at Ecole Normale Israélite Universelle, a
Jewish organization that prepared teachers for the Alliance Israélite Universelle, where he
was appointed the director. During World War II (1940), he was a prisoner of war in a
German camp along with the other French officers of his regiment. During his time in the
military prisoners’ camp, he served as an interpreter of Russian and spent most of his
time reading and discussing Hegel, Proust, Diderot, Rousseau, and others while tragically
most members of his family in Lithuania were assassinated by the Nazis.5 Levinas,
though Jewish, was protected by the French uniform, and was not exterminated along
with six million other Jews. This memory of the Holocaust has always played a major
role in his thinking, and was without a doubt a causal issue in his long-lasting concern for
the primacy of the ethical relation to the other person.
In his book, Existence and Existents (1947), Levinas manifestly asserted the need
for a thought beyond ontology, opposing ipso facto Heidegger’s thought that aimed at
transcending the metaphysics of beings to Being. He points to another transcendence, the
Good, which commands a movement beyond the limits of Being. It was not until the late

5

Peperzak, Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, 2.

4

1950’s and early 1960’s that he began to develop his own philosophy - critiquing
Heidegger, prior phenomenologists and Western thinking in general.6
Levinas’s explicit critique of Heidegger’s project is presented in his 1951 article,
“L’ontologie est-elle fondamentale?” His essay, “Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity,”
published in 1967, was an appropriation of the concept of infinity from Descartes,
anticipating many of the theses he later developed in Totalité et Infini: Essai sur
l’extériorité (1961), (Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, 1963). With the
publication of Totalité et Infini, Levinas established his philosophical and global fame
which led to invitations and the publication of a great number of philosophical papers. He
taught philosophy at the University of Poitiers in 1961 and at the University of ParisNanterre in 1967. In 1973 he moved to Paris VI (Sorbonne), and became an honorary
professor in 1976. The publication of Totalité et Infini: Essai sur l’extériorité, 1961
constituted the turning point of his philosophy. In this book, he suggested a new
orientation in phenomenology and in the whole history of European philosophy, from
Parmenides to Heidegger. He criticized Western civilization for its dependency on Greek
philosophy that laid too much emphasis on the thinking subject and encouraged a system
of totalization. He proposed to go beyond the conventional and ethically Western
totalization, and addressed the problematic of ontology by analyzing the self-other
relation. The other is not known as such, but calls into question and confronts the selfrighteousness of the self through desire, language, and the concern for justice. Ethics for
Levinas begins with the encounter with the other while maintaining that such a relation
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cannot be simply reduced to a symmetrical relationship. It cannot be localized historically
or temporally.7
Furthermore, Levinas asserted that ethics calls into question the “Same.” Here, the
encounter with the other has no empirical basis as an event or non-event in linear time,
nor is there a “self” that exists a priori to the encounter which may choose to avoid the
traumatic experience of alterity. The encounter, a discovery of alterity in itself, is an
original and essential moment through which the self comes into being – it precedes
freedom and determinism, action and passivity. This encounter has always taken place
already, and its terms make up a central paradox in Continental philosophy.
Levinas’s second major book, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence
(Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence) was published in 1974. This book asserts
Levinas’s intention for a philosophy that goes beyond ontology, using Plato’s
categorization of the Good as beyond the ousia. Suddenly new descriptions are given,
which are entirely absent from Totalité et Infini. The relation between the other and self is
explored in terms of asymmetrical proximity, vulnerability, responsibility, substitution,
hostage, obsession, and persecution; and the concept of Time is carefully examined as
fundamental diachrony. The other the subject encounters is both the other human being
and God. Yet, Levinas’s God is never present in the time of history; his God always
passes by into an immemorial past, a passing that leaves a trace from which the human
other emerges as primary command.8
The postwar years were marked by his meeting with the Talmudic scholar
Monsieur Chouchani, with whom he studied. These studies resulted in a series of five
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volumes of Talmudic readings. The last of these readings, Nouvelles Lectures
Talmudiques, appeared shortly after his death. At the time Levinas was writing this work
he was actively involved with the Colloque des Intellectuels Juifs de Langue Française,
and the majority of his Talmudic studies originate in lectures he presented there. His
Talmudic commentaries include Quatre lectures Talmudiques (1968), Du sacré au saint
(1977), and L'au-delà du verset (1982). Levinas published a great deal of other books
and articles before his death on Christmas day of the year 1995, after a long period of
illness. The funeral oration, ‘Adieu’, was given by Jacques Derrida at the funeral on 28
December 1995.
The biographical details presented above show that Levinas developed his ethical
philosophy by challenging the phenomenological method that attempts to understand
human experience in terms of rationality. It is an approach that limits an analysis into
human experience on consciousness and denies any significant relationship with
something beyond self-consciousness. Obviously, at the start, Levinas’s critique seems
problematic. How does reason prevent relationship beyond consciousness? The answer to
this critical question could be found in the tradition that originates in Descartes and Kant,
even though it takes proper shape in Husserl and Heidegger. Since Levinas’s philosophy
begins from his critique of this tradition, it is in order to begin this study with a review of
the metaphysical and phenomenological tradition. Here this work will focus only on
Descartes and Kant as it will address Husserl’s and Heidegger’s occupation with
phenomenology later on in the chapter.

7

René Descartes and Rational Subjectivity
Descartes begins his study of rational subjectivity by trying to distance himself
from the philosophical tradition before him that presented the unity between thinking and
being as the ultimate philosophical question. He starts his Meditations by questioning all
that can convincingly be questioned with the hope to establish a solid philosophical
foundation upon which will be based all future philosophical knowledge. Descartes
launches his inquiry into rational subjectivity by wondering whether things are as they
appear. Is it possible that human perception of reality might as well be images in a
dream? And if so, is it not also right to wonder whether what comes to human perception
might not be as it appears. This for Descartes could be an obstacle to the rational inquiry
into the philosophy of knowledge.9
Furthermore, having posited this fundamental doubt, Descartes realizes that the
existence of the being who doubts is a prerequisite for the meaningfulness of the
fundamental doubt. For in order for a being to think, one thing must be true: this being
must exist. The implication is that one cannot meaningfully claim that he/she doubts that
he/she exists without first existing. Hence, for Descartes, the existence of a being who
doubts can be said to be a claim beyond doubt. Now, for Descartes, this being who
doubts is the same that understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also
imagines and has sensory perceptions. And all these faculties that are active within the
mind of this being are called acts of thinking or ideas.10 Now these acts of thinking and
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the being that make them possible constitute what Descartes calls rational subjectivity
(ego cogito). Rational subjectivity is a world of self-centeredness in which a thinking
subject is in control and nothing other than the self can exist. This is an ideal world, a
world constituted through the act of the thinking subject and in which the ideas that
belong to this subject appear to be like the world of sensible experience. Descartes,
however, later argues that the foundation of philosophical knowledge requires the
existence of another world apart from the ideal world of the thinking subject, because the
task of philosophical knowledge is to determine the exact relationship between these two
worlds.11
Having posited the concept of rational subjectivity – constituted by a thinking
subject and the field of its ideas – Descartes will now attempt to establish a proof for the
independent existence of infinite being. In this process, he begins by exploring the ideas
that belong to the mind of this thinking subject. These ideas may be considered in two
ways. First is to take them formally or actually as ideas and second is to examine the
object in them.12 For him, “in so far as the ideas are considered simply as modes of
thought, there is no recognizable inequality among them: they all appear to come within
me in the same fashion.”13 Furthermore, “in so far as different ideas are considered as
images which represent different things, it is clear that they differ widely.”14 Obviously,
there is in Descartes’ view a conviction that objects in ideas fall into three metaphysical
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classes: the ideas of modes or accidents, the ideas of finite substances, and the idea of an
infinite substance.15
Now, for Descartes the idea of an infinite substance is more perfect than the ideas
of modes and finite substance, because “something cannot arise from nothing, and also
that what is more perfect – that is, contains in itself more reality – cannot arise from what
is less perfect.”16 This means that the effect of a cause can never have more reality than
its cause. Thus, necessarily, the objective reality in the ideas of a mode and finite
substance, originate from the idea of the infinite substance. Hence, “the cause of a finite
substance must be a finite substance or an infinite substance. It cannot be a mode,
because a mode contains less reality than a finite substance. Since this maxim is true for
things taken formally, Descartes thinks, it must also be true for objects in ideas.”17
Descartes’ argument reaches its climax when he addresses the issue of the
possible cause of the idea of God in the thinking subject. This possible cause, for
Descartes, has to be traced in the infinite substance, which must exist formally in order to
cause an idea of an infinite substance taken objectively. And this would suggest that God
must exist. Besides, the only way one can possess the idea of God is for God to have put
this idea in one’s mind.18 Descartes writes: “It is true that I have the idea of substance in
me in virtue of the fact that I am a substance; but this would not account for my having
the idea of an infinite substance, when I am finite, unless this idea proceeded from some
substance which really was infinite.”19 So, one’s awareness of one’s inability to
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comprehend God, that is, one’s awareness of one’s rational limits – its finitude – requires
that the idea of God be prior to the idea of oneself. The existence of an idea that contains
more objective reality than the finite substance indicates the presence of an idea that the
finite substance could not have created for itself, as this idea could only originate from an
infinite being that must actually exist. Now, since God exists, the idea of God has to be
prior in the subject to the subject’s idea of him/herself. Levinas comes up with a more
radical conclusion than Descartes. For Levinas, as Beavers argues, “the impossibility of
thinking completely the idea of an infinite substance along with the desire to do so
indicates that an encounter with this infinite substance must be prior to my act of
thinking.”20 That is why the idea of face-to-face encounter with the other person in
Levinas precedes the entire order of knowledge. Levinas writes:
In the access to the face there is certainly also an access to the idea of God. In
Descartes the idea of the Infinite remains a theoretical idea, a contemplation, a
knowledge. For my part, I think that the relation to the Infinite is not a knowledge,
but a Desire. I have tried to describe the difference between Desire and need by
the fact that Desire cannot be satisfied; that Desire is like a thought which thinks
more than it thinks, or more than what it thinks. It is a paradoxical structure,
without doubt, but one which is no more so than this presence of the Infinite in a
finite act.21
To the extent that desire cannot be satisfied in Levinas’s metaphysical desire for the
otherness of the other, he is indebted to Descartes’ idea of infinity. The idea of infinity in
Descartes is eternal, that is, knows no end.22 In both Descartes and Levinas, this idea is
in the thinking subject (ego cogito), transcending the ego cogito’s isolation. Thus, in the
Meditations, Descartes engages in the study of the philosophy of knowledge of the
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known world by first examining the relationship between a finite and infinite being. This
is the insight that Levinas would recognize, but which Kant, Husserl and Heidegger
would fall short of identifying.23
Immanuel Kant and the Phenomenal World
At the starting point of Kant’s philosophical project – like Descartes’ – is the
conviction that the discovery of rational subjectivity necessitates the acceptance of
idealism. Yet, Kant does not share Descartes’ idea of the isolated mind that does not
assume the existence of a prior categorical experience. At the onset of Kant’s
philosophical project is the reception of idealism which – for him – seems to necessitate a
proof for the existence of an external world. He asks a question: how is the experience of
objects possible? Kant answers this question by calling on the concepts of categories,
which must be presupposed prior to experience. For Kant, the ego utilizes the concepts of
categories to systematize objects within experience and constitute them in their
relationship with one another. In so doing, the ego makes objects ready to be known prior
to any experience of them as objects.24
Kant’s recognition that objects have to be prearranged for experience by the ego
situates him on the brink of one of the most important findings in the history of
philosophy, namely, that the real is phenomenal. For him, the world that is known is only
the world of objects as they appear in experience. As any conjecture to what must be the
case apart from experience is impossible, Kant is convinced that Descartes’ proof for the
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existence of God is problematic, because it employs the category of cause and effect
beyond the realm of appearances.25
With this issue about the origin of the concept of causality, Kant begins his
Copernican revolution in philosophy by conceiving a relationship between sensibility and
understanding that constitutes a key element about the problem of knowledge. For Kant,
“objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields intuitions; they are
thought through the understanding, and from the understanding arise concepts.”26 Thus,
for Kant “sensible intuition is the means by which an object, derived from sensation, is
situated in immediate relation to knowledge.”27 Concepts such as causality, Kant would
argue, are not drawn from experience, “but sprang from the pure understanding.”28
Hence, Kant’s assertion in Critique of Pure Reason that knowledge is two-fold,
comprised both of what human beings receive through their sense impressions and of
what their own faculty of knowledge provides from itself. Kant calls the first aspect of
knowledge that derives from experience, a posteriori, and the aspect of knowledge that
our faculty of knowledge supplies from itself, a priori, that is to say, knowledge
completely autonomous of all experience.29
This concept of a priori led Kant to reconceive fundamentally the relationship
between the subject and knowledge, between the knower and the process of knowing. For
Kant, as Robert Manning argues, “the mind is not only the passive recipient of sense
impressions, but it supplies to sense impressions its own a priori structures, and
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‘supplies’ them in the sense that sense impressions are experienced through these a priori
structures.”30 Yet, Kant also admits the limit of this a priori knowledge to know external
things in themselves. He writes,
...objects in themselves are quite unknown to us, and that what we call outer
objects are nothing but mere representations of our sensibility, the form of which
is space. The true correlate of sensibility, the thing in itself, is not known, and
cannot be known, through these representations; and in experience no question is
ever asked in regard to it.31
But Kant’s concept of a priori knowledge or Copernican Revolution in Philosophy, as
Manning has interestingly noted, separated human subjectivity to whatever it came into
contact with but that was exterior to it, its other. But Kant would try to break this gap in
his book, Critique of Practical Reason, but in the end the chasm proved difficult to be
bridged.32 The rift between the subject and its other, not only was manifest in Kant’s
work, it also gave the entire continental philosophy its fundamental challenge, namely,
trying to overcome Kant’s chasm between subject and object.33 The greatest challenge to
Kant’s notion of the rift between subject and object came from the German philosophers
Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger.34 Husserl takes Kant seriously and
creates the phenomenological method to explain consciousness by redefining the world in
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terms of experience only. The following section will consider carefully Husserl’s and
Heidegger’s occupation with phenomenology as it provides the impetus for
understanding Levinas’s own philosophical project.
II. An Overview of Edmund Husserl’s and Martin Heidegger’s Occupation with
Phenomenology
As one cannot begin to consider Levinas’s philosophy without acknowledging the
phenomenological tradition within which his thought emerges, it is necessary to
understand Levinas’s relationship to these two great phenomenologists. Levinas has
always insisted that – despite fundamental differences from Husserl and Heidegger – his
philosophy from the beginning follows in the phenomenological tradition of these great
mentors. About Husserl, he comments:
Husserl brought a method to philosophy. It consists in respecting the intentions
which animate the psyche and the modalities of appearing which conform to
these intentions, modalities which characterize the diverse beings apprehended by
experience. It consists in discovering the unsuspected horizons within which the
real is apprehended by representative thought but also apprehended by concrete
pre-predicative life, beginning with the body (innocently), beginning with culture
(perhaps less innocently).35
In Freiburg between 1928 and 1929 he had studied under Edmund Husserl and Martin
Heidegger. In 1930, he published the first book on Husserl in French and in 1932 the first
substantial article in French on Heidegger’s philosophy, and he collaborated on the
French translation of Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (1931). Levinas dedicated much of
his early philosophical career to explicating the work and significance of his German
teachers. This study will look at Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological reduction and
Heidegger’s critique of representational consciousness. In this way, this work will be able
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to explain why Levinas takes issue with Husserl and Heidegger, account for his
association with phenomenology and explain his steady development of a postphenomenological ethics which differentiates itself in opposition to the philosophy of
Husserl and Heidegger.
Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Reduction
Many attempts were made in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to address
the Kantian dilemma of the gap between subject and object. From the very beginning,
Husserl shared Kant’s ideal of making philosophy scientific, yet he distances himself as
far as possible from Kant’s preoccupation with the independent existence of the external
world. Husserl insists that his writings “…are attempts at genuinely executed
fundamental work on the immediately envisaged and grasped things; and even where
they proceed critically, they do not lose themselves in discussions of standpoint, but
rather leave the last word to the things themselves and to the work on them.”36
Husserl’s phenomenological method took shape with his publication of Ideas
Concerning Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy in 1913. In this
book, he intended a phenomenology filtered of all claims about reality other than that of
intentional consciousness.37 He alludes to the blossoming apple tree in the garden to
elucidate the notion of intentionality.38 For him, the notion of intentionality asserts that
all consciousness is a consciousness of something and that all mental acts have an object.
Husserl’s goal has been to give an absolutely secure philosophical foundation to
the natural sciences, and this could only be provided – Husserl would argue – by a strict
36
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reflection on what science does not normally question, that is, the role of the perceiving
consciousness in the constitution of the perceived world. Husserl could not, as Levinas
puts it, accept as unquestionable the natural attitude of scientific realism, that is, the
presumption that the world as we experience it exists outside and independently from
consciousness.39
Against this natural attitude, Husserl proposes the methodological innovation he
called phenomenological reduction, or transcendental reduction, or the epoché. What
exactly is Husserl’s phenomenological reduction? Husserl’s phenomenological reduction
is the bracketing of all questions about the reality of things outside consciousness. This
includes the existence of the external world, and – significantly – the existence of other
consciousnesses. Thus, Husserl’s expression to return “to the things themselves” became
to return to the consciousness of the subject that is always consciousness of something.
Phenomenology is no longer only the science of phenomena in themselves but also the
science of ‘pure consciousness.’40 In other words, for Husserl, as Michael Purcell argues,
“before ever there is a differentiation into a subject and an object, there is, on the
‘subjective side’, a consciousness which is never other than a consciousness of, and, on
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the ‘objective side,’ an object which is only ever perceived as. This is described in the
terms of intentionality.”41
For Husserl, thought is never without an object, and consciousness always intends
something other than itself; it transcends itself. “Intentionality is for Husserl, a genuine
act of transcendence and the very prototype of any transcendence.”42 By emphasizing
consciousness as a realm of absolute existence, Husserl rises above those who question
and doubt the correspondence of knowing and known. For Levinas, Husserl’s affirmation
of consciousness as always a consciousness of and as an absolute existence, articulates
both the unquestionable and definite character of the cogito.43 This underscores a key and
significant distinction between Husserl and Descartes. Descartes takes for granted the
self-evidence of consciousness, but falls short of cross-examining its sources. Purcell
remarks:
Thus, in the Cartesian schema there is the move from the absolute existence of
consciousness to the existence of God, whose veracity guarantees the evidence of
the senses, and thereafter to the existence of the world which offers itself to
consciousness through the senses. The cogito is the foundation from which all
else follows. For Husserl, however, consciousness is always and already
consciousness of…and always and already implicates the existence of a world.
Thus, unlike Descartes, existence does not follow from a cogito, but rather
existence allows a cogito.44
While Husserl reduces the entire world to human subjectivity, Descartes goes beyond
subjectivity toward the infinite as the creator of the entire universe, even of the
phenomenal world. The ego creates its world in an act of world-constitution. In this act,
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the entire world is reduced to subjectivity.45 Husserl writes, “this reduction to my
transcendental sphere of particular ownness or to my transcendental concrete I-myself, by
abstraction from everything that transcendental constitution gives me as Other, has an
unusual sense… I ‘alone’ remain.”46 The effect of this reasoning is that one
consciousness also represents the ‘sense’ of the other person as one who is able to
experience the world.
Husserl, by positing the subject’s intentional consciousness as that which defines
the other makes this other dependent on the subject. The other, in this intersubjective
relationship, is considered present simply in an “objective sense” and constituted as “copresent;” because the other’s coming into the world is contingent to the subject’s
intentionality. For Husserl, the other person is not the extra-mental other; it is my
consciousness that makes present the other person there. He/she is not him/herself there
and can never become a him/herself-there.47 Thus, in Husserl’s analysis of human
experience and the constitution of meaning the existential status of objects apart from
experience is irrelevant. By implication, the other human person has no role and is
irrelevant to the meaning of life, except that in his/her relationships with the subject in the
world, he/she is constituted by the subject’s intentionality. So for Husserl, the
experienced world and all exterior objects depend on the subject’s consciousness. It is the
subject’s very act of knowing that establishes the objects as objects, since they are only
objects for consciousness. Hence, in the formation of meaning, the subject only relies on
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his/her consciousness, since no object precedes knowledge. Meaning is entirely the result
of the subject’s action.48
Levinas commends Husserl for taking philosophical discourse away from a
naturalist conception of being toward a phenomenological one. In the naturalist
conception of being, “being and its categories are ascribable only to objects in the known
world, much as Kant’s categories were.”49 According to Levinas, Husserl’s main
contribution has been his discovering of the crucial and basic distinction between being
qua consciousness and being qua thing.50 In Husserl’s phenomenological turn, Levinas
sees a prospect for a movement from the theory of knowledge to the theory of being.51
For him, Husserl’s phenomenology had the merit of defining subjectivity’s intrinsic
ontological value and his/her inherent meaning. The subject’s existence and experience is
what defines his/her significance in life. This is the main goal of Husserl’s
phenomenological reduction, that is, to present humans with their authentic identity. Yet
this presentation, for Levinas, remains inadequate as it mostly focuses on a merely
contemplative and speculative view of life but different from it.52 Levinas also recognizes
as implicit in Husserl’s theoretical and cognitive dimension of intentionality the notion of
knowledge, which focuses on an analysis of cognitive life, but yet does not exhaust all of
life. Husserl’s non-theoretical acts that are constitutive of objects open up to a new and
irreducible ontological structure.53 There are, therefore, in Husserl’s thought
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fundamentals that seem to open up a more affluent concept of existence than a simple
presence of an object to contemplative consciousness.54
Levinas also notes, however, the incompleteness of Husserl’s thought, because it
takes all relationships to function in a theoretical and intentional manner. The abstract
nature of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, according to Levinas, stems from his
vacillating conception of consciousness. While Husserl’s phenomenological reduction,
Levinas argues, may not have the intention of being merely theoretical or speculative, but
seeks to discover our truly concrete life, nevertheless, it falls short of grasping the
contradiction in the idea of pure immanence and the fact that consciousness will need a
world in order to exist.55 Levinas sees in Husserl’s “indecision or rather obscurity in the
relation between hyle and noesis, that the reduction seems to be a return to a
consciousness without the world in which the world would have to be constituted on the
basis of a pure hyle, a type of abstraction in which one seems to see a revival of the
sensationalist theses.”56 Here Husserl reduces consciousness to knowing and as a result
takes it away from the concrete life as it is lived. Levinas writes:
There is another reason why the phenomenological reduction, as we have
interpreted it so far, does not reveal concrete life and the meaning that objects
have for concrete life. Concrete life is not the solipsist’s life of a consciousness
closed upon itself. Concrete being is not what exists for only one consciousness.
In the very idea of concrete being is contained the idea of an intersubjective
world. If we limit ourselves to describing the constitution of objects in an
individual consciousness, in an ego, the egological reduction can be only a first
step toward phenomenology. We must also discover ‘others’ and the
54
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intersubjective world. A phenomenological intuition of the life of others, a
reflection by Einfühlung opens the field of transcendental intersubjectivity and
completes the work of the philosophical intuition of subjectivity. Here again, the
problems of the constitution of the world will arise.57
Levinas criticizes Husserl because his philosophy of the phenomenological reduction
leaves unidentified the pre-conditions of the phenomenological reduction. He writes
[D]espite the revolutionary character of the phenomenological reduction, the
revolution which it accomplishes is, in Husserl’s philosophy, possible only to the
extent that the natural attitude is theoretical. The historical role of the reduction
and the meaning of its appearance at a certain moment of existence are, for him,
not even a problem.58
In other words, as Beavers affirms, “Levinas’s philosophy is directed precisely at the preconditions for the reduction. Prior to the intentional relation, that is, prior to thought,
unfolds another kind of meaning that Husserl neglects”59 – namely – the intersubjectivity
and responsibility for the other. To be sure Levinas reproaches Husserl for his
intellectualism and for his abstraction of consciousness from history. Husserl’s
transcendental ego looks at the raw matter of life from a disinterested, uninvolved,
ahistorical position. Consciousness is sovereign, responsible only to itself, and free.60
Martin Heidegger comes to the rescue of Edmund Husserl by trying to extend Husserl’s
phenomenological reduction to the constitution of human existence rather than restraining
it himself to the subject’s intentional consciousness. Yet he too, in Levinas’s estimation,
will not go far enough.61
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Heidegger and Representational Consciousness
So far we have seen that the key to Husserl’s phenomenology lies in its
denunciation of the natural attitude and its reducing human experience to the experience
of the objects. Husserl takes this stance because of his firm commitment to the doctrine of
intentionality. Intentionality is, for him, the characteristic activity of consciousness as it
constitutes itself in relation to the world. The division between object and subject can be
regarded as one of the ways in which consciousness makes the world intelligible to itself.
The world is understood as a compilation of objects thus constituted by the intentional
power of consciousness. Here Husserl reduces the world to the transcendental ego.62
Heidegger reacts to Husserl’s phenomenological reduction by raising a
fundamental ontological question of metaphysics in his unprecedented book, Being and
Time. He asks: What is the meaning of Being in general? Heidegger’s effort is geared
towards redefining phenomenology in terms of Being.63 For him, phenomenology is “a
method of ‘intuitive grasping’ of things in their being, a way in which the being of things
could be wrested away from their disclosure and hiddenness and laid bare.”64 This, for
Heidegger, is nothing other than what Husserl expresses in the maxim to the things
themselves. Heidegger believes that Husserl’s maxim, to the things themselves, that is, to
the things as they are constituted by and in consciousness, means to the things as they
actually are in their being;65 because Husserl’s objects of consciousness are, first and
foremost, the beings that one meets in the world. Heidegger therefore posits the meaning
of Being in general as the prerequisite for understanding particular beings or entities or
62

Beavers, Levinas Beyond the Horizons of Cartesianism, 26.
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York:
Harper and Row, 1962), 49-50.
64
Manning, Interpreting Otherwise than Heidegger, 178. See Heidegger, Being and Time, 61.
65
Manning, Interpreting Otherwise than Heidegger, 177-178.
63

23

what it means for them to exist.66 This issue has been – for Heidegger – the major failure
of the entire philosophical tradition including Kant, that is, “to master the basic problem
of Being.”67 Now, the right way to understand being, Heidegger asserts, is to begin with
the examination of the Dasein. In his philosophical discourse Being and Time, Heidegger
offers an existential ontology of selfhood as Dasein (being-there) – the concretely
existing human being who is there – as part of a world. He writes:
We are ourselves the entities to be analyzed. The Being of any such entity is in
such case mine. These entities, in their Being, comport themselves towards their
Being. As entities with such Being, they are delivered over to their own Being.
Being is that which is an issue for every such entity.68
For Heidegger, Dasein exists as an entity which in each case I myself am. What I myself
am or, what Heidegger calls Mineness, is constitutive of any existent Dasein as that
which make Dasein’s two modes of existence – authenticity and inauthenticity –
possible.69 Furthermore, in Dasein’s original disclosedness as Being-in-the-world, one is
thrust into the ontological contingency of “Being-in” a milieu and “Being-with” others
and with-oneself, which underlies all participation, engagement and concrete
involvement with the world that is given in a person’s immediate preoccupations and
concerns. Thus, the world itself is constitutive of Dasein’s Being, and Dasein finds itself
in the world and is affected by it. Dasein is thrown into the world as being-in-the-world.
The state of being thrown is an indispensable a priori, yet insufficient for totally
establishing Dasein's Being.70
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Heidegger’s conception of Dasein as always already Being-in-the world, as an
entity concerned about its Being and as a Being who understands the Being of entities
enables him to argue that Dasein is to be examined prior to any effort to express its Being
as ‘rational animal.’ Human beings are first and foremost concerned about their existence
before the search for knowledge and its achievement in representation which are
expressions of their fundamental concern about existence.71 Thus, for Heidegger, prior to
the introduction of the categories of subject and object in knowledge there is a
relationship between Dasein and its world. It is from this relationship that Dasein’s Being
as concern and his characterization of knowing as a mode of Being takes shape. Dasein is
principally a Being who acts and only secondarily a Being who knows. Now, the entities
Dasein encounters in its world are significant in so far as they are useful to Dasein for
some reason or another.72 In a way, for Heidegger, “such entities are not thereby objects
for knowing the ‘world’ theoretically; they are simply what gets used, what gets
produced, and so forth.”73
Significant here is the fact that Heidegger – while accepting what his
predecessors, Descartes, Kant, and Husserl, have to say about the characterization of
reason since it is in reason that Dasein’s world comes to a substantial existence as the
world of subjects and objects – distances himself from his predecessors on the
understanding of knowledge. Knowing, for Heidegger, “is founded upon Being-in-theworld, and this means that the world is given in knowledge even if it cannot be conceived
and taken up as a theme.”74 Thus, where Husserl limits representation within the
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parameters of the transcendental ego Heidegger argues that “prior to representing
realities, the human being dwells in the world… knowing is but one way in which the
human being exhibits this concern” in the context of life.75 While Heidegger inherits
“from Husserl the method and means of uncovering the transcendental conditions of
knowledge”76 he deems it possible only “by the opaque drama of a concrete existence in
a concrete history which cannot be mastered by theoretical evidence.”77
Levinas’s discussion with Heidegger has to be understood within the context of
Husserl’s phenomenological reduction. Most of Levinas’s critique of Husserl is in every
respect Heideggerian, even though he had in the same time published anti-Heideggerian
studies.78 Levinas reproaches Husserl for his intellectualism and for his abstraction of
consciousness from history. He discovers in Heidegger a philosophy entirely engaged in
the world, in experience and desire, which replaces the Husserlian terms of noesis and
noema (acts and objects of consciousness) with the Heideggerian vocabulary of history,
world, and dereliction or thrown-ness.79
In a couple of articles, however, Levinas began to express discontent with
Heidegger’s work by questioning and contesting the primacy of ontology.80 Heidegger –
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Levinas contends – seems to maintain the supremacy of the same over the other. He does
not destroy it, but rather he characterizes a whole current of Western thought. Dasein that
Heidegger puts in the place of the soul, of consciousness, of the Ego, retains the structure
of the same.81 In order to avoid reproducing this primary presumption of Western
philosophy, Levinas began to build up his own philosophy in which his debts to
Heidegger do not prevent him from suggesting that we must leave Heidegger’s thought
behind. In the introduction to From Existence to Existents (De l’existence à l’existant),
Levinas writes:
If at the beginning our reflections are in large measure inspired by the philosophy
of Martin Heidegger, where we find the concept of ontology and of the
relationship which man sustains with Being, they are also governed by a profound
need to leave the climate of this philosophy [le climat de cette philosophie], and
by the conviction that we cannot leave it for a philosophy that would be preHeideggerian.82
Furthermore, in the article “De la description à l’existence,” he questions Heidegger’s
ontology with the following questions: Is the relation of man to Being uniquely ontology?
Does ontology exhaust the possibilities of relationship with Being, or is there something
which exceeds ontology? Does the search for the meaning of Being miss something
which may be even more fundamental?83
In Heidegger’s ontology, Levinas refutes the fact that the relationship between
beings and Being primarily consists in “comprehension or understanding.”84 Heidegger
understands the entities, beings within the horizon of Being. “In so doing, he rejoins the
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‘great tradition of Western philosophy,’ which is to understand ‘the particular, which
alone exists,’ within the context of a knowledge of the universal.”85 Levinas has
expressed himself on this in a rather important manner:
The primacy of ontology for Heidegger does not rest on the truism: “to know an
existent it is necessary to have comprehended the Being of existents.” To affirm
the priority of Being over existents is to already decide the essence of philosophy;
it is to subordinate the relation with someone, who is an existent, (ethical relation)
to a relation with the Being of existents, which, impersonal, permits the
apprehension, domination of existents (a relationship of knowing), subordinates
justice to freedom. If freedom denotes the mode of remaining the same in the
midst of the other, knowledge, where an existent is given by interposition of
interpersonal Being, contains the ultimate sense of freedom. It would be opposed
to justice, which involves obligations with regard to an existent that refuses to
give itself, the other, who in this sense of freedom would be an existent par
excellence. In subordinating every relation with existents to the relation with
Being the Heideggerian ontology affirms the primacy of freedom over ethics.86
For Levinas, Heidegger underestimates ethics or the relation to the other. That is, he
makes it submissive to ontology. This way of understanding existence does not allow
another being (autrui) to present him/herself as he or she is.

Levinas sees in

Heideggerian ontology a penchant which places the relationship with the other to the
relation with being in general. This way of thinking unavoidably set the stage for
attitudes of domination, violence and tyranny.87 This argument has been the source and
center of Levinas’s transcendental ethics of responsibility, from the 1940s until the
publication of Totalité et infini in 1961, and his subsequent works.88 Levinas criticizes
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Heidegger not only because he falls short of appreciating the transcendence of the other,
but also because his notion of being simply ignores the absurdity and the confusion of
mere being-there (in the sense of il y a) and overlooks the dreadfulness of a completely
anonymous existence.89
For Levinas, Heidegger – who “sets out to solve the problem of solipsism” by
grounding knowledge existentially “as one of the many modes of being human”90 – fails
to appreciate the fact that the “contact between the self and the other” [in-the-world]
“cannot occur in reason or in function, but in affectivity, which is ultimately tied to
sensibility.”91
Even though Levinas departs from the tradition of rational subjectivity that began
with Descartes and was clarified by Kant, Husserl and Heidegger he is still within the
horizon of Cartesianism. This insight into how his philosophy is related to Descartes,
Kant, Husserl and Heidegger will enable us to comprehend fully his singular way of
doing phenomenology after the manner of Heidegger rather than Husserl. Yet different
from them, Levinas asserts that knowing takes place always within the context of the
difficile de pardonner à Heidegger.” - “One can forgive many Germans, but there are Germans who it is
difficult to forgive. It is difficult to forgive Heidegger.” (My translation).
89
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intersubjective relation. The issue of the other becomes now the central theme of his
philosophy. Levinas’s philosophical enterprise will then be dominated by one question:
what does it means to think of the other as other? This leads us to the examination of
Levinas’s transcendental ethics of responsibility.
III. Emmanuel Levinas’s Ethics of Responsibility
The previous section of this chapter discussed how the philosophical project of
Levinas developed out of a confrontation with the phenomenological tradition of Western
philosophy. This philosophy, Levinas observes, is dominated by the distinction between
existents and existence and is concentrated on the thinking existence. Levinas reverses
the course and moves it to a new direction: “from existence to the existent and from the
existent to the other, a path which delineates time itself.”92 Levinas seeks to develop a
phenomenological alternative to the ontology of Husserl and Heidegger which reduces
the subject’s relation to otherness to comprehension or understanding. The central task of
Levinas is to attempt to describe a relation with the other person that cannot be reduced to
comprehension. He argues that ethics, that is, intersubjectivity and responsibility for the
other, should replace traditional metaphysics as first philosophy.
In this section, we would like to shed some light on Levinas’s ethics of
responsibility. This exposition will be far from exhaustive, but it will help situate
Levinas’s philosophy within the context of this work. We will begin by looking at
Levinas’s understanding of ethics as first philosophy in order to appreciate that which is
beyond being, the ethical command. The ethical command – which precedes all knowing,
choosing, willing, or even Being – is demanded by the encounter with the other through
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the face, the trace, and the infinite. The encounter with the other calls the ethical subject
to responsibility to the point of substitution, sensibility, hostage, proximity, and
vulnerability. It is this encounter with the other that constitutes the central point of
Levinas’s thought. Indeed, it is only through the ethical command – prior to free choice
and to any ontological thematization – that we experience the trace of the divine other,
God. Furthermore, in order to clarify the relationship between the ethical command
which is diachronic and pre-ontological, and its expression in the thematized world, we
will examine Levinas’s understanding of transcendence and time, the Saying and the
Said, and the third party. In the end, we will establish the impact of Judaism and the
Holocaust on his thought.
Ethics as First Philosophy
Levinas’s thesis, ethics is first philosophy, stems from his resolve to leave the
climate of Husserl’s idealism and Heidegger’s thinking toward the ethical issue of the
meaning of being, obtainable in the face-to-face relation. The essential task of his work
becomes an effort to describe a relation with autrui, the other person that cannot be
abbreviated to knowledge. Autrui is certainly Levinas’s key term in all of his work. It
signifies the human other, the other person who can never be represented in a theme or a
concept in his/her relationship with the subject because he/she is beyond comprehension
of Being.93
Levinas’s philosophy exalts ethics, making the ethical relation the most central
definition of philosophy. Our ethical duty to one another, he maintains, must be
considered first philosophy and the central truth that heads as sovereign over the rest of
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philosophy. The question might then be how does Levinas arrive at this priority of ethical
relation over ontology? The answer has to be found in his understanding of the self –
other relationship.
In Totality and Infinity - which sets his whole philosophical agenda - Levinas
presents how the self first comes to ascertain its identity as the same not only by its
opposition to an other, but from out of its concrete egoism in relation to the world. In this
relation to the world, the egoist self remains free, dominating and mastering what is other
without being determined by it. And the moments in the self’s sojourn in the world in
which it first establishes its identity are, enjoyment, dwelling, labor and possession, and
representation.94 These, for Levinas, are the moments through which the constitution of
the self of interiority and economy are articulated.95 Here, the self gets separated from
totality by retiring to the interiority of a home where everyone is at home: chez soi.
As soon as Levinas introduces the face of the other totality breaks into pieces. The
face of the other plays a central role because “the gleam of exteriority or of
transcendence”96 happens in the face of the other, requiring a new thinking in the face of
the other. Levinas describes the appearance of the absolute other – who is the infinite – in
terms of desire and the face. My relation to the other – he argues – is desire, not need,
because “over him I have no power.”97 One cannot comprehend the other, confine
him/her, and place him/her within a context in order to get a handle on him/her. The other
is ungraspable. The other and self are radically separated from one another. The other
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does not limit the self; the other allows the self to transcend itself to reach to the heights
to be better than it is.98
Ultimately the ethical relationship, for Levinas, does not stem from an individual
conscious choice confronted with the face of the other. Ethics does not first arise in the
context of knowledge and freedom of an intentional consciousness. Ethics precedes
ontology, not in a synchronic, but in a diachronic way. In a diachronic way the face of
the other commands me, prior to any commitment on my part, to responsibility. Levinas
writes:
Responsibility for the Other, for the naked face of the first individual to come
along. A responsibility that goes beyond what I may or may not have done to the
Other or whatever acts I may or may not have committed, as if I were devoted to
the other man before being devoted to myself. Or more precisely, as if I had to
answer for the other’s death even before being. A guiltless responsibility,
whereby I am none the less open to an accusation of which no alibi, spatial or
temporal, could clear me…A responsibility stemming from a time before my
freedom - before my (moi) beginning, before any present…Responsibility from
my neighbor dates from before my freedom in the immemorial past,
unrepresentable past that was never present and is more ancient than
consciousness of…A responsibility for my neighbor, for the other man, for the
stranger or sojourner, to which nothing in the rigorously ontological order binds
me – nothing in the order of thing, of the something, of number or causality. It is
the responsibility of a hostage which can be carried to the point of being
substituted for the other person and demands an infinite subjection of
subjectivity.99
The ethical imperative is so primordial that one always is late in one’s response to the
ethical command of the face that calls one to responsibility. The subject is always first
and foremost “the servant of a neighbor, already late and guilty for being late… [the
subject is structured] from the outside, traumatically commanded, without interiorizing

98
99

Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 187-240.
Levinas, “Ethics as first philosophy,” in The Levinas Reader, 83-84.

33

by representation and concepts the authority that commands him/her.”100 He/she is
always in a state of insomnia/wakefulness (impossibility of sleep), that is, always in
perpetual responsibility for the other.101 One’s responsibility for the other pre-exists any
self-consciousness, and it is unconditional. It is enactive of subjectivity and transcends all
emotional, historical or social unforeseen events which could limit it. The other’s face is
real humanity and carries with it the idea of infinity rather than totality. For Levinas, “the
other becomes my neighbour precisely through the way the face summons me, calls for
me, begs for me, and in so doing recalls my responsibility, and calls me into question.”102
Thus, for Levinas, what constitutes the human person’s very humanity is the concern for
the death of another, not its concern for its own death. The philosophical question par
excellence is no longer “why being rather than nothing, but how being justifies itself.”103
For philosophy to regain its credibility, Levinas argues, it has to substitute ontology with
the ethical relation, for “ethics is not a moment of being; it is otherwise and better than
being, the very possibility of the beyond”104 that points to the Good. Ethics is first
philosophy.
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Ethical Subjectivity: Encounter with the Other, the Face, the Trace, and the Infinite
We established above that Levinas’s ethics as first philosophy was the result of
his determination to distance himself from his mentors who gave priority to the
comprehension of being, making it more central to the definition of philosophy itself than
the ethical relation with the other. This ethical encounter with the other – pre-thematic
and pre-ontological – constitutes the center and principal originality of Levinas’s
analyses. Levinas associates this other with the other person and, in the form of illeity,
with God.105 The other for Levinas is the absolute other that the same/self cannot
comprehend, or place within a context in order to get a handle on him. He or she is
completely ungraspable.
Levinas’s philosophical ethics takes places in the context of non-intentional
consciousness which is a form of mauvaise conscience.106 Mauvaise conscience is the
non-intentional consciousness of the ethical subject, an identity without identity of the
ethical subject, a feeling of never being responsible enough. It is “a fear for all the
violence and murder my existing might generate, in spite of its conscious and intentional
innocence. A fear which reaches back past my ‘self-consciousness’ in spite of whatever
moves are made towards a bonne conscience by a pure perseverance in being.”107 Hence,
ethical subjectivity is understood in terms of an asymmetrical proximity, vulnerability,
responsibility, substitution, hostage, obsession, persecution, maternity, etc. Levinas
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argues that “the other remains infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign; his face in which
his epiphany is produced and which appeals to me breaks with the world that can be
common to us, whose virtualities are inscribed in our nature and developed by our
existence.”108 The other appears to me as the face of the other, the trace and the infinite.
The face, for Levinas, does not just mean the physical and visible face. It exceeds one’s
gaze by which one would objectify it. He writes:
The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in
me, we here name face. This mode does not consist in figuring as theme under my
gaze, in spreading itself forth as a set of qualities forming an image. The face of
the Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me,
the idea existing to my own measure and to the measure of its ideatum – the
adequate idea.109
Here Levinas supports the ethical subject’s relation to a transcendence that is outside of
the system of objectifying thought. This transcendence is that of the face of the other, as
she/he reveals her/himself to me in his/her absolute otherness – which is outside of any
context – because the face of the other never appears to one’s intentional consciousness.
It never appears within the time of history. Yet, it addresses the situation of inhumanity in
history in time that goes contrary to the synchronic time. The other’s face expresses
his/her uncontaminated exposure; his/her mere presence addresses a silent request to the
subject not to kill him/her. The face reveals to the subject the reality of the other human
person in his pure humanity, beyond all the socio-political and economic roles. It calls
into question the insensitivity of the self, and validates the uniqueness of the subject as
that which is irreplaceable in responsibility. The distinctiveness of the subject rests in the
Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 194. (Levinas’s italics). It is important to note that for Levinas “the other
does not purely and simply negate the I; total negation, of which murder is the temptation and the attempt,
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fact that no one can answer for him/her. The face is what is against the violence intrinsic
in the totalization of being in which the other is reduced to the same. It commands the
expression “Thou shall not kill” and calls the ethical subject to exposure and
vulnerability.
A further important element in the understanding of the face is that the other
always meets the ethical subject from an immemorial past, considered as a never-ending
responsibility, otherwise than the time of representation, that calls forth the ethical
subject’s submission to the face of that other who both orders and begs. This face,
Levinas argues, passes away in this unrepresentable time as a trace. He writes:
A face is a trace of itself, given over to my responsibility, but to which I am
wanting and faulty. It is as though I were responsible for his morality, and guilty
for surviving. A face is anachronous immediacy more tense than that of an image
offered on the straightforwardness of intuitive intention. In proximity the
absolutely other, the stranger whom I have “neither conceived nor given birth to,”
I already have on my arms, already bear, according to the Biblical formula, ‘in my
breast as the nurse bears the nurseling.’110
For Levinas, the trace of the other is what is left of the other for us in the other’s absence
– an absence which nothing can reverse as it refers back to what is beyond the face – to
absolute exteriority. The fact that the face is an unrepresentable trace calls forth in
Levinas’s thought the idea of transcendence which goes beyond every closed structure of
totality in which every other relation is linked in terms of either knowledge or power. It is
this transcendence of the ethical relation that Levinas calls the infinite. He writes “the
face of the other in proximity, which is more than representation, is an unrepresentable
trace, the way of the infinite.”111 The question for Levinas is whether or not, beyond
being, a meaning might not show itself whose priority, translated into ontological
110
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language, will be called prior to being.112 Levinas sees in the face of the other, the trace
of God, who is never there. And God – to be sure – is only revealed through his trace. At
this point we might as well ask how precisely this infinite of the other bears the infinity
of God. The answer, for Levinas, has to be found in the ethical subject’s turn to the face
of the other. Thus, “the ethical subject’s responsiveness to the face of the other is always
already a desire for the infinite of God.”113 This desire “is beyond satisfaction, and,
unlike a need, does not identify a term or an end. This endless desire for what is beyond
is dis-interestedness, transcendence – desire for the Good.”114 From this point of view,
God for Levinas “remains near because God’s trace passes in the face of the other. Yet
God is also utterly transcendent calling upon the ethical subject to ‘what is non-desirable,
the undesirable par excellence – the other’ enacted as responsibility for that other.”115
Levinas – as Marie Baird would argue – “posits a sort of a triangular relationship to
divinity mediated through the ethical relation: ‘The goodness of the Good…inclines the
movement it calls forth, to turn it from the obliqueness that goes higher than
straightforwardness’.”116 Levinas asserts:
To be good is a deficit, waste and foolishness in a being; to be good is excellence
and elevation beyond being. Ethics is not a moment of being; it is otherwise and
better than being, the very possibility of the beyond. In this ethical reversal, in this
reference of the desirable to the non-desirable, in this strange mission that orders
the approach to the other, God is drawn out of objectivity, presence and being. He
112
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is neither an object nor an interlocutor. His absolute remoteness, his
transcendence, turns into my responsibility – non-erotic par excellence – for the
other…117
Levinas’s comments are helpful in establishing the fundamental connection between the
face, the trace and the infinite. He affirms the fact that the ethical relation is “the irruption
of God within being, or the bursting out of Being towards God in the desire for the
infinite that is enacted as responsibility for the other.”118 Hence, the absolute otherness of
another, envisioned as absence, communicates to the trace of God in man. “God thus falls
into meaning or comes to the idea in the infinity of an ethical obligation in response to
the face of the other.”119
To be sure, in Levinas, the ethical enactment as bearing the trace of God focuses
on two aspects of God. On the one hand we have “the absolutely transcendent God,
YHWH or the kabbalistic Ein-Sof, who remains completely outside of and unaffected by
the world”120 (God and Philosophy). On the other hand, there is also the immanent God,
Elohim (the kenotic God), “who, like a soul of the world, maintains the existence, light,
power and holiness of the world, in the form of continuous creation.”121 So what we see
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in Levinas’s conception of God is the interplay of these two aspects. Levinas, however,
focuses more on Elohim, the kenosis of God, because of his association with the worlds
and humans. He writes:
[T]here is a privileged relationship between the human soul, the soul of Israel, and
God. There is a connaturality between man and the manifold entirety of creature
on one hand, and a special intimacy between man and Elohim on the other. This
intimacy is characterized both by Elohim’s superiority to man, who is a part of
creation, and by the dependency, intended by Elohim, of Elohim on man with
respect to everything concerning the association of Elohim with the worlds, i.e.,
everything concerning the very existence and devotion of the worlds. Man, by
acting in agreement with the Torah, nourishes the association of God with the
world; or, by his transgression, he exhausts the powers of that divine
association.122
Again, in the same vein he continues:
God associates with or withdraws from the worlds, depending upon human
behavior. Man is answerable to the universe! Man is answerable for others. His
faithfulness or unfaithfulness to the Torah is not just a way of winning or losing
his salvation: the being, elevation and light of the worlds are dependent upon it.
Only indirectly, by virtue of the salvation or downfall of the worlds, does his own
destiny depend on it. As if through that responsibility, which constitutes man’s
very identity, each one of us were similar to Elohim.123
Hence, for Levinas, “the very being of the world is thus dependent upon the model of
ethical responsibility”124 exemplified by the prophet’s answer: ‘Here I am.’ This
prophetic approach is “a moment of the human condition itself” that concerns every
human person; no one is exempt from this moment.125 The subject, therefore, is always
summoned up to a responsibility he/she never bargained for; a responsibility engraved in
the infinity of the face of the other. He/she realizes him/herself in extreme passivity that
conceptualization in the book of Rabbi Haim of Volozhin (1759-1821), Nefesh Hahaim (The Soul of Life).
For more details, see Levinas, “Judaism and Kenosis,” 122-127; Baird, On the Side of the Angels, 78.
122
Levinas, “Judaism and Kenosis,” in In The Time of the Nations, 124-125.
123
Levinas, “Judaism and Kenosis,” in In The Time of the Nations, 125.
124
Baird, On the Side of the Angels, 78.
125
Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 113.

40

precedes and questions all freedom.126 Hence, in the subject’s ethical encounter with the
other, the infinity of the other bears the trace of the infinity of God. And the trace for
Levinas “is not just one more word: it is the proximity of God in the countenance of my
fellowman.”127
The subject is distressed, confronted, called out of its naïve, calculating sleep,
awakened to its injustice and welcomes the other into its world. For Levinas, the ethical
relation of infinite responsibility for the other is that which endorses the human person
into subjectivity itself. He characterizes ethical subjectivity and responsibility as
“maternity in the complete being ‘for the other’ which characterizes it” or “having-theother-in-one’s-skin.”128 As for Levinas humanity at its best is an act rather than a state of
being, human responsibility becomes passivity in action. Thus, to be human is to act
ethically. The human person rightly understood is fundamentally responsible prior to any
commitment in relation to the other human person.
The Temporality of the Ethical Encounter: Transcendence and Time, the Saying and the
Said, and the Third Party.
The foundation of Levinas’s philosophy is the ethical encounter between the moi,
(self) and autrui, (the other). This relation is considered in terms of sensibility,
vulnerability and exposure, proximity, the face, hostage, obsession, trauma, persecution,
substitution, obligation and responsibility. It is within this context that Levinas lays out
his own basic approach concerning the temporality of the ethical encounter and his own
account of its construction and meaning. To talk about the temporality of the ethical
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encounter supposes an understanding of Levinas’s idea of time. The notion of time, in
Levinas’s project, is deep-seated in the asymmetrical straightforwardness of the subjectother relationships, and it constitutes the basic configuration of being. This notion is both
ethical and intersubjective.129 Thus the ethical encounter for Levinas takes place in
atemporal temporality. In this section of the work, we will have a closer look at concepts
such as transcendence, Saying and Said, and the third party in relation to the temporality
of the ethical encounter.
Transcendence and Time
Key to Levinas’s understanding of subjectivity is the notion of separation130
between alterity and the same. It expresses otherness and difference between the subject
and the other, and insists on the fact that the other remains absolutely transcendent and
infinite with respect to the subject. For Levinas, as Michael Purcell comments,
“subjectivity is ‘the-Other-in-me,’ experienced not in itself … but in the responsibility
for-the-other which is provoked and evoked in me.”131 What is at stake in Levinas’s
philosophy is the dimension of alterity of the other human person that has to be
understood in terms of that which exceeds comprehension totally, that which is higher to
the horizons of being, the truth of being, and precedes the grounds of philosophy. Now,
what is higher than being, comprehension, and philosophy is the priority of ethical order
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and the infinite responsibilities that stem from it.132 Hence, the surplus or extra to which
Levinas draws attention in terms of infinity is “transcendent exteriority.”133 What then is
transcendence for Levinas?
The idea of the infinite, for Levinas, has to do with height, nobility, and
transascendence.134 Transcendence, for Levinas, is characterized by a relationship with
the other in his or her verticality. The move toward the other in terms of his or her
verticality introduces the dimension of height, not as principally a position in being, but
an ethical relation.135 Levinas writes:
Transcendence designates a relation with a reality infinitely distant from my own
reality, yet without this distance destroying this relation and without this relation
destroying this distance as it would happen with relations within the same; this
relation does not become an implantation in the other and a confusion with him,
does not affect the very identity of the same, its ipseity, does not silence the
apology, does not become apostasy and ecstasy.136
What really happens in the relation between the self and the other is that the other is
always on high, and his appeal is always by way of command and injunction. Levinas’s
other always presents itself as the absolutely other, the transcendent human other (autrui)
who shows a face and opens a dimension of height, that is to say, it infinitely overflows
the bounds of being and knowledge. And “the epiphany of the Absolute Other is a face
by which the Other challenges and commands me through its nakedness and
destitution.”137 The other challenges the subject from its humility and height, provokes
this ethical movement, disturbs its good conscience with a surplus inadequate to
132
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intentionality. Thus, “because of this inassimilable surplus,” Levinas comments, “we
have called the relation which binds the I to the other (Autrui) the idea of the infinite.”138
The subject is put into question by the other in an elevation, where the subject’s
consciousness finds in itself more than it can contain. Before the other (autrui), the
subject is infinitely responsible.
Levinas’s approach can be called transcendental, better, diachronically
transcendental139 - as Charles Reed argues - because, it “is produced on the basis of
exposure rather than evidence… [and] …operates within a new notion of temporality.”140
Here, temporality is “understood as time opened up by and for the ‘ethical adventure’ of
the relationship to unassimilable, incomprehensible other person.”141 The other who is
totally other has always already transcended, disturbed the imaginary self-centered
totality of the same, in a time that goes contrary to the linear, synchronic time of being
and history. Levinas’s affirmation of the priority of the other takes place in diachronic
temporality.142 It is in this time that the self transcends itself, that the infinite comes to
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pass and that the self is related to the other.143 The encounter between the self and the
other, therefore, takes place in the time of transcendence. This is a time that is not able to
be recovered by memory or represented, known and mastered, for it comes from the
other.
The Saying and the Said
In order to appreciate the nature of responsibility of the subject vis-à-vis the other,
it might be helpful to analyze how Levinas expresses this relationship in terms of the
concept of Saying and the Said. Levinas develops his argument about ethics as first
philosophy by positing the notion of the Saying and the Said (le dire et le dit).144
Alphonso Lingis explains it in these terms:
Levinas several times proceeds by way of language to these positions. In general a
language, the said, is the medium of simultaneity, the field where everything past
or to come can be presented into a system, that establishes togetherness, that
institutes synchrony. Space, the sphere of the simultaneous, is itself a work of
temporalization, constituted and fixed, maintained logos itself is sustained by the
saying that is a relationship with alterity.145
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Here, Levinas inserts the subject’s address to the other into a communication in which the
Saying is already active prior to any Said since the relationship between the Saying and
the Said is not synchronic, but diachronic. “[T]herefore the Saying is beyond the
possibility of thematic exposition in the Said.”146 The Saying can never be reduced to the
Said, and remains beyond the ontological play of being or beyond essence. Saying is “the
pure surplus over evidence, theme and logic. It is the positive production of the other as
other (autrui), and it is this which gives all significations its significance.”147 To illustrate
the connection between Saying and ethical responsibility, Levinas writes:
Saying is a denuding, of the unqualifiable one, the pure someone, unique and
chosen; that is, an exposedness to the other, where no slipping away is possible.
In its sincerity as sign given to another, it absolves me of all identity…This
absolution reverses essence. It is not a negation of essence, but a
disinterestedness, an “otherwise than being” which turns into a “for the other,”
burning for the other, consuming the bases of any position for oneself and any
substantialization which would take form in this consummation, consuming even
the ashes of this consummation, in which there would be a risk that everything be
born again.148
Levinas presents the Saying as that which is prior to its thematization in the Said. The
Saying is the ethical relation, the responsibility the subject has for the other who faces
him or her. By contrast to the Saying, the Said is the realm in which themes are stated and
disclosed. It is the realm of ontology and phenomenology – of what shows itself. The
Said establishes meaning and identification; it is the thematization of meaning and
consciousness, “a statement, assertion or proposition of which the truth or falsity can be
ascertained….One might say that the content of my words, their identifiable meaning, is
the said.”149
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In the relation between the Saying and the Said, however, Levinas is faced with a
difficulty, namely, how to conceptualize the ethical Saying within the ontological Said.
Levinas admits the fact that the Saying, at some point, has to be thematized into ontology
through the Said. Hence, he maintains the interruption of the ethical Saying within the
ontological Said.150 The Said is the thematization of the Saying, without exhausting it in
this thematization. The Saying while entering in the Said maintains its alterity and
diachrony and its primacy of the ethical command. Levinas writes:
When stated in propositions, the unsayable (or the an-archical) espouses the forms
of formal logic; the beyond being is posited in doxic theses, and glimmers in the
amphibology of being and beings – in which beings dissimulate being. The
otherwise than being is stated in a saying that must also be unsaid in order to thus
extract the otherwise than being from the said in which it already comes to signify
but a being otherwise.151
The Saying, which signifies the otherwise than being, is transformed into a Said, which
conveys just a being otherwise. Yet the Saying, ultimately, cannot be contained in or
comprehended by the Said for it exceeds the Said.
In this “ethical event of communication,”152 in which language enables the subject
to approach the neighbor, “the first word says only the saying itself before every being
and every thought in which being is sighted and reflected.”153 Furthermore, in the
responsibility for the other, “the saying in being said at every moment breaks up the
definition of what it says and breaks up the totality it includes.”154 The Saying expresses,
therefore, the moment at which God comes to mind in the trace seen in the face of the
other. This trace comes from an immemorial past, a past which was never present, the
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realm of the Saying, the first Saying. Levinas argues that “the first saying is to be sure but
a word. But the word is God.”155
The Third Party
In the ethical relationship the subject is responsible for the neighbor prior to any
choice, action or decision that would commit the subject to this relationship. It is a
relation prior to freedom. After reviewing the duo self – other, Levinas finds that they
remain undisturbed by concern for the rest of humanity. The ethical subject once only
confronted with the face of the other that called him or her to responsibility, now has also
to take into account the arrival of the third party on the scene.
If proximity ordered me only to the other alone, there would not have been any
problem, in even the most general sense of the term. A question would not have
been born…The responsibility for the other is an immediacy antecedent to
questions, it is proximity. It is troubled and becomes a problem when a third party
enters.156
With the third party Levinas announces the birth of consciousness. He states:
Consciousness is born as the presence of the third party. It is in the measure that it
proceeds from it that it is still disinterestedness. It is the entry of the third party, a
permanent entry, into the intimacy of the face to face. The concern for justice, for
the thematizing, the kerygmatic discourse bearing on the said, from the bottom of
the saying without the said, the saying as contact, is the spirit in society.157
Three main accounts on the role of the third party in Levinas’s philosophical project
suggest that the third party is the place of the passage to justice and human fraternity in
the political sphere.158 In Levinas’s writings, the relationship between ethics and politics
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is announced by this entrance of the third party, le tiers. The other and the third party, my
neighbors, contemporaries of one another, put distance between me and the other and the
third party. He writes:
The third party introduces a contradiction in the saying whose signification before
the other until then went in one direction. It is of itself the limit of responsibility
and the birth of this question: What do I have to do with justice? A question of
consciousness. Justice is necessary, that is, comparison, coexistence,
contemporaneousness, assembling, order, thematization, the visibility of faces,
and thus intentionality and the intellect, and in intentionality and the intellect, the
intelligibility of a system, and thence also a copresence on an equal footing as
before a court of justice.159
Levinas introduces the third party into the face of the other to prevent the complicity of a
private relation. The third party, Levinas argues, as he/she looks at the subject in the eyes
of the other, evokes the language of justice, because the appearance of the other as face
opens humanity. The other’s face in his/her exposure as a face presents to the subject the
misery of the poor one and the stranger.160 Robert Bernasconi expounds upon what this
means:
The face of the other does not ask only for him-or her-self, as if there were only
two of us in the world. My responsibility to the other does not allow me to put
aside my responsibility to the others. However, even if there is thereby already
implied a questioning of my relation to the other – for example, as to whether it is
too exclusive or consuming – Levinas’s focus falls on the way the face to face
provides the basis for an ethical questioning of the political.161
In his own words, Levinas writes: “In the measure that the face of the other relates us
with the third party, the metaphysical relation of the I with the other moves in the form of
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the We, aspires to a State, institutions, laws, which are the source of universality.”162 The
absence of the third party in the subject’s face to face encounter with the other human
person, not only would permit the complicity of private relation, but also would present a
risk of absolving the subject from all his/her commitments and obligations to everyone
else.163 Hence, “the presence of the face, the infinity of the other, is a destituteness, a
presence of the third party (that is, of the whole humanity which looks at us) and a
command that commands commanding.”164
Levinas insists on the fact that this third party is not merely a multiplication of the
other. From the outset the third party is concurrently different from the other, and makes
the subject one among others. This quality or condition of being other is itself primarily
ethical, not merely in a mathematical sense, but in the sense of a relation of demand and
conflict.165 In the confrontation with the third party the other whom the subject is
responsible for is also responsible for another. He writes: “the third party is other than the
neighbor, but also another neighbor, and also a neighbor of the other, and not simply his
fellow…the other stands in relationship with the third party, for whom I cannot entirely
answer, even if I alone answer before any question, for my neighbor.”166
A further aspect with regard the arrival of the third is the use of the word illeity.
Illeity is “that which preserves the specific signifyingness of a trace in each trace of an
empirical passage, over and above the sign it can become.”167 This illeity addresses, for
Levinas, the same issue to which the third party is directed, that is, it prevents a
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possibility of a private relation; yet more than the third, it breaks off the face to face
relationship and initiates justice.168 For Levinas, Bernasconi contends,
Illeity is … not only ‘the fact that the others show themselves in their face.’ Illeity
also has certain ‘indirect ways’ that through ‘the presence of a third party
alongside of the neighbor’ lead one along the path of thematization and
consciousness to that comparison of the incomparable that is necessary for justice
and that is usually assigned to the third person perspective. Illeity is the condition
for irreversibility, the irreversibility of time and of the relation with the Other.169
At the intercession between the ethical and the political, Levinas places the third party or
the interhuman which corresponds to what he calls fraternity.170 Fraternity, for Levinas,
is not motivated by resemblance in human race or biological genus in human society; it is
not an adequate ground upon which to base the subject’s responsibility for the other
human person who is separated from him/her. Because, “the biological human
brotherhood – conceived with the sober coldness of Cain – consists in conceiving
responsibility as proceeding from freedom or in terms of a contract.”171 Rather, fraternity
which Levinas talks about is the way in which the subject’s relation with one human
other already opens up to the relation with other human others. He affirms:
168
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[T]he relation with the face in fraternity, where in his turn the Other appears in
solidarity with all the others, constitutes the social order, the reference of every
dialogue to the third party by which the We – or the party – encompasses the face
to face opposition, opens the erotic upon a social life, all signifyingness and
decency, which encompasses the structure of the family itself.172
The word justice in Levinas’s thought stems from the other’s close relationship with the
third party and it is centered on love. Now, since love calls for justice, the subject’s
relation with the other human person, the neighbor cannot but involve other neighbors or
third parties whom the subject’s neighbor maintains a relationship with.173 One can argue
that the entrance of the third party on the scene in Levinas’s thought is brought about by
his desire to emphasize the relevance of his thought for concrete human community. For
him society must be a fraternal community to be commensurate with the
straightforwardness and the primary proximity in which the face presents itself to one’s
welcome. His thought – as he himself pointed out in the preface of Totality and Infinity –
is a response to a Western philosophical understanding of the human being that has led to
war and to the directly and indirectly oppressive penchant of human institutions.174
Levinas’s philosophy does not hang in the air on the level of spiritual desire, but
rather, challenges empirical situations. Levinas himself describes it in these words: “The
fact that the other, my neighbor, is also a third party with respect to another, who is also a
neighbor, is the birth of thought, consciousness, justice and philosophy.”175 This fact
would be made clearer with the analysis of the impact of the Jewish aspects in Levinas’s
philosophy to which we now turn.
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VI. The Influence of Jewish Aspects in Emmanuel Levinas’s Philosophy
Any attentive reader of Levinas’s work would agree with the fact that Levinas’s
declared philosophical ambition was influenced by his Jewish background and heritage.
He was born in Kovno, one of the places in Lithuania that was the center of Ashkenazi
Jewish learning. “The Lithuanian Jews were famous for their insistence on rigorous
argument, and their contempt for the enthusiastic and charistimatic religiosity with
Hassidism.”176 Most scholars of Levinas seem to note two main sources from which
Levinas draws his inspiration: the experience of Jewish life through his familiarity of the
Hebrew Bible and Greek/European philosophy and literature. Levinas’s life, however,
has also been influenced by the feeling and the remembrance of the Nazi horror. This
section examines the role Jewish thought and the Shoah played in Levinas’s
philosophical project.
Levinas and Judaism
We have noted that Levinas’s work was enriched by the Hebrew Bible and Greek
philosophy. Levinas’s thought is profoundly rooted in Judaism yet it remains
philosophical.

The Jewish aspect of Levinas’s thought is noticeable through his

resistance to Western philosophy expressed through the opposition between Jerusalem
and Athens. Jews are reminded of the conflict each year at the feast of Hanukkah which
celebrates their recurrent and astonishing victory over Hellenic universalism.177 Levinas
expresses this clash on the intellectual level by opposing “the absolute transcendence of
the other person encountered ethically and the relative transcendence of the truth of being
determined as presence, especially as found in the phenomenology of Husserl and
176
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Heidegger.”178 Hence, Jewish aspects in Levinas’s work must clearly be understood in
relation to his critique of Western thought.179 Opposing the primacy of Knowledge,
Levinas proposes an ethical priority that recalls the overall different priority articulated in
the well-known response of the Jewish people at Mount Sinai: “We will do and we will
listen.”180 Thus, as Richard Cohen argues,
Levinas’s entire philosophy can be understood as but another layer of meaning
attached to Sinai, another interpretation – priority of the other, conscientiousness
before consciousness, ethics before reason – exalting and penetrating to the heart
of one of the greatest moments in the religious history of the world.181
Therefore, the Judaism Levinas draws from “is one that speaks to Jews, opens a space for
their difference”182 and then speaks to all humanity. “It is a Judaism … that teaches
humanity its humanism, the absolute transcendence that opens up between people united
ethically.”183 This is a Judaism characterized by the fundamental obligation which we
find in the Jewish Bible, namely, the hineni (here I am) of Abraham. Abraham is offering
himself here to God unreservedly. Levinas speaks of this expression when he writes:
The subjectivity of the subject, as being subject to everything, is pre-original
susceptibility, before all freedom and outside of every present. It is accused in
uneasiness or the unconditionality of the accusative, in the “here I am” (me voici)
which is obedience to the glory of the Infinite that orders me to the other…it is
one absolved from every relationship, every game, literally without situation,
without dwelling place, expelled from everywhere and from itself, one saying to
the other “I” or “here I am.” The ego stripped by the trauma of persecution of its
scornful and imperialist subjectivity, is reduced to the “here I am,” in a
transparency without opaqueness, without heavy zones propitious for evasion.184
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For Levinas, therefore, “to be a human being – to be what Jews call a mensch – involves
recognizing that I am commanded to say hineni,” because what is essential is the
relationship with the other.185 Levinas universalizes the traditional Jewish teaching which
argues that obedience to the divine command is the source of dignity for a Jew. He
applies it to all humans, arguing that humans find their dignity by observing God’s
original ethical command to say hineni to the other. To say hineni is to respond to the call
for infinite responsibility for the other.186
What Levinas does in using his Jewish heritage to expound his philosophical
thought is precisely to emphasize the “underivability” of the fundamental obligation,
hineni, from any epistemological source. Concepts such as infinite responsibility, face,
trace, height, etc, connect “with his two fundamental ideas that ethics is based on
obligation to the other, not on any empirical or metaphysical ‘sameness’ between myself
and the other and that this fundamental obligation is asymmetrical.”187 For instance, with
regard to the infinite responsibility, Levinas follows “an ancient Jewish principle that
says every Israelite is responsible for every other. The corresponding Levinasian claim is
that every human being is responsible for every other.”188 In the face of the other, there is
an elevation, a height that makes the other higher than I am. And God is without content
apart from the relation to the other. God for Levinas appears in the ethics and justice of
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the relation of one person to another, in the one for another. In reading Levinas one is
struck by many mentions of the Jewish Bible and the Talmud. He writes:
The great miracle of the Bible lies not at all in the common literary origin, but,
inversely, in the confluence of different literatures toward the same essential
content. The miracle of this confluence is greater than the miracle of the unique
author. Now the pole of this confluence is the ethical, which incontestably
dominates this whole book.189
Levinas sees in the Bible and the Talmud the sources of ethical knowledge to which all
humans should refer. He goes as far as proposing the wisdom of the Talmud as “an
excellent source of experiences, food for philosophers.”190 One clear example of
Levinas’s texts where his thought and religious idea converge is in the preface to Entre
Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other:
The main intent here is to try to see ethics in relation to the rationality of the
knowledge that is immanent in being, and that is primordial in the philosophical
tradition of the West; even if ethics – ultimately going beyond the forms and
determinations of ontology, but without rejecting the peace of reason – could
achieve a different form of intelligibility and a different way of loving wisdom,
and perhaps even – but I will not go that far – the way of Psalm 111:10.191
In addition there is a noticeable and productive crossing point between Levinas’s writings
in Difficult Freedom and his philosophical works. These confessional writings continue
to a certain extent Levinas’s meditations on the face. They are considered essential to a
serious appraisal of his work as a whole. They make explicit a dimension in Levinas’s
work – his inspiration in or reference to Judaism – that is only implicit in the
philosophical work. About the influence of Jewish thought on Levinas’s work, Richard
Cohen interestingly notes: “the ethics Levinas finds in Jewish texts is, of course, the face-
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to-face dialogical metaphysics that he elaborates in his properly philosophical work.”192
Strangely enough, it was exactly through Judaism that Levinas believed he could
designate a locus beyond cultural relativity: that domain was, for him, the ethical.
Perhaps the most articulate feature of Levinas’s Judaism is voiced in his preface to
Difficult Freedom when he says: “The other’s hunger – be it of the flesh, or of bread – is
sacred; only the hunger of the third party limits its rights; there is no bad materialism
other than our own.”193 We would say with Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak that the
fundamental message of Jewish thought in Levinas’s vision can be summarized by the
following:
It ties the meaning of all experiences to the ethical relation among humans: it
appears to the personal responsibility of man, who, thereby, knows himself,
irreplaceable to realize a human society in which humans treat one another as
humans. This realization of the just society is ipso facto an elevation of man to the
society with God. This society is human happiness itself and the meaning of life.
Therefore, to say that the meaning of the real must be understood in function of
ethics, is to say that the universe is sacred. But it is sacred in an ethical sense.
Ethics is an optics of the divine. No relation to God is more right or more
immediate. The divine cannot manifest itself except through the neighbor. For a
Jew, incarnation is neither possible, nor necessary. After all, Jeremiah himself
said it: “To judge the case of the poor and the miserable, is not that to know me?
says the Eternal.”194
Levinas’s Jewish-Talmudic writings imply a philosophical dimension, and both can be
used at the same time, each clarifying the other. An attentive reader would recognize in
Levinas’s philosophy, references, examples and phrases that stem from the deepest
themes in Jewish ethics and spirituality. In his metaphysical ethics, as Richard Cohen
argues,
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Levinas weaves the specifics of the moral and holy language of Judaism into a
compelling and critical web with the most advanced issues and idioms of
contemporary continental philosophy…He persuades not by citing proof-texts,
which would have no force in philosophical discourse in any event, but by giving
voice to the prior and discordant claims of morality, to the very priority of its
claim, as exerted by the one who faces, the other person to whom the morally
elected self is obligated, the ‘orphan, widow, and stranger,’ for whom and to
whom one is responsible unto death.195
Levinas and the Holocaust
There seems to be in Levinas’s major philosophical works a sense of urgency to
prevent some catastrophe or war due to the drama of the metaphysical interest in human
beings. He writes in the preface to Totality and Infinity that:
Everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether
we are not duped by morality. Does not lucidity, the mind’s openness upon the
true, consist in catching sight of the permanent possibility of war? The state of
war suspends morality; it divests the eternal institutions and obligations of their
eternity and rescinds ad interim the unconditional imperatives. In advance its
shadow falls over the actions of men. War is not only one of the ordeals – the
greatest – of which morality lives; it renders morality derisory. The art of
foreseeing war and winning it by every means – politics – is henceforth enjoined
as the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to
naïveté.196
This picture of war is taken up again and amplified in Otherwise than Being, in the
following terms: “War is the deed or the drama of the essence’s interest. No entity can
wait its hour. They all clash, despite the difference of the regions to which the terms in
conflict may belong. Essence thus is the extreme synchronism of war.”197 This sentiment
will eventually play a major role in all aspects of his thought. For Levinas, “war leaves
nothing exterior to it and changes the other to the same. Is this not another way of
195
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expressing the Hitlerian directive, the Gleichschaltung, a command that the entire Reich
was to think and act in unison?”198 In 1934, reflecting on the doctrine of Hitlerism,
Levinas wrote a short note to the editors of the Catholic journal, Esprit, not only to
condemn the barbarism of National Socialism, but also to denounce Western
philosophy’s emphasis on the radical freedom of human beings.
The article stems from the conviction that the source of the bloody barbarism of
National Socialism lies not in some contingent anomaly within human reasoning,
nor in some accidental ideological misunderstanding. This article expresses the
conviction that this source stems from the essential possibility of elemental evil
into which we can be led by logic and against which Western Philosophy has not
sufficiently insured itself.199
From this we see clearly how Levinas distances himself from Western philosophy “which
has transformed its radical freedom into gratuitous play (or a game: un jeu), preferring to
retain its freedom by not choosing anything rather than considering it the prelude to a
commitment.”200
The Holocaust is, of course, the most important historical event that most
influenced Levinas. Its impact on Levinas’s life and philosophical thought cannot be
missed. Michael Smith helpfully comments on this: “The rise of anti-semitism in the
1930s, the threat of totalitarianism, and the Holocaust itself not only ‘mark’ Levinas’s
work, they set in motion a complex intertwining of his philosophical reflection with the
state of the world in which it unfolded.”201 He himself rightly pointed out in his essay
“Signature” that his entire life has been influenced by the feeling and the memory of the
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Nazi horror.202 Worst still, members of his own family were victims of this anti-semitism.
Questions of religious faith after the Holocaust, the meaning of Judaism and the relation
between being and beyond being turn out to be crucial to Levinas’s personal experience
and thought. In his own words he expresses it this way:
When one has that tumor in the memory, twenty years can do nothing to change
it. Soon death will do no doubt cancel the unjustified privilege of having survived
six million deaths. But if, during that stay of grace, life’s occupations and
diversions are filling life once more…nothing has been able to fill, or even cover
over, the gaping pit. We still turn back to it from our daily occupations almost as
frequently and the vertigo that grips us at the edge is always the same.203
In the same vein, he continues quoting Shmuel Agnon, the Nobel Prize-winning Israeli
novelist:
Six million Jews murdered by the Gentiles among us. A third of Israel has been
killed, and the other two-thirds orphaned. There is no one in Israel who does not
have several dozen dead among his or her close relatives…It was a great thought
that He who lives eternally had, to have chosen us from among all the people, to
give us the Torah of Life, although it is a little difficult to understand why he
created, facing us, a kind of human being that would take our lives because we
observe the Torah.204
With the inscriptions at the beginning of Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence,
Levinas’s perception of the Holocaust takes an universal dimension to include the nonJewish, the victims of the same anti-Semitism: “To the memory of those who were
closest among the six million murdered by the National Socialists, and the millions upon
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millions of all confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of the other man,
the same anti-Semitism.”205
For Levinas, anti-Semitism is the equivalent of anti-humanism. In this context the
Holocaust is absolute and useless human suffering, an event that sides itself with the
worse order of human catastrophe.206 After such a disaster, the alternative is to leave the
world of theodicy – the “vindication of divine justice in the face of the existence of
evil”207 – and “assume a full responsibility for human behavior that is not the product of
my freedom but ironically its condition that is given in the created fabric of the world.”208
For Levinas, it is time that humans take responsibility rather than redirecting it onto the
divine. This sentiment leads him to focus on Jewish texts in search of new priorities in
life, because, for him, there are no institutions left to count on. All human values have
been swept away and human beings have embraced warlike virtues. He recommends
giving priority to inner life and advocates the values of Judaism as the way out of this
unbearable situation. Judaism, he suggests is humanity on the brink of morality without
institutions.
How does Judaism conceive of humanity?... by experiencing the presence of God
through one’s relation to man…The way that leads to God therefore leads ipso
facto – and not in addition – to man….the fact that the relationship with Divine
crosses the relationship with men coincides with social justice…epitomizes the
entire spirit of the Jewish Bible.209
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For Levinas, Goodhart comments, “all responsibility is in our hands, not because there is
no God or because God has concealed or veiled His Face but because… God is otherwise
than being, a God who demands of us nothing less than shouldering God’s own
responsibility for others, for their lives, for their responsibility, even for their deaths.”210
Conclusion
In the present chapter we have offered a review of Levinas’s philosophy which
centers on his transcendental ethics of responsibility. This consideration is essential for
any discussion of his thought in relation to liberation theology. We situated Levinas’s
thought within the phenomenological tradition of Continental philosophy. We further
gave an overview of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s occupation with ontology, and showed
how Levinas took issue with Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology for not giving
a satisfying account of intersubjectivity and responsibility for the other.
The examination of Levinas’s transcendental ethics of responsibility led us to
appreciate his enduring concern about the primacy of the ethical relation to the other
person. In order to further clarify Levinas’s assertion that ethics should replace
metaphysics as first philosophy, we analyzed major concepts of his philosophy: the
encounter with the other, the face, the trace, the infinite, transcendence and time, the
Saying and the Said, and the third party and its call to justice. We also noted that the
encounter with the other, in Levinas’s thought, calls the ethical subject to responsibility
to the point of substitution, proximity, obsession, sensibility, hostage, vulnerability,
maternity, etc. Given that Levinas held that philosophical thought was rooted in prephilosophical experiences – and recognizing the place of Jewish history as part of his life
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– we also looked at Jewish aspects in his thought, especially the influence that the Torah,
the Talmudic tradition and the Holocaust have on his philosophy.
This review has established that for Levinas the appropriate basis for philosophy
lies not so much in the conjecture which gives rise to reflection, but “in a cry of ethical
revolt, bearing witness to responsibility. It begins in prophecy.”211 Levinas presents the
meeting with the face of the other as the suitable context in which to glimpse the trace of
the divine. God is encountered in the ethical command of “Love thy neighbor.” The
subject emerges as human in and through the ethical relation understood as love of the
other as neighbor.

Here “there is only ‘me’ who bears the other ‘in my skin’ with the

unique irreplaceability implied in this position.”212 These philosophical stirrings – subtle
or explicit – will serve to put his position in dialogue with liberation theology’s
standpoint. It is to liberation theology’s perspective that we now direct our consideration.

211

Levinas, “God and Philosophy,” in The Levinas Reader, 185. With regard to Levinas’s view of
philosophy as prophetic, Purcell writes, “Levinas views philosophy as prophetic, for philosophy’s task
today is essentially a placing in question of the dominance of ontology and assessing ethics as first
philosophy. The assertion of the primacy of the ethical and the challenge to the totalizing system is the role
of the prophet. The prophet is related to ‘a surplus always exterior to the totality, as though the objective
totality did not fill out the true measure of being, as though another concept, the concept of infinity were
needed to express this transcendence with regard to totality, non-encompassable within a totality and as
primordial as totality.’ The prophetic experience is situated within the totality and history, but it disrupts
that totality.” See, Purcell, Mystery and Method, 218, footnote, 5.
212
Baird, “Divinity and the Other: The Ethical Relation as Revelatory of God,” 105.

63

CHAPTER TWO
The Neighbor as Liberation Theology’s Point of Departure:
Gustavo Gutiérrez and Jon Sobrino
Introduction
The rise of modernity had a serious impact in the church’s theological approach.1
Most contemporary theologians, since the Age of the Enlightenment, seem to take as
their point of departure the challenge raised by the modern spirit, which proposes
experience as essential for human understanding, while questioning the spiritual world
and requiring of it a purification and revitalization.2 The substance of this experience
includes all that is encountered in existence, because the experiential is always related to
society, the place of human encounter with the others.
One of the major tasks of theology became to reflect on experience, that is, the
bringing together of human experience and the Christian story.3 Hence, the need for

1

The term modernity can be rather slippery because it can describe a wider range of periods. As it applies to
this dissertation, this term means the Cartesian-Kantian model of thought that places the human subject at
the center of all knowing and meaning. This helps to characterize the major contours of Emmanuel
Levinas’s and liberation theology’s critique of modernity that tends to measure everything from the turn to
the subject, the independent, the free and self-sufficient individual.
2
Some twentieth century theologians influenced by the modern spirit include, to name but a few: Karl
Rahner, Henri de Lubac, Jean Daniélou, M.-D. Chenu, Yves Congar, Bernard Lonergan, and Edward
Schillebeeckx.
3
Wilhelm Breuning, “Experience of God,” in Handbook of Catholic Theology, edited by Wolfgang Beinert
and Francis Schüssler Fiorenza (New York: Crossroad, 1995), 248; Ellen Leonard, “Experience as a Source
of Theology,” in Sources of Theology: Current Issues in Theology 3, Proceedings of the Catholic
Theological Society of America, 43 (1998): 44-45. Gerald O’Collins has argued that, Roman Catholic
fundamental theology has only recently incorporated the language of “experience” into its theology. The
term was avoided by most Catholic theologians before the Vatican II Council (1962-1965); see his article
“Experience,” in Dictionary of Fundamental Theology, edited by René Latourelle and Rino Fischella (New
York: Crossroad, 1995), 306. For discussion on the role of human experience in theology, see Henri
Bouillard, “Human Experience as the Starting Point of Fundamental Theology,” The Church in the World:
Theology in the Age of Renewal. Concilium (New York: Paulist, 1965), 79-91. Donald L. Gelpi, The Turn
to Experience in Contemporary Theology (New York: Paulist, 1984), 90.
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fundamental theology, not only to incorporate experience into its project, but rather to
begin its venture with human experience. This turn to experience resonated with many
Catholics to the point that they were convinced – over and against the resistance and the
obstinacy of some popes, namely Pius VI and later Pius IX – that turning to the new
world was for the church the only option left, leading to the new era called new
evangelization. The new era began during the pontificate of Leo XIII, who with the
publication of the Encyclical Rerum Novarum laid the foundations for the option for the
poor that became explicit under John XXIII.4
Vatican II’s “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern world”
(Gaudium et Spes) expresses the urgency for a real solidarity of the Church with the
whole human family, specially, with those “afflicted in any way.”5 The document affirms
the Church’s responsibility and function of analyzing the signs of the times and of
interpreting them in the light of the Gospel.6 It encourages Christians, especially pastors
and theologians, to seek a balance between modern spirit and traditional themes, and
begin a constructive dialogue with the contemporary world regarding the lasting
questions of living the faith.7 In the immediate aftermath of the Council, the eighteenth

4

José Comblin, Called For freedom: The Changing Context of Liberation Theology (Maryknoll, N.Y.:
Orbis Books, 1998), 1. For a helpful study on the rise of the expression “New Evangelization,” read 1-21.
5
“Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,” Gaudium et Spes 1, in Vatican Council II:
The Conciliar and Postconciliar Documents, edited by Austin Flannery, vol.1, New Revised Edition (New
York: Costello Publishing Company, 1998).
6
Gaudium et Spes 4.
7
Dennis P. McCann, “Signs of the Times,” in The Modern Dictionary of Catholic Social Thought, edited
by Judith A. Dwyer (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1994), 882. The Second Vatican
Council began the official reinstatement of experience in sacred theology by vindicating some of the
concerns and insights of the Modernists. The Council used the actual term experience in its teaching even if
it was only carefully employed in the documents Gaudium et Spes and Dei Verbum. Dei Verbum speaks of
the “intimate sense of spiritual realities which Christians experience.” See, Gerald O’Collins and Edward
Farrugia, “Modernism,” in A Concise Dictionary of Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 1991), 145;
“Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, “Dei Verbum 8, in Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and
Postconciliar Documents, edited by Austin Flannery, vol.1, New Revised Edition (New York: Costello
Publishing Company, 1998).
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century turn to the subject became part of the Roman Catholic fundamental theological
agenda. Human subjectivity and history became the fundamental ground for an
epistemological theology. The starting point in theological method was no longer God,
but the human person and his/her sitz im leben.8
In a continent such as Latin America, the challenge to Christian theology became
the political oppression and the socio-economic plight of “the ‘non-persons,’ those who
are not recognized as humans by the social order: the poor, the exploited, those
systematically and legally deprived of their status as human beings, those who barely
realise what it is to be a human being.”9 Liberation theology invites Christian theology to
leave the climate of the turn to the subject and move a step forward toward a
consideration of the turn to the other that constitutes the truth of Christianity: the concern
for the humanity (dignity) of every human being created in God’s image. This theology
argues that God’s transcendental power is seen in human historical reality. To be sure, for
Gutiérrez, Sobrino, and all liberation theologians, the opening to transcendence is the
opening to history, such that the concepts of the kingdom of God and soteriology are
linked to the creation of a better society and ethics. God’s transcendence and mystery are
made visible only in human historical experience of love and responsibility for the
neighbor.

8

Theologians date the turn to the subject to the seventeenth and eighteenth century Enlightenment (Kant
and Descartes). The influence of this turn to the subject on Christian theology took another two centuries.
For Catholic theology, the crucial moment was the Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s. For a good
survey of this turn to the subject, see Komonchak, “Defending Our Hope: On the Fundamental Tasks of
Theology,” in Faithful Witness: Foundations for Today’s Church, 18-19; Gelpi, The Turn to Experience in
Contemporary Theology, 90.
9
Gustavo Gutiérrez, “The Task and Content of Liberation Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to
Liberation Theology, translated by Judith Condor and edited by Christopher Rowland (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 28.
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The stress here is on the neighbor’s humanity as a first moment in the process of
theological reflection. The humanization of the victims of this world through the
principle of love of neighbor as taught by Christianity characterizes Gutiérrez’s and
Sobrino’s theological enterprise. It is a theology that stems from the meaning of love of
neighbor in Christianity in the midst of the tragic human situation. It searches for the
divine transcendence in a life of commitment to the other human person, and calls for
justice and love of neighbors.
This chapter aims at discussing Gutiérrez’s and Sobrino’s theological contribution
to Catholic theology. After discussing the emergence of liberation theology in the context
of both modernity and sacred theology, this chapter examines Gutiérrez’s and Sobrino’s
social, cultural, and ecclesial background and their major theological themes. Lastly, this
chapter will show that the central insight of Gutiérrez’s and Sobrino’s theological models
repose on the human neighbor. The human person, the neighbor, the poor, the stranger,
the widow, the oppressed, the homeless, etc is the place for a possible revelation from
God.10 For Gutiérrez and Sobrino, it is in the works of justice, in loving one’s neighbor,
that transcendence is encountered. Thus, salvation cannot be dissociated from the real
historical humanity in which humans live. This soteriological perspective takes its
content from Jesus’ command of love of neighbor, his ministry to the poor and his
opposition to oppression. Notwithstanding possible reservations in terms of the method

10

James Gustafson gives a strong criticism of liberation theology in terms of a lack of subordination of
human piety and ethics to God and God’s purposes. As a matter of fact, Gustafson criticizes a great deal of
Christian theology for the same reason, of making human existence the measure of the content of religious
piety; see his Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 2225. Other articulations of the same suspicion are in terms of a reduction of the vertical dimension of
Christian faith to the horizontal. For an overview of some criticisms of liberation theology, see Arthur F.
McGovern, Liberation Theology and Its Critics: Toward an Assessment (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books,
1989), 11-14, 47-50; Dennis P. McCann, Christian Realism and Liberation Theology: Practical Theologies
in Creative Conflict (Maryknoll, N. Y.: Orbis Books, 1981).
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used to articulate this thought in the concrete situation, this chapter would argue that the
foundation of liberation theology, that is, the turn to the neighbor, has a continuing
relevance for the critical issues of Christian life and witness in our postmodern wounded
world, and share some conceptual affinities with Levinas’s philosophical turn to the
other. Gutiérrez, Sobrino, and Levinas – as it will be shown in the third chapter – argue
that the other human person or the neighbor is the condition for the possibility of the
subject’s subjectivity, and that humans relate to God as subjects of a historical world.
I. The Emergence of the Theology of Liberation
The historical roots of liberation theology are to be found in the earliest colonial
days in Latin America, namely, at the time of Conquista. At the time of the crossing of
the Atlantic Ocean by Columbus, the Conquistadores and the missionaries, religion and
state, were working hand in hand. Christ’s images that were developed took the line to
suit the colonialist propaganda interests; Christ was presented as a dying man and as a
heavenly ruler (1492).11 In a sense, Christology, instead of being liberative, was
developed as a tool for oppression. Prophetic missionary voices questioned the Church’s
position and the ill treatment of indigenous Indios. The names of Bartolomé de Las
Casas12 (1484-1566), Antonio de Montesino, and others stand as figures of the opposition
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Volker Küster, The Many Faces of Jesus Christ: Intercultural Christology (Maryknoll, N. Y.: Orbis
Books, 2001), 41- 42. Küster Volker is a lecturer in the history of religion, mission and ecumenics in the
University of Heidelberg. His book, The Many Faces of Jesus Christ, offers a good overview to the
theologies of the Third World. It focuses on commonalities and differences of Third World Christologies,
and on their significance for ecumenism.
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The positive role Bartolomé de Las Casas played in setting the stage in which liberation theology was
built does not mean that we overlook his initial participation in the colonial system. He later converted and
freed his Indio slave so as to stop the system.
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to the systematic killing of the Indios. For these missionaries, the Indios became the poor
of whom the scriptures speak about.13
The most notable fact about the emergence of liberation theology in Latin
America, however, is the cultural challenge that modernity posed to traditional
Christianity in the late 1960s. This was not a new phenomenon. Already in the early days
of the church, Christians were to defend and explain their faith in their cultural milieu.
They found in the neighboring cultures logoi spermatikoi (germinal intelligibilities) that
enabled them open up their faith to the new cultural realities. This incorporation of the
cultural in the ecclesial was so effective that in the twelfth and thirteenth century the
church established universities as a means to a necessary cultural commitment. There
surfaced a few daring figures, most outstandingly Thomas Aquinas.14 In that sense,
Kenneth L. Schmitz is right to argue that one would be right while discussing liberation
theology to use Aquinas as a reference point, because at the basis of his theology lies
human historical experience (human active intellect).15 Pope Leo XIII, in his time,
presented Aquinas to the world as a guide in this very praxis, because Aquinas developed
13

Küster, The Many Faces of Jesus Christ , 42, 45.
Komonchak, “Defending Our Hope: On the Fundamental Tasks of Theology,” 15-16. Komonchak
writes: Thomas Aquinas “not only took up the challenge of writing new works contra gentiles (against the
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Reformation, the scientific revolution, the Enlightenment, the economic and social revolutions of the
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16. It was not until the Second Vatican Council that that these cultural elements were taken into
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Kenneth L. Schmitz suggests following Thomas Aquinas’ point of view that “the evidential role of
experience in Thomas points towards experience as prelude to conceptualization.” By conceptualization
Schmitz does not refer to the formation of abstract concepts, but rather the entire range of the intellectual
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Experience,” Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America, 47 (1992) 1-20.
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a universal understanding of a particular temporal-historical situation that put into focus a
community of beings.16 Currently, Schmitz contends “the appeal to experience is taken
by many to be what gives to meaning its modern currency. Experience so taken becomes
the central bank for meaning and for its communication and exchange.”17 Fulton Sheen
observes that experience seeks encounter and relationships rather than arguments;18 here
experience is a direct encounter with reality.19 Aquinas has provided an intellectually and
affectively rich understanding of experience which had proved crucial in the development
of Catholic theology’s appeal to experience.
Most contemporary theologians, who took seriously questions raised by
modernity, as we shall see below, were imitators of Aquinas. They had talent, selfassurance, humility, and admiration for him; and more importantly, these scholars, both
before and after the Council, brought back to Catholic consciousness, the spirit and the
determination of the Fathers of the church to face major cultural challenges. This
theological orientation had great impact on Vatican II Council’s new reading of the
socio-economic and cultural context. Vatican II committed the church to participate not
only in the “joy and hope, grief and anxiety” (Gaudium et Spes, 1) of contemporaries but
to join them in the common responsibility of analyzing critically socio-political,
economic and cultural issues.20
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Joseph A. Komonchak notes three areas in which modernity challenged classical
theology: the epistemological, the historical, and the political. The epistemological
inaugurated by Descartes and Kant required that “all knowledge claims be justified
critically through an analysis of the structure and dynamics of human consciousness. This
‘turn to the subject’ meant philosophy’s passage from metaphysics to epistemology as
grounding discipline, from being to subjectivity as the primary focus, and from nature to
history as the primary object.”21 The historical consciousness has to do with human
beings’ responsibility for the ever-evolving history of the world in which they are a part.
This means that as they live in history, they exercise their freedom within the limits of the
conditions of history and at the same time, have the responsibility, individually and
communally, to construct the human future. In other words, they have to adapt to new
realities. The socio-political factor represents the third area. Its main concern is the
permanent transformation of the socio-political structures of societies. A new sociopolitical environment forces Christian theology to rethink its presuppositions as these
changes effect a displacement of the public function of religion as being part and parcel
of human society. The church to remain credible was to face head-on the effect of
modernization rather than retreating into a less significant system stimulated by an ideal
of the past, which has no connection with credible and relevant new cultural realities.22
Vatican II affirms Roman Catholic theology’s relationship with modernity and a
great generation of theologians collaborated to bring about this significant encounter. It
became important to articulate the meaning of Christian theology by considering the
cultural context and the experience of persons to whom and for the sake of whom the
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gospel is proclaimed. From that moment onward, Catholic theologians made theological
anthropology the focal point of fundamental theology. They attempted to show how “the
fundamental structure and dynamism of the human consciousness opens itself to the
question of God and to a possible revelation from God.”23 The anthropocentric turn
became the main “task of Christian theology that of showing how the central Christian
doctrines meet the fundamental needs and desires of the human person which the basic
anthropology uncovers.”24
To be sure, most theologians that articulated this theological anthropology were
German and were influenced by the philosophical anthropology of Max Scheler. They
included Emil Brunner, Paul Tillich, Friedrich Gogarten, Karl Rahner, Wolfhart
Pannenberg, Jürgen Moltmann, and Walter Kasper to name but a few. No one, however,
was more prominent in those days than Karl Rahner. Rahner pays attention to the insights
of the Greek philosophers, the Bible, the transcendental Thomism of Joseph Maréchal,
and the historicity of Heidegger to announce a method that combines anthropocentrism
and theocentrism. Rahner’s task has been to make the truth of Christianity as articulated
by the church’s tradition pertinent and connected to human experience.25 He uses a
correlational method that links experience and revelation to show the reasonableness for
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theological reflection “from within human experience.”26 For Rahner, every categorical,
concrete experience points always as its condition of possibility to a transcendental
experience that is, unthematically but originally, involved in the experience of
transcendence. And transcendence, always hinted at in any human experience, is most
adequately identified with the triune God of Christian revelation.27
Rahner’s theology is important for understanding the emergence of liberation
theology. It plays the role of a starting point and opens new ways for subsequent
theological currents. Liberation theology, in its determination to make Christianity
relevant for human society, shares Rahner’s key principle, specifically, “the intrinsic
correlation that exists between human history and the history of salvation.”28 It is from
this heritage that Gutiérrez, Sobrino and other Latin America scholars developed their
own theological projects by taking into account their socio-political and economic
context of poverty and oppression. The fundamental discontinuity in relation to Rahner is
that Latin America Liberation theology takes as its starting point human relationships
with one another in society as a place of God’s revelation while Rahner begins with the
subject’s transcendental experience with God and then directs that experience to human
historical reality.29 It is not enough to only focus on the philosophical anthropology of the
26
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subject’s openness to the transcendent being, but rather, it is important, liberation
theology argues, to realize that the opening to transcendence is the opening to history,
such that the concepts of the kingdom of God and soteriology are linked to the creation of
a better society and ethics.
After Vatican II, conditions were created within the Church for local churches to
find their ways for a new Catholic praxis; hence, a new method of theology was
necessary. Reading the signs of the times, Latin American theologians developed a new
theological method: social Christianity. The effort since the council, to construct local
theologies or social Christianity stemmed from the desire to leave the climate of a
generalized anthropology and address, as Komonchak contends, “questions of meaning
and value posed by individuals living in particular places at specific times, confronting
concrete personal and social challenges with the resources mediated by their societies and
culture.”30
Social Christianity, which began in the 1930s and continued to have some appeal
until the early 1960s, emerged in response to the hardships, uprisings, and repressions of
that period. It stressed the duty of lay persons to remedy social ills without waiting for the
religious hierarchy, represented by its priests, to act. Although these movements did not
advocate change in the basic social and political structure of the country, they did call for
improvements. In most Latin American countries between the 1950s and 1960s, populist
governments inspired nationalistic consciousness, and significant industrial development
benefited only the middle classes and the urban proletariat while a huge sector of the
Church’s Development Work,” abstract, Karl Rahner’s Theological Investigations 1-23 (Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press, 2002), 547-548; For a helpful study on this, see Karl Rahner, “Theological
Justification of the Church’s Development Work,” in Theological Investigations, vol. 20, translated by
Edward Quinn (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1981), 66-70, 70-73.
30
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peasantry was forced into a deep rural marginalization. The consequence of this was the
creation of strong popular movements seeking profound changes in the socio-economic
structure of their countries. In turn, these movements provoked the rise of military
dictatorships to safeguard the interests of capital repression and police control of all
public demonstrations. In the Church of Latin America, the 1960s’ renewal began with a
movement whereby lay persons, bishops, priests and religious started taking their social
role seriously.31 In the late 1960s, the social attitudes of the Roman Catholic Church in
El Salvador, as elsewhere, were profoundly influenced by Vatican II and the social
encyclicals of Pope John XXIII,32 as well as by the Second Latin American Bishops’
Conference held in Medellin, Colombia, in 1968, which addressed the issues of Vatican
II from a distinctly Latin American perspective. The Medellin document on poverty
begins:
The Latin American bishops cannot remain indifferent in the face of the
tremendous social injustices existent in Latin America, which keep the majority of
our peoples in dismal poverty, which in many cases becomes inhuman
wretchedness. A deafening cry pours from the throats of millions of men, asking
their pastors for a liberation that reaches them from nowhere else.33
These gatherings, especially the Medellin conference, emphasized the need for a more
worldly involvement by the Roman Catholic clergy in the lives and problems of
31
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parishioners and advocated activist programs to improve the living conditions of the
lower class. The document commits the Church to a project of a radical social change
“claiming that to create a just social order … is an eminently Christian task.”34
As the Latin American socio-political and economic situation called for actions,
liberation theologians introduced a radical interpretation of the Bible that employs
Marxist terminology to analyze and condemn the wide disparities between the wealthy
elite and the impoverished masses. Hence, a liberating theology was set out in a particular
context, a context of poverty and oppression. Gutierrez is seen as the founder of this
theological approach in the late 1960’s, and since then, one of its proponents. He
“proclaims a prophetic theology based on the gospel and the experiences of men and
women who have committed themselves to the process of liberation in the oppressed and
exploited land of Latin America.”35 For Küster Volker, if Gutiérrez is the father of this
new approach to theology in a Latin American context, Leonardo Boff and Jon Sobrino
are among those who gave it a systematic direction.36 Sobrino, confronted with the
phenomenon of oppression in El Salvador, sought to reinterpret the spectrum of Christian
theology in light of the real.37 This real for Sobrino is what is profound and true, and
what touches the inner being of the individual. An option was made in Latin America to
recapture the truth of Christianity by showing concern for the poor, the oppressed, and
the marginalized of the society. And this preferential option for the poor was the germ of
what later came to be known as liberation theology – concern for others’ humanity.
34
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In Latin America, a theology of liberation arises by asking the following
questions: “What is the meaning of faith in a life committed to the struggle against
injustice and alienation? And what is the meaning of the struggle against an unjust
society and the creation of a new man in the light of the Gospel?”38 How to proclaim God
as Father in an inhuman world? “How do we tell the ‘non-persons’ that they are the sons
and daughters of God?” 39 How could we explain human suffering before God?
What is at stake here for liberation theology is the humanity of human beings, that
is, the place of mediation of God’s revelation. Christianity, Gutiérrez and Sobrino affirm,
cannot be dissociated from the real historical fact of humanity: the subject’s encounter
with the other who bears the mark of God. Although Gutiérrez and Sobrino, always
against the background of Vatican II, had their theology opened up by the same
Rahnerian heritage, each developed his theological project in different cultural and social
contexts, yet denounced the same human responsibility behind poverty, injustice, and
oppression. At this point, we now turn to the analysis of the theology of Gutiérrez and
Sobrino, paying special attention to the social, cultural, and ecclesial milieu of each and
their major theological themes.
II. Gustavo Gutiérrez
An understanding of liberation theology as a theological movement would be
possible only in relation to the characteristics of the society and the church from which it
emerges as a way to comprehend Christian faith. In the case of Gutiérrez this context is
the Peruvian society and by extrapolation the whole of Latin American society. It is
therefore in order to examine here the social, cultural, and ecclesial background from
38
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which Gutiérrez’s theology stems. In the process of his thought, religion, faith, and God
become part of everyday life, narrowing the gap between the secular and the sacred,
between life and faith.
Social, Cultural, and Ecclesial Background of Gutiérrez Theology
Gutiérrez is a Dominican priest and theologian born on 8 June 1928 in Peru where
he obtained his Bachelor of Science from the National University of Lima in 1950.
During his years in Europe (1951-1960), he studied philosophy and psychology in
Louvain, and theology in Lyon and Rome. It was not until 1985 that he received his
doctorate from the Institut Catholique de Lyon. Gutiérrez has been professor at the
Pontifical University of Peru and visiting lecturer at many major universities in North
America and Europe. He is John Cardinal O'Hara professor of theology at the University
of Notre Dame. Ordained to the priesthood in 1959, he works as pastor in Rimac, Peru,
directs the Bartolomé de Las Casas Center in Lima, and has been a member of the
Peruvian Academy of Language. Gutiérrez is recognized for his work for human dignity
and life in Latin America and the Third World. He has also published in and been a
member of the board of directors of the international journal, Concilium.40
His years of studies in Europe, especially his encounter with les mouvements
spécialisés d’Action Catholique (Catholic Action’s specialized movements) and la
nouvelle théologie, would have an impact on him and on other Latin American graduate
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students who came to Europe to study.41 Proponents of la nouvelle théologie called for a
theological renewal that would bring the church into contact with the concerns of
contemporary society.42 During those years, according to Muskus, Gutiérrez came into
contact with the inspiring intellectual environment of European Catholicism in search of
renewal and profound dialogue with modern social sciences. He was also attentive to
different philosophical and ideological movements – regarded with suspicion by the
church – such as Marxism, Freudianism, the different theories of evolution, etc.43
Equally important in that regard is the pastoral consequence that derives from
these theological developments, namely, that witness aspect of Christian faith in society.
Christians were invited to witness to the values of the gospel of love in their different
social milieus. These developments are important to Gutiérrez’s theology. His
experiences in Europe were translated into the Latin American scene. When he returned
to Lima in 1959, he became pastor in a parish and began working as a lecturer in the
department of theology and social sciences at the Catholic University of Lima. He also
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became the chaplain of the National Union of Catholic Students, a university branch of
Catholic action where he identified himself with the political fight of the people and the
extensive number of articles he wrote articulated that profound concern.44
While Gutiérrez is acknowledged worldwide as one of the most original and
expressive theologians of liberation, few, however, give sufficient attention to the fact
that he is a Peruvian theologian who was born among the poor of Peru, and lived in
Rimac, Lima, “a gray dirty, noisy slum where residents are anxiously trying to survive, to
find or keep a job, to feed and clothe children.”45 It was in this context of abject poverty
in Rimac that Gutiérrez not only worked as pastor and friend of the poor, but also wrote
nearly his entire theology. Being a Quechan Indian by birth Gutiérrez is located among
the oppressed in Peru who suffered prejudice and discrimination from fellow Peruvians
because of their mestizos’ heritage. As the people of Peru struggle for hope Gutiérrez puts
that hope into theological language.46
Peru is situated in western South America, bordering the South Pacific Ocean,
between Chile and Ecuador. It is a land of remarkable beauty and complex socio-political
problems. Ancient Peru was the seat of several prominent Andean civilizations, most
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notably that of the Incas whose empire was captured by the Spanish conquistadors in
1533. Peruvian independence was declared in 1821, and remaining Spanish forces were
defeated in 1824.47 After years of military rule, Peru embraced democratic leadership in
1980, but its wealth and economic structure have deteriorated over the years due to a
number of factors, including the growth of a violent insurgency.
In Peru it is obvious that poverty, corruption, drugs, and terrorism are
interconnected. These are the major problems that the country faces in addition to
discrimination and division. The Spanish conquest and the subsequent colonization
negatively affected the cultures and traditions of the country.48

One of the direct

consequences of the conquest was the dramatic massacre of the native population and the
inhuman working conditions. Even after the independence from the Spaniards, the
natives were still being oppressed and discriminated against. They were not consulted in
the political process and could not hold public office.49 The racial structure of the country
made up of natives, whites, blacks, mestizos, Chinese and Japanese has created a very
complex racial mix in which marginalization and repression were common. For instance,
the Indians were excluded and considered as nonpersons; they were disregarded and illtreated by the ruling white minority.50 Gutiérrez has constantly stated that in Peru and in
many other Latin America countries, both natives and blacks were counted among the
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nonpersons. For Peruvians the fundamental question has been the question of identity in
the land of conquest, poverty, and violence. Cadorette writes
[B]oth in the past and in the present, race, class, and gender determine who will
flourish and who will perish in Peru…. The legacy of colonialism is all too tragic:
divisive, destructive stratification built into the fabric of the nation’s history,
immense disparity between rich and poor, male and female, and a painfully
ambiguous sense of nationhood. This is the human, historical backdrop of
Gustavo Gutiérrez’s theology.51
The crucial development in recent Peruvian history that constitutes the direct referential
point for Gutiérrez’s theology, most especially his notion of ‘the irruption of the poor in
history,’ is the population growth in the 1940s. As a result many Peruvians, especially the
Sierra and the Selva left the villages to immigrate into the cities, looking for a better life
in terms of jobs, services, and social mobility. As this situation could not leave people
indifferent, a group of thinkers and politicians came up and proposed a rethinking of the
nation and a change in its structures. These intellectuals would eventually have a major
influence on Gutiérrez’s theological project.52
With regard to the role of the church, one could say that the church played a
major role in Peru. From the outset the church’s role has been confusing because of its
close tie with the conquerors. This relationship was part of Alexander VI’s papal bull in
1493.53 The royal patronage of Spain over the church in Peru made the Peruvian church
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submissive to the Spanish crown and the task of evangelization was in the hands of the
crown. Instead of denouncing this situation of real exploitation of the local population,
the church, in a way, blessed the establishment of the law that nearly always privileged
the existence of systems that gave the conquerors compensations at the expense of the
indigenous.54
Notwithstanding the church’s involvement and confusing role during this period,
some of its members had the courage to denounce the colonial mistreatment of the
Indians and defend their right to be considered of equal dignity with the conquerors, also
in the name of Christ.55 For instance Bartolomé de Las Casas, although he never achieved
his goal, was outstanding in denouncing the abuses and the illegality of the conquest.56
As things started changing gradually in the country, the Peruvian church became
suspicious of the central government with regards to the people’s social plight. This
movement seemed to have been generalized in the wider Latin American church. Diverse
Christian communities in the Latin America continent came together for the first time in
“an attempt to interpret the new social challenges the church had to face in a society that
that the crown had fulfilled the condition of evangelizing those possessions…In 1505 and 1529 new bulls
established the patronage of the Spanish crown over the church in the American territories, meaning that
the administration of missionary work (such as the sending of missionaries and the appointment of bishops)
was directly under the crown. That determined that the role of the church in America was intrinsic to the
advance of the conquest, that the administration of the task of evangelization was in hands of the crown,
and that the roles of the church and the crown were not clearly separated.” See, his Confronting the
Mystery of God, 100-101.
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was becoming more complex and more and more touched by the transformations of
modernity.”57 This began the church’s commitment to take special actions aimed at
addressing the very root of unjust situations of poverty and oppression. It was the
beginning of a cry for love of neighbor and justice.
In Peru, the opening of the church to the modern world, along the lines of the
Vatican II’s Gaudium et Spes, exposed the country to its social problems. The reality of
the sweeping poverty had challenged the basic premises of the modern hopeful view of
the world. Most Latin American countries denounced a relational framework which
created an unhealthy dependency of developing nations upon the developed countries.
The denunciation was articulated on the model of analysis called the theory of
dependency which spread throughout Latin America in the late 1960s.58
In the same period, Latin American bishops were holding their second general
conference in Medellin, Colombia interpreting Vatican II from their own local
standpoint. The conclusions of the conference had a tremendous impact on the Latin
American church as it took a strong position in opposition to unjust social structures.
57
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Medellin became for the church in Latin America a re-reading of Vatican II’s goal of
being the universal sacrament of salvation. Medellin’s conference by so doing
undoubtedly made clear the new orientation of the Latin American church, namely the
preferential option for the poor. Such an orientation, Medellin argues, has to be espoused
by the universal church.59 Also crucial in the development of the theology from the
underside of history was the third conference of Latin American bishops in Puebla,
Mexico, in 1979. Puebla proclaimed the preferential option for the poor of the Latin
American church.60 In Peru the church identified itself openly with the cause of the
people, especially the poor. Thus, the first steps of Gutiérrez’s theology have to be
understood against this background.
Gutiérrez’s education inspired him to come to grips with those challenges from
the poor and the oppressed. His training and encounter with people in Europe made him
conscious of the need to take sides with the oppressed and the poor. According to
Cadorette, that Gutiérrez knows the people’s culture and language and that he shares their
hopes and aspirations as part of his heritage are significant elements for whoever who
wants to understand him both as a human being and a theologian.61 The main points of
his theology examined henceforth will help to uncover the reason why the experience of
the poor and oppressed are important to Gutiérrez’s understanding of faith.
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Gutiérrez’s Major Theological Themes
Gutiérrez’s theology is an attempt at reflection, based on the gospel and the
experiences of men and women committed to the process of liberation in the oppressed
and exploited land of Latin America. For Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Gutiérrez places
at
[T]he center of theological reflection the poor, the ‘others,’ the nonpersons, who
are absent from history. He insists over and against Euro-American ‘progressive’
theology that the point of departure for Latin American theology is not the
question of the modern nonbeliever but the struggle of the nonperson for justice
and freedom.62
Gutiérrez’s theological themes run through his writings, most especially in his book, A
Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation, which introduces the insights,
themes, and process of liberation to the rest of the world. For the purpose of this
dissertation, our attention will be focused on the following themes because of their
relevance: theology as critical reflection on praxis, the fundamental option for the poor,
encountering God in history, liberation, development and salvation, spirituality of
liberation, and the church as sacrament of history.
Theology as Critical Reflection on Praxis
In analyzing Gutiérrez’s theology the influence of Vatican II and other theological
currents that became decisive at that council must be kept in mind. The Council and
Gutiérrez’s European stage sparked in him a new understanding of what being a Christian
means. He became completely influenced by the primacy of pastoral action in his
62
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reflection and expressed his dissatisfaction with the classical task of theology defined as
wisdom and rational knowledge.63
Theology for Gutiérrez has to be understood as the critical reflection on the
church’s action in the light of the revealed word. This means a reflection “on humankind,
on basic human principles… [and on a]…clear attitude about economic and sociocultural issues in the life of the Christian community.”64 As a result, theology would
unavoidably “be a criticism of society and the church insofar as they are called and
addressed by the Word of God.”65 Thus, “a privileged locus theologicus for
understanding the faith will be the life, preaching, and historical commitment of the
church.”66 Citing the work of Yves Congar, Gutiérrez asserts:
If the church wishes to deal with the real questions of the modern world and to
attempt to respond to them …it must open as it were a new chapter of theologicopastoral epistemology. Instead of using only revelation and tradition as the
starting points, as classical theology has generally done, it must start with facts
and questions derived from the world and from history.67
This turning to the totality of human history allows theology to realize its significant
function vis-à-vis ecclesial praxis without limitation. In this way, Gutiérrez believes
theology “fulfils a prophetic role insofar as it interprets historical events with the
objective of revealing and proclaiming their profound significance.”68 In the final
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analysis, theology, understood as a critical reflection on society and the church inevitably
calls for a redefinition of the two tasks of classical theology. Wisdom’s and rational
knowledge’s approach to theology ought to have the ecclesial praxis as their point of
departure and their context. As Gutiérrez asserts:
It is for all these reasons that the theology of liberation offers us not so much a
new theme for reflection as a new way to do theology… It is a theology which is
open – in the protest against trampled human dignity, in the struggle against the
plunder of the vast majority of humankind, in liberating love, and in the building
of a new, just and comradely society – to the gift of the kingdom of God.69
This kind of theology, emerging from concern for historical events, is both desired and
needed.
The Fundamental Option for the Poor
Poverty, marginalization, oppression, and the new forms of exploitation brought
about by capitalism have been the major problems for Latin American countries since the
nineteenth century and up to the recent past.70 This is what Medellin so fittingly describes
as “institutionalized violence” on the poor and a systematic violation of the most
elemental human rights.71 It is in view of this that Gutiérrez came to an awareness of the
world of the ‘other’ – of the poor, the oppressed, and the exploited class. He questions all
the economic, social, and political order that oppresses and marginalizes the poor and
proposes a theology of the fundamental option for the poor. He seeks to go to the very
root of the misery and injustice in which millions in Latin America and other parts of the
world live.
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From the outset, Gutiérrez’s theological project is about the life of the poor and
oppressed. In the situation where Gutiérrez lives the questions of the meaning of life and
God were not posed by intellectuals, but rather by those whom he calls nonpersons, the
oppressed, those for whom society has no place. They are indeed treated as such by those
with power in society. They wonder how to believe in God in the world that denies their
personhood. For Gutiérrez this question concerns the whole human person “who is
already wondering how liberation can come and how one can move from being a
nonperson to a real person. And this means looking at the political, social, and economic
structures of society as the context in which the theological issue is raised.”72
The characteristic trait in Gutiérrez’s theology is the connection between pastoral
practice and reflection. This linkage has greatly to do with the spirit of Vatican II which
invites Christians to give witness to their faith in society. The Medellin conference in
1968, embracing the spirit of Vatican II, encouraged the Latin American theologians to
creatively relate the doctrine of the church to the world in Latin America. An impetus
was added with the publication of Populorum Progressio and the Third World Bishops’
Letter to the Peoples of the Third World. These two documents clearly condemn the
exploitation of the poor by developed countries and invite the church to take seriously the
plight of the poor and the oppressed.73
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Gutiérrez is looking for a program of transformative action dependent on both
the word of God and a right social analysis that effectuates “liberation from every form of
exploitation, the possibility of a more human and dignified life, [and] the creation of a
new humankind” 74 – all of which passes through the love of one’s neighbor who bears
God’s image. For Gutiérrez the existence of poverty is structural and its causes lie in the
oppression of some classes by others. Marginalization, oppression, and poverty are rooted
in social relations. Any conversation about Christian love must criticize such attitudes
and take side with the oppressed. All genuine theology, for Gutiérrez, has to take into
consideration the irruption of the poor in history by creating thus a new and different
society. The task of Christian theology as taken from this fundamental option for the poor
is to tell both the oppressors and the nonpersons, that God is love, and that this love
makes us all brothers and sisters. Martinez words are here helpful, as they summarize
Gutiérrez’s theology:
Gutiérrez’s theology of liberation is a decision to work from the viewpoint of the
poor – the exploited classes, marginalized ethnic groups, and scorned cultures.
This led him to take up the great theme of poverty and the poor in the Bible. As a
result, the poor appear within this theology as the key to an understanding of the
meaning of liberation and of the meaning of the revelation of a liberating God.75
The Encounter with God in History
The fundamental theological issue in the discussion about encountering God in
history is that of the relationship between nature and grace as developed by Karl Rahner.
Rahner maintains the essential relationship between nature and grace by arguing that
is no doubt that his influence at Medellin was decisive to establish the overall orientation and the
theological framework of the assembly, and that, in turn, he was confirmed and encouraged by the spirit
and the result of the conference in his search for the theology of liberation.” 121. For an analysis of a
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God, the holy mystery, is connected to human history by revealing himself in Jesus and
he is operative in history through the Holy Spirit. Gutiérrez sees in Rahner’s
understanding of the relationship between nature and grace an avenue for the assertion of
an intrinsic link between human history and salvation history. Thus, in his book, A
Theology of Liberation, he creatively worked out Rahner’s significant view which affirms
the constant existence of God’s grace in all created reality and the central connection
between the history of salvation and history at large.
Gutiérrez constructs his project upon the Rahnerian foundations and must
specifically embrace Rahner’s anthropological perspective. Yet he also expands Rahner’s
anthropology by focusing, not on the subject in general, but on the concrete and historical
subject’s relationship with the other in his/her own society. Gutiérrez’s subject is the
other, the nonsubject, the neighbor, the other human person utterly poor, oppressed and
abandoned.76 Gutiérrez is eager to show how the human subject relates to God through
the encounter with the nonsubjects, the others.77 This is Gutiérrez’s way of answering the
question about the meaning of the Latin America struggle. Human history, therefore, is
the location of our encounter with God, in Christ.
In history, Gutiérrez argues, the biblical God has always been close and
committed to human beings. At the outset of the history of the chosen people, God made
a covenant with the people and vowed to live with them forever (Exod. 29: 45-46; 26: 1112); and God’s sanctuary is in the midst of them forever (Ezek. 37: 27-28). The tent, the
Ark, and the mountain in the Hebrew Scriptures stressed God’s presence sharing in the
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historical life of the people and how he revealed himself in history (Exod. 33: 7-11; Num.
1:1; 10: 35-36; 11:16, 24-26; Deut. 31: 14; 2 Sam. 7: 6-7). Again, in proclaiming the new
covenant with his people, God promised to be present in the very heart of every human
(Ezek. 36: 26-27; Jer. 31: 33).78 God’s commitment to human beings, however, was
totally fulfilled, for Gutiérrez, with the Incarnation of the Son of God who became flesh
to dwell among us (John 1:14). “God is visible in the humanity of Christ, the God-Man,
irreversibly committed to human history.”79 Christ is God’s temple and “the Christian
community is a temple of living stones, and each Christian, a member of the Christian
community, is a temple of the Holy Spirit who should not be destroyed” (1Cor. 3: 1617).80
Gutiérrez asserts also in a more comprehensive way that “not only Christians are
temples of God; every human being is.”81 To substantiate this he refers to the episode of
Cornelius in the New Testament (Acts 10:45, 47; 11: 16-18 and 15:8). Hence, Jesus
Christ is the universalization of the presence of God. “In him, in his personal uniqueness,
the particular is transcended and the universal becomes concrete.”82 Now, since humanity
– every human person – is the living temple of God, all human actions in history have an
effect upon God. As a consequence, “we meet God in our encounter with others; we
encounter God in the commitment to the historical process of humankind.”83 That the
encounter with God occurs in the neighbor is a traditional biblical theme. Matthew 25:
31-45 is a very good illustration of this, but the whole Hebrew Scriptures teach: to know
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God is to do justice (Jer. 22:13-16). Whatever is done for the stranger, the widow, and the
orphan has an effect upon God; those are the three types of poor. With regard to the
parable of the final judgment in Matthew 25, Gutiérrez insists that Christ is in the
neighbor we encounter daily. Christ teaches us the importance of the other person as the
ultimate meaning of human life. He insists “on a love which is manifested in concrete
actions, with ‘doing’ being favored over simply ‘knowing’, and the revelation of the
human mediation necessary to reach the Lord.”84
The love of God for human beings is found incarnated in human love. Gutiérrez
gives the example of the Samaritan who approached the injured man on the side of the
road to explain that God is loved in the neighbor (Luke 10: 33; 1:7, 8; 7:13; 15:20).85
Thus, “the neighbor” Gutiérrez warns:
[I]s not an occasion, an instrument, for becoming closer to God. We are dealing
with a real love of persons for their own sake and not ‘for the love of God,’ as the
well-intended but ambiguous and ill-used cliché would have it – ambiguous and
ill-used because many seem to interpret it in a sense which forgets that the love
for God is expressed in a true love for persons themselves. This is the only way to
have a true encounter with God. That my actions towards another is at the same
time an action towards God does not detract from its truth and concreteness, but
rather gives it even greater meaning and import.86
A distinct merit of Gutiérrez and the entire liberation theology movement is that it gave
renewed attention to the centrality of human mediation as the primary means to reach
God, which has strong scriptural roots:
our encounter with the Lord occurs in our encounter with others, especially with
those whose human features have been disfigured by oppression, despoliation,
and alienation and who have “no beauty, no majesty” but are the things “from
which men turn away their eyes” (Isa. 53:2-3)…Our attitude towards them, or
rather our commitment to them, will indicate whether or not we are directing our
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existence in conformity with the will of the Father. This is what Christ reveals to
us by identifying himself with the poor in the text of Matthew.87
For Gutiérrez, “theology of liberation means establishing the relationship that exists
between human emancipation – in the social, political, and economic orders – and the
kingdom of God.”88 Martinez’s words excellently illustrate Gutiérrez’s thought on the
other human person’s role in our relationship with God:
God is encountered in history because God is irreversibly committed to human
history in Christ. Christ is the point of encounter of God and the creature and the
expression of the utter importance of human reality and history within the divine
plan. It follows then that to believe in God and to encounter God in history
through the other are intrinsically linked.89
Liberation, Development and Salvation
For Gutiérrez, liberation theology’s emphasis on the turn to the neighbor in the
human historical situation cannot remain indifferent to the problems of human liberation
and development, because God’s desire to save humankind embraces all human reality.
As the world experiences profound and rapid socio-cultural transformation, differences in
the transformation process have separated diverse countries, regions, and groups of
people on the planet. This situation calls for liberation and development of those lessprivileged as a participation in God’s desire to save all humankind.90 As the evangelical
principles are in radical incompatibility with unjust and alienating structures of societies,
Christians, in virtue of their faith in the God of love, should be moved to participate in
the liberation of the oppressed peoples and exploited social classes.91 Gutiérrez sees the
process of liberation and development as a way to address the most primary human
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aspirations of liberty, dignity, and the possibility of personal fulfillment for all.92 He
understands the struggle for liberation and development as the breaking of the domination
of the rich countries and the misuse of power and wealth by some people in their
societies. For Gutiérrez, the process of liberation articulates the unavoidable moment of
fundamental change which is unfamiliar to the common use of the term development. For
a strategy of development to be effective and meaningful, Gutiérrez insists, it has to take
place within the context of liberation.93
Gutiérrez views “development [as] a total social process, which includes
economic, social, political, and cultural aspects, [because] this notion stresses the
interdependence of the different factors.”94 Progress in one area implies a move forward
in all areas, while stagnation in one area would hold back the growth of the rest. To view
development in this wider context, Gutiérrez affirms, unavoidably calls for an ethical
aspect which assumes a concern for human values. Thus, development as economic
growth would be meaningful only by embracing a humanistic perspective: the concern
for human values, most fundamentally the dignity of the human person.95 For Gutiérrez,
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to speak about a theology of liberation and development is to seek an answer to the
question: what relation is there between salvation and the historical process of human
liberation?96 The need for liberation and development as a participation in God’s desire to
save all humankind led Gutiérrez to argue for a close link between salvation and
liberation. “Salvation – the communion of human beings with God and among
themselves – is something which embraces all human reality, transforms it, and leads it to
its fullness in Christ.”97
The world beyond ours is the transformation and fulfillment of the present life.
Hence, as Gutiérrez states, “the absolute value of salvation – far from devaluating this
world – gives it its genuine meaning and its own autonomy, because salvation is already
latently there.”98 The salvific action of God underlies all human existence, because there
are no two histories, one profane and one sacred. “There is one history – a ‘Christofinalized’ history.”99 Thus, “salvation embraces all persons and the whole person; the
liberating action of Christ – made human in this history and not in a history marginal to
real human life – is at the heart of the historical current of humanity; the struggle for a
just society is in its own right very much a part of salvation history.”100
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Spirituality of Liberation
For Gutiérrez history is one, and the history of salvation is at very heart of human
history. Human history, therefore, provides the location of the human encounter with God
where it can find peculiar expression in contact with others so as to bring about the
liberation of humankind. To place oneself in the perspective of the kingdom of God
means to participate in the struggle for the liberation of those oppressed by others.
Gutiérrez stresses the urgent need for a spirituality of liberation that focuses on a
conversion to the neighbor, the oppressed person, the exploited social class, the despised
ethnic group, the dominated country.101 He sees a relationship between spirituality and
the content of liberation theology, and insists that human spiritual life cannot be separated
from historical life.102
Gutiérrez distinguishes three themes of the new spirituality: conversion,
gratuitousness, and joy. Conversion means a break with the past, a setting out on a new
path. It involves a possibility for a new life, lived in solidarity with others. Moreover, it
also has to influence the socio-economic, political, cultural, and human milieu from
which conversion comes about.103 Hence, a real human person is concerned with the life
of those of who suffer injustice. A purely interior and spiritual attitude is not enough to
become a new person. Conversion to the neighbor is significant because it leads to the
“knowledge” of God; “to know God is to do justice… Hunger for God and hunger for
bread, mainly bread for the neighbor, are perpetually interconnected.”104
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Gratuitousness has to do with God’s gracious love. It is the source of our ability to
love, act and commit ourselves to a liberating task. A genuine love begins with an
attention to the real need of the other human person, not with an obligation to love.105 For
Gutiérrez “the conversion to one’s neighbors, and in them to the Lord, the gratuitousness
which allows me to encounter others fully, the unique encounter which is the foundation
of communion of persons among themselves, and of human beings, with God, these are
the source of Christian joy.”106 Joy as a gift is an expression of life’s victory over death.
It is already present and not yet present amidst the complexities and worries of the great
effort for the construction of a more just society.107 Joys also articulates the assurance
that undeserved oppression and suffering will be surmounted. In the face of this,
Gutiérrez argues,
The only joy that can finally sustain is ‘Easter joy, joy springing from hope that
death is not the final word of history,’ and that those who encounter crucifixion
can likewise experience resurrection. God’s activity can be seen in movements for
justice, and human involvement in such movements makes the life of joy
possible.108
Spirituality as the placing of oneself in the perspective of the kingdom means to join a
new way that privileges an option on behalf of life. The option finds expression
predominantly in the life of commitment to those who are subject to ‘a premature and
unjust death.’ This attitude of God must serve as a model for all humans.109 As the
prophet Micah puts it, “He has showed you, O man, what is good; and what does the
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Lord require of you but to do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your
God?” (6:8).
The Church as Sacrament in History
Any examination of Gutiérrez’s ecclesiology cannot but make reference to the
influence of the Second Vatican Council on the church as a whole and the encouragement
it gave to the Latin American church. Vatican II documents on the church in the modern
world, Gaudium et Spes, defined clearly what role the church should play amidst the
profound and rapid changes as well as the cultural and social transformations that are
evident around the world.110 During the period of the council, and with the return home
of a new generation of priests from their studies in Europe, the Latin American church
began to think through ways of launching a discussion on salvation explicitly addressed
to the plight of women and men in their part of the world. The aim was to arrive at a
common pastoral and theological trend for the Latin American people in the light of their
sitz im leben. Medellin’s conference theme summarizes well this new orientation: “The
Church in the actual transformation of Latin America in the light of the Council.”111
As Vatican II was able to set forth a new perspective for the church by speaking
of it as a sacrament of salvation whose visibility in history reveals and signifies
humankind’s union with God and the unity of all humankind,112 Gutiérrez called for “a
new ecclesial consciousness and a redefinition of the task of the church in a world in
which it is not only present, but of which it forms a part more than it suspected in the
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past.”113 As the universal sacrament of salvation, the church has to be a sign of the reality
it proclaims to humankind, that is, its being is not ‘for itself,’ but rather ‘for others.’114 As
a result, the church must cease to see itself as the exclusive place of salvation and instead
orient itself towards a new and radical servant of the people. It has to turn to the world,
where Christ and his Spirit are continually active for the salvation of all humanity. It
should also be evangelized by the world.115 Gutiérrez writes:
This dialectic relationship is implied in the emphasis on the church as sacrament.
This puts us on the track of a new way of conceiving the relationship between the
historical church and the world. The church is not a non-world; it is humanity
itself attentive to the Word. It is the people of God which lives in history and is
oriented toward the future promised by the Lord. It is, as Teilhard de Chardin
said, the “reflexively Christified portion of the world. The church-world
relationship thus should be seen not in spatial terms, but rather in dynamic and
temporal ones.”116
Consequently, the church as a sign of God’s presence in history should – in its concrete
existence – be a place of liberation both internally and externally. It should break with
unjust social orders, commit itself to oppose exploitation and alienation, promote justice
on behalf of the nonpersons, and dedicate itself to build a society of solidarity and justice.
This is, for Gutierrez and other liberation theologians, the essence of what the church is:
to strive to create a human brother/sisterhood. In the context of Latin America, Gutiérrez
asserts, the role of the church is to struggle against the radical causes of injustice,
oppression, and marginalization of the poor. If it does so, it will play its prophetic role
and so be an authentic and effective sign of unity under the universal love of God.117
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Gutiérrez’s theology of liberation – as presented in his major theological themes –
is a decision to work from the viewpoint of the neighbors, the other human persons,
especially those who are oppressed and marginalized. It calls for the ‘creation’ of new
human persons based on God’s love for us and the love of neighbor. Jon Sobrino’s
theological perspective, after Gutiérrez, takes the same direction. It is to Sobrino’s
theology that we now turn.
III. Jon Sobrino
In the preceding part of this chapter Gutiérrez’s theology was analyzed and it
became clear that an understanding of liberation theology as a theological movement
would be possible only in relation to the characteristics of the society and the church
from which it surfaces. A useful place to begin an examination of Sobrino’s theological
project is the El Salvadoran society and by extension the whole of Central American
society. It will therefore be the task of this study to situate Sobrino’s thought in his sociocultural and ecclesiastical context. In the development of his reflection, the humanization
of the victims of this world becomes part of everyday life. This lessens the breach
between the worldly and the holy and links life and faith.
Social, Cultural, and Ecclesial Background of Sobrino’s Theology
Jon Sobrino, a Spanish-Basque, was born in 1938 and entered the Jesuit order in
1956 at the age of eighteen. He went to El Salvador in 1957 as a nineteen-year-old Jesuit
novice, and since then, has belonged to its Central American province. Between 1963 and
1965, he earned a licentiate in philosophy and humanities as well as a diploma in
engineering, both from the University of St. Louis. After his ordination to the priesthood
in 1969, he continued his studies in theology at the Jesuit College of St. Georgen in
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Frankfurt, where he received a doctorate in 1975. His dissertation was on “The
Significance of Cross and Resurrection in the Theologies of Jürgen Moltmann and
Wolfhart Pannenberg.” 118
Upon his return to El Salvador he began editing, along with his Jesuit confrere
Ignacio Ellacuria, a collection of books entitled Mysterium Liberationis. This series was
meant to be the Summa Theologica of liberation theology. In November 1989, members
of the Salvadoran army murdered Ellacuria and five other Jesuits priests. Apart from the
two periods of study in Germany and in the United States, Sobrino has spent his life in El
Salvador teaching at the Jesuit University José Simeón Cañas in San Salvador, its capital
and largest city.119 He is one of the many Roman Catholic clergy who have risked their
lives by identifying with and defending the Salvadoran poor and oppressed. Sobrino
escaped the fate of six of his closest companions who were murdered by the security
forces in November 1989, only because he was lecturing in Asia at the time.
The Republic of El Salvador is situated in Central America and it is surrounded
on the south by the Pacific Ocean, on the west by Guatemala, and on the north and east
by Honduras. It is “the smallest,” “one of the poorest” and “most densely populated
republics in Latin America.”120 According to Peterson the “average per capita gross
national product was slightly over one thousand U.S. dollars in 1991, and combined
under, and unemployment hovers around seventy percent.”121 Most Salvadorans have no
access to clean water, food, and medical care. There is also a high level of illiteracy.
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Peterson points out that the notable disproportionate sharing of land and revenue has also
contributed to the plight of the people, in a society in which most families have
traditionally depended on agriculture for their living.
After independence from Spain, indigenous lifestyle was yet to improve. The
economic problems and the concentration of land and wealth in the hands of a few was
still a major concern. For instance, as Peterson shows “one percent of the population
controls seventy-one percent of the farmland, and over ninety-six percent of the rural
population has twelve acres or less. Half of the national income goes to only eight
percent of the population.”122 As a result this created a significant economic disparity
among the population and has stimulated several revolutions during colonial and
postcolonial periods of the country’s history. To the indigenous protests the government
and the landowners responded with the formation of militia groups to repress popular
protest.123 While the country seemed to have made some economic progress during the
1950s and 1960s, its overpopulation, economic problems, and inequitable social system
led to social and political unrest. By the end of the 1970s, murder and other terrorist acts
by leftist guerrillas and especially by right-wing “death squads” had become
common.124 Peterson describes the situation as follows: The
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[C]entral government remained out of reach of the opposition, political organizing
intensified at the grassroots. Spurred by the continued corruption and economic
injustices, a number of organizations emerged during the late 1960s and early
1970s to challenge the traditional division of power and resources. In parts of the
countryside, peasants organized to demand fairer wages, land distribution, and
living conditions.125
Peterson also explains that following Vatican II and the Medellin conference, churchbased groups in rural areas of El Salvador, such as FECCAS (the Christian Peasant’s
Federation) and the UTC (Union of Farmworkers) began to reflect on the meaning of the
scripture in relation to their situation.126 These, according to Sigmund, “proposed an
agrarian reform program that would respond to the desperate land hunger of an
overpopulated country in which most of the land was in the hands of a small, wealthy
oligarchy.”127 Quickly, in Peterson’s estimation, “these organizations developed
leadership skills as well as ideas about social justice and the value of collective action, in
base Christian communities, cursillos, encuentros, and other Catholic educational and
pastoral programs.”128 Moreover, these organizations had the support of clergy and
religious, and most importantly those connected with the Jesuit institutions in San
Salvador which were accused of promoting reform. Included here were obviously Ignacio
Ellacuria and Sobrino whose call for the end of injustice and violence led to accusations
of leftist sympathies.129
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In El Salvador, social Christianity emerged in the 1930s in response to the
hardships, uprisings, and repressions of that period. The movements called for
improvements and the respect of the other human person. In the late 1960s, the social
attitude of the Roman Catholic Church in El Salvador was profoundly influenced by
Vatican II and the social encyclicals of Pope John XXIII.130 Also influential was the
Second Latin American Bishops’ Conference held in Medellin, Colombia, in 1968, which
addressed the issues of Vatican II from a distinctly Latin American perspective. These
gatherings, especially the Medellin conference, emphasized the need for a more worldly
involvement by the Roman Catholic clergy with the lives and problems of parishioners
and advocated activist programs to improve the living conditions of the lower class.
Sobrino observes that the poor and the outcast are a majority that live in misery
because of socio-economic structures, severe repression and political violence. This
situation of injustice in El Salvador between the 1970s and 1980s has contributed to his
commitment to view the world through the eyes of the poor, the marginalized and the
oppressed – the victims of this world. He writes:
I have been asked to write about “how my mind has changed,” and I must say that
it has changed indeed – though not just my mind, I hope, but my will and heart as
well. Because the changes that I have experienced and will write about have also
been experienced by many others in El Salvador and throughout Latin
America…I will therefore try to explain the essence of such fundamental change
from the perspective of El Salvador, comparing it with another change which is
often said to lie at the heart of so-called modern Western civilization. From the
time of Kant, such change has been described as an awakening from a “dogmatic
slumber” – an awakening that is like the liberation of reason from subjection to
authority and which, in turn, gives rise to the dogmatic proclamation that the
fundamental liberation of the human being lies in the liberation of reason. In the
Third World, the fundamental change also consists of an awakening, but from
130

Mater et Magistra (1961) – Christianity and Social progress: Deplores the widening gap between rich
and poor nations, the arms race, and, the plight of farmers. It calls Christians to work for a more just world;
Pacem in Terris (1963) – Peace on Earth: Affirms a full range of human rights as the basis for peace. It
calls for disarmament and a world-wide public authority to promote universal common good.

105

another type of sleep, or better, from a nightmare – the sleep of inhumanity. It is
the awakening to the reality of the oppressed and subjugated world, a world
whose liberation is the basic task of every human being, so that in this way human
beings may finally come to be human.131
This realization is what Sobrino experienced upon his return to El Salvador in 1974 after
his studies in Europe. Many of his Jesuits brothers and others, among them Ellacuria and
Archbishop Oscar Romero, had already been awakened from the sleep of inhumanity and
had begun to speak of the poor, injustice, and liberation. Gradually, it became clear to
him “that truth, love, faith, the gospel of Jesus, God, the very best we have as people of
faith and human beings – these were somehow to be found among the poor and in the
cause of justice.”132 In El Salvador, Sobrino argues, he discovered what the cross of Jesus
signifies looking at the life of millions of innocent people who die at the hands of
executioners, and because of poverty and injustice. He explains:
What characterizes our Salvadoran reality is the unjust poverty of the majority,
which produces a slow daily death, to which can be added the speedy and violent
death which occurs in the form of repression and war. The world which is more
real and more Salvadoran is thus the world of poverty and injustice. This is in a
quantitative sense, since the majority are poor, and it is in a qualitative sense,
because that poverty is not only one dimension of reality among many, but the
one which cries out the most.133
Confronted with the phenomenon of oppression in El Salvador, Sobrino – like his Jesuit
brothers – could not but begin by asking the questions: Why this oppression and what are
its roots? How is it “possible to be a human being and not sometimes feel the shame of
belonging to inhuman humanity”?134 This experiential reality led him to the ideological
suspicion of the superstructure, particularly of Christian theology; and so he arrived at a
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new way of experiencing theological reality, which became, in a way, his new
hermeneutic.
Sobrino seeks to reinterpret the spectrum of Christian theology in light of the real.
The real is, for Sobrino, the historical humanity in which we live. He takes the real for his
starting point and rethinks the whole of revelation and the life of the church in a search
for the salvation-liberation of the victims of this world. He was relentless in his efforts to
develop a systematic Latin-American liberation theology with a Christological
perspective. Christology is central to Sobrino’s theological reflection as it will be
discussed fully below. Influenced by his theological education and journey through his
historical-social location, he came to understand Christology as a reflection on praxis,
whereby context precedes the text.
The world of poverty and crucified peoples has allowed Sobrino to overcome
blindness and discover dishonesty. He made an option, above all, to live in the midst of
the true Salvadoran reality. This was his fundamental option for the poor, demanded of
Christians by the gospel and ethically required by history. But above all, it is a primarily
human option to become simply real and more human himself. The emphasis here is on
the sufferings of the majority of people, not only in Latin America but all over the world.
“Jesus’ actions,” Sobrino argues, “were designed not only to declare the dignity [of the
poor and the oppressed] in the sight of God, but also to mount a radical assault on the
causes of their social indignity – the material conditions of their existence and the
religious concepts of their time.”135

135

Jon Sobrino, Jesus in Latin America, translated by Robert R. Barr (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books,
1987), 142.

107

Jon Sobrino’s Major Theological Themes
The life, death and the resurrection of Jesus stand at the center of Sobrino’s
hermeneutical approach to theology. His reflection is mainly Christological and endorses
the image of Jesus’ historical life, his teaching about the kingdom, and his death and
resurrection. It is in this Christological approach that his main themes surface: the
historical Jesus, the death and resurrection of Jesus, the centrality of the Reign of God,
ecclesiology, and spirituality as being human with spirit.
The Historical Jesus
An important aspect in Sobrino’s Christological thinking is the possibility of
constructing Christology on the basis of the historical Jesus.136 In his book Christology
at the Crossroads,137 he makes clear that the historical Jesus is the best starting point for
developing Christology.138 He sees the historical Jesus as being concrete and the basic
traits of Jesus as key.139 He argues that “it is access to the concrete Jesus that brings out
his universal potentialities in diverse historical situations.”140 Hence, “the historical Jesus
is the hermeneutic principle that enables us to draw closer to the totality of Christ both in
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terms of knowledge and in terms of real-life praxis.”141 This is how Sobrino finds the
unity of Christology and soteriology.
Sobrino sees Latin American Christology as responding to a concrete situation in
the light of the actual history of Jesus of Nazareth. The dominant image is that of Christ
as the Liberator. For him, theology goes beyond the role of explanation and focuses
instead on developing a concrete praxis for responding to the situation at hand. In this
sense, liberation theologians begin with the area in which they see a need for salvation
and find in Christ a response. Sobrino also argues that liberation theology’s turn to the
historical Jesus as a model is a normative way for Christians and other humans to discern
how to act in their own political and social situations.142
The Death and Resurrection of Jesus
As the historical reality of the cross of Jesus is critical to the theological notion of
Christian resurrection, Sobrino argues that there should be a more concerted emphasis in
theology on the cross of Jesus, the scandal of the event, and what it means for today. For
Sobrino, Jesus’ crucifixion is at the center of his historical life. This is the central facet of
theology as it articulates the genuine originality of the Christian faith.143 Without the
cross, it is impossible to conceptualize the resurrection of Christian people with concrete
reality. Sobrino denounces any theological approach that tries to explain away the event
of Jesus’ crucifixion by only focusing on the resurrection.
The death of Jesus shows that he truly suffered the same way like those living in
poverty and oppression in the present-day Latin America. And as such, it is an important
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concrete point of reference for the victims of this world to develop Christology. The
theological consideration of the death of Jesus leads to a reformulating of the conception
of God. It was on the cross that God himself suffered the death of the Son and took upon
himself all the pain and suffering of history.144 In so doing, God expressed his love for
humanity in a historical way. If the cross of Jesus was not a historical reality, the
revelation of God in the cross could not have occurred because the death of Jesus on the
cross historicizes God’s love.145 As such, the suffering of those oppressed in today’s
society must be able to relate to the suffering of Jesus in a real way. So the suffering of
Jesus on the cross must be a real event of history.
The reality of the cross opens the reality of freedom from oppression for people in
the real world. Without the cross being accepted as a real historical event, the reality of
salvation through the cross would be impossible to achieve, Sobrino observes. He holds
the cross at the center of his theology and feels that it must be viewed as a historical
reality. He urges humanity to take the crucified people down from the cross. Finally, he
also sees the reality of the cross as the way to political holiness. Because of Jesus, people
can die in the hope of resurrection, looking forward to a new heaven and a new earth.
Jesus’ suffering on the cross shows God’s solidarity with the victims of this world.146
Sobrino, while understanding Jesus’ Resurrection as an eschatological event, also
argues that this event, ultimately, has significance in the reality of our history. Faithful to
his Christological starting point, he approaches the resurrection event from the
perspective of the Third World situation – the victims of this world as a challenge to the
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affluent to conversion. The eschatological aspect of the Risen Lord’s existence may
include some type of breaking into our own history and it may shape our life accordingly.
Our experience, although non identical to the original experience, has a “certain
repeatability of the Easter experience.”147 What seems more appropriate for Sobrino is
“the experience of the irruption of something quasi-eschatological into the human
situation.”148 The experiences of the victims of the world are real experiences of finality
in history, not mediated by texts but by actual reality: “injustice that generates poverty,
violence, lies, and death, but also a situation that generates hope, compassion, justice, and
love.”149 These experiences happen, according to Sobrino, in various dimensions:
anthropological, theological, and ecclesial.
However, the Christological dimension remains the focal point of these
experiences, for the risen Christ is the crucified Jesus. Besides, “the resurrection
concentrates God’s eschatological action in history on the person of Jesus, and that in this
sense present-day experiences are not identical with those narrated in the New
Testament… but we can allow ourselves to be given the capacity for remaking –
experiences of finality.”150 In spite of everything, there is light and hope in the crucified
people. For Sobrino therefore, “Christian faith lives when, throughout history, we not
only accept a doctrinal testimony that, coming from outside, remains always something
external to us, alien to us, but when we go on remaking this type of experience of
finality.”151 The experience of finality is discipleship, the following of Jesus within the
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circumstances of history. It is a certain form of fullness not the totality that should change
the quality of one’s life. To live fully is to live more in the conditions of historical
existence through love, triumph, freedom, and joy. Freedom as triumph over selfishness,
joy as triumph over sadness. The lives of the victims of this world inspire a new spirit of
struggle and new hope in people. Sobrino sees Jesus’ resurrection as a Christian response
to a lasting human question of justice for the victims of this world.152
The Centrality of the Kingdom of God
More than influencing a particular theological treatise, the symbol of the kingdom
of God has shaped a way of doing theology and its fundamental character. This is true
especially in the case of liberation theology of various provenances and motifs. Jon
Sobrino has argued at length, and convincingly, that whereas for Latin American
theology the liberation of the poor is the primacy of reality, the kingdom of God rather
than the resurrection of Jesus is its eschaton.153
In Sobrino's view, there are several convergences between liberation theology and
the theme of the kingdom of God. Liberation theology presupposes a pre-theological
option for the poor who are the addressees of the kingdom of God.154 Furthermore, it has
certain formal characteristics which correspond to the symbol of the kingdom of God: it
is concerned with historicizing the transcendental realities of faith, with denouncing and
unmasking historical sin, with transforming reality, and with making the people the
subjects of theology and the agents of faith.155
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Jesus’ historical life as the mediator of the Father brings about this kingdom of
God. Sobrino insists on life as the historical content of the kingdom of God. Because
poverty means proximity to death, “life means that, with the advent of the kingdom of
God, the poor ceases to be poor.”156 Life is a reality which points to ‘more;’ “its concept
is dynamic and directional,”157 it unfolds gradually in multiple levels of realization and is
always open to the “perpetual element of the ‘more’ in the concept of the kingdom of
God.”158 God becomes the God of those who suffer “lack of life,” the victims of this
world and this divine solidarity go as far as the Cross. The centrality of the kingdom of
God means that God desires life for the poor and delivers them from the anti-kingdom.
Ecclesiology
For Sobrino Christology is not merely anthropological and social in nature, but
also theological and ecclesial. The Second Vatican Council’s Dogmatic Constitution on
the Church begins with the following words: “Christ is the light of humanity; and it is,
accordingly, the heart-felt desire of the sacred Council, being gathered together in the
Holy Spirit, that, by proclaiming his Gospel to every creature, it may bring to all men that
light of Christ which shines out visibly from the church.”159 This quotation shows the
direct link between Jesus and the church; the church exists because Jesus willed it. This
helps to understand Sobrino’s approach to the reality of the church. At the basis of his
ecclesiology, there is the experience of the poor. Sobrino presents a passionate
commitment to the poor, not just those who have nothing, but especially those deprived
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by an unjust global system of the goods to which they are entitled. This point drives his
theological reflection on the church. The poor call the church into question, as nothing
else does, but they have not been the church’s central concern.160
The most serious aspect from a theological point of view is that the poor have not
come to possess the theological status they deserve according to Jesus. Sobrino,
therefore, hopes to shed light on some basic problems faced by a church that desires to be
faithful to its Christian nature. He then proposes the historical Jesus as a model of strict
theological importance to ecclesiology because “the essence of the church does not exist
unless it takes historical form.”161 Although he admits that the church comes into
existence after the resurrection event, he nevertheless underlines the correlation of the
resurrection to the reality of history, namely the reality of Jesus’ ministry to the poor
prior to his crucifixion. Jesus’ ministry and his crucifixion are continuous images leading
to the resurrection. Today the risen Lord has appeared to the church of Latin America to
restore it again; He gave the Latin American church the grace of ‘seeing’ him in the poor,
hence the existence of the church of the poor.
For Sobrino, the church of the poor is a church “formed on the basis of the poor
and that finds in them the principle of its structure, organization, and mission.”162 It is in
this church that one finds the basic substance of ecclesiality, namely, faith, hope, love,
the presence of Christ and mission. Furthermore, this church of the poor is not to be
identified with the Vatican II understanding of church as the people of God because of
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the universal vagueness that Vatican II gives to the term people of God.163 A church of
the poor means going beyond a purely universalist, ethical approach of the people of
God; it “means that the poor are the authentic theological source for understanding
Christian truth and practice and therefore the constitution of the church.”164 These
churches are where people should seek and find God.
If this is now the orientation, what then comes of the universality or the
catholicity of the church? In response to this question Sobrino affirms that the
universality referred to in catholicity is not achieved except through partisanship, which
means through
the discovery of the originality and the specificity of the ‘local’ church… There is
a good deal of evidence to prove that the church in Latin America is becoming an
authentic ‘local’ church and not simply an appendage or prolongation of the
churches of the parent countries. This development is a result of the church’s
option for the poor.165
While Sobrino acknowledges the teaching of the magisterium on ecclesiology as
normative, he also insists on the fact that its interpretation cannot but take into
consideration the cultural specificity of each milieu. In the case of Latin America,
Sobrino would argue, a relevant ecclesiology should be more attentive to the plight of the
poor and the oppressed. It is no longer enough to affirm that praxis comes first, but that
the historical subject of this praxis, the others, should be taken seriously. By so doing, the
church ceases to be abstract but concrete in history and therefore relevant to the people.
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Spirituality
In Sobrino’s judgment, too many people and too many theologians fail to
emphasize the need to see a link between the demands of real life with spirituality. He
understands spirituality as a “life with a certain spirit, life lived in a particular spirit,
especially, in the case of Christian spiritual life, or life lived in the spirit of Jesus.”166
From the very beginning, theology of liberation in Latin America has thought to
be a creative synthesis of what it means to be human and Christian in the real world of
today. Rather than speaking of spirituality in the abstract, Sobrino’s point of departure is
the concrete that actually becomes present in human beings and animates their thoughts,
feelings, and actions. He begins with the proposition that spiritual persons are persons
who live with spirit. Spirituality does not intend a relationship with immaterial, invisible
realities; spirituality is the spirit with which humans confront the real, the concrete
history in which we all live. Sobrino presents the basic premise of spirituality in terms of
honesty and fidelity to the truth of things as they actually are, responding to the demand
of people’s concrete reality. 167
Basic for liberation theology’s spirituality, Sobrino asserts, is the spirituality of
forgiveness expressed through love of the oppressors. This love seeks the conversion of
the oppressors.168 This means that the victims of this world are the locus of conversion
and evangelization because their situation calls for the universal setting for God’s
question: what have you done to your brother/sister? Thus, for Sobrino, the non-poor are
called to respond and correspond to the God of the poor revealed in Jesus. And this
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requires conversion of all who are not on the side of the victimized poor, that is, the
oppressors and those who participate in oppression by their passivity.169 The real here is
the life of the other human being. Salvation, Sobrino affirms, cannot be dissociated from
the real historical humanity in which we live.
For Sobrino, theology is about following Jesus in the path of justice and love in
the cause of God’s kingdom by taking the crucified people down from the cross. For what
the Lord requires of us is to embody justice and love in history. This is the way we
respond to God’s love; the way of seeking the answer to the question of what it means to
be human. Sobrino’s theology of liberation, like Gutiérrez’s, is a decision to work from
the viewpoint of the neighbor. Sobrino’s subject, like Gutiérrez’s, is the other, the poor,
the exploited classes, marginalized ethnic groups, and despised cultures.
The analysis of liberation theology in Latin America as understood by Gutiérrez
and Sobrino has shown that God is found in the course of human history and more
importantly in the neighbor. God stands before humans on the boundary of the historical
future. He is the driving force of history urging Christians to experience transcendence as
a permanent turn to the neighbors. The Christian God we worship is the crucified God
who submerges himself in a world of misery. God is found on the crosses of the
oppressed rather than in beauty, power, or wisdom. At this point, it would be significant
to address the issue of the centrality of the neighbor in liberation theology as it makes
explicit how the Christian response to God is to be lived out.

169

Sobrino, The Principle of Mercy, 59-68.

117

IV. The Centrality of the Neighbor in Liberation Theology
At the heart of Rahner’s philosophical theology is a view of the world as the
mysterious field where God’s self-communication in Jesus and the Holy Spirit takes
place. God for Rahner remains a mystery, always beyond human reach, as the horizon
posited in humans’ movement toward knowing and willing, freedom and love. In a
transcendental movement human beings are oriented and able to know God only through
their being in the world. Karl Rahner has always held that the human spirit, although
transcendent, is bound ontologically to matter, the physical, appearance, the world and
history by a transcendental relation. Therefore its encounter with the transcendence is
always and inevitably mediated through history.170 This implies that there is no pure
religion separate from history because religion is at all times and unavoidably a reality of
the world in which human beings live. Whatever their religion, human beings express
their faith within a concrete particular historical situation. All symbols, concepts, things,
places, persons and events of history, are elements of mediation between a human person
and the divine transcendence.171
Since Vatican II the Catholic Church has adopted this approach to theology as a
way of making Christian doctrine relevant to the contemporary questions. Hence, for the
Catholic Church and Christian theology faith is an experience that governs the whole of
one’s life and being. It has been the concern of the Catholic Church to persistently
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condemn the injustices of the economic and social conditions created by modern
societies. The church’s declarations have always been in support of basic human rights in
the social, economic, and political orders of societies. Liberation theology has in recent
times endeavored to give voice to these concerns through a less conventional structure of
thought which has been the object of many criticisms, mainly for its use of Hegel’s and
Marx’s views of history.172 History for Hegel and Marx is not something to speculate
about but also a place where real issues of the future of humanity are dealt with. The
notion of historical consciousness that liberation theology embraces from Hegel and
Marx emphasizes the eschatological vision of history. History is now understood as the
place where the process of emancipation of human beings occurs because God reveals
God’s self through history or God saves in history. This vision of eschatology raises
fundamental questions: how could historical-temporal-spatial events be events of
salvation while retaining a basic orientation toward the future (eschatological salvation)?
How does liberation theology understand the tension between the already and the not-yet
of salvation?
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Liberation theology’s biblical hermeneutic was shaped by its reception of the
Enlightenment philosophical perspective that argues for the independence of human
reason. The turn to the subject became the fundamental point in Christian theology.
God’s transcendence and self-disclosure were no longer only mysterious, rather God is
found in the medium of human dealings in history. Yet, for liberation theology, the
devastating experiences of oppression and poverty in Latin America have shown the limit
of this excessive emphasis on the thinking subject’s freedom and autonomy in history. It
challenges also a futuristic vision of eschatology that has no bearing on human reality.
Liberation theology recognizes that the here and now of salvation has a basic orientation
toward the future. But it insists that this process begins here on earth and ends in eternity.
For Gutiérrez, Sobrino, and most liberation theologians, the historization of salvation
does not consist of reducing salvific action to the transformation of the socio-political
structures. It consists of saying that salvation does not reach its fulfillment if it does not
attain that historical dimension, and when appropriate, that political dimension. It
proposes the turn to the other, that is, social responsibility and commitment to the other
human person that is necessary for the establishment of the anthropology of the new
human.
It argues that the human person’s fullness and the defeat of socio-political and
economic structures of power in human societies can be realized only through a reappropriation of the biblical principle of Christianity of love of neighbor. This is a
fundamental response to the issue of human existence and authenticity. For liberation
theology, Gutiérrez asserts, “the veneration of God and the doing of God’s will are the
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necessary conditions for reflection on Him.”173 Humans find God mostly through
concrete commitment toward the poor (cf.Matt.25:31-46). “Contemplation and
commitment in human history are fundamental dimensions of Christian existence.”174
John Risley’s comments on liberation theology as an authentic spirituality that embraces
the neighbor and God are here helpful:
The gospel sense of the poor, moreover, is also the authentic verification of the
contemplative and interior values of Christian spirituality… orthodox Catholic
spirituality, when trying to discern the criteria for the authenticity of prayer and
mystical experience, has always responded that the verification does not come
with the contemplative prayer in itself, that is, with the subjective mystical
experience. That can easily be deceiving. No, its verification is in the practice of
fraternal love, in fidelity to the sense of the brother or sister in need. The gospel
declares that authentic spirituality is one love which embraces both God and
neighbor, the neighbor who is precisely the poor and needy (Luke 10:29ff.; Matt.
25:31ff.). The experience of God and the experience of the poor are mutually
verifying and mutually reinforcing: the sense of the poor brings with it and
reinforces the sense of God, and vice versa.175
For liberation theology, the biblical concept of salvation is associated with the process of
liberation from oppression and injustice. Sin is understood in terms of the human
person’s inhumanity to the other human. For Liberation theology, as Gutiérrez affirms,
“it is not enough to say that love of God is inseparable from the love of one’s neighbor. It
must be added that love for God is unavoidably expressed through love of one’s
neighbor.”176 Hence, God is found in our neighbor and salvation is said not to be
dissociated from the real historical humanity in which we live. The history of salvation
becomes the salvation of history embracing the entire process of humanization.
Liberation theology centers its argument about the centrality of the neighbor on biblical
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stories of the quest for justice and human dignity, exemplified by Israel's liberation from
Egypt and Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection.
Jesus Christ, the founder and determining factor of Christian faith, taught a self
sacrificing love of God and love of neighbor as an integral part to our relation to God. He
displayed his teaching as the fundamental reason of his own life. He went around doing
good. He was remembered after his death by his friends for his actions which were
consistent with his teaching and faith. To be his disciple is about following in his life
patterns which are essentially a life of love and doing good, not simply for one’s friends,
but for the others, one’s enemies, the outsiders. Hence, in the ethical teaching of Jesus
Christ, as Roger Haight argues, “the love of God and the love of neighbor are
inextricably entwined.”177 For liberation theology, Haight contends, “one cannot love
God wholly without including in that love all that is of God, especially all other people
who are God’s own… [Equally] an authentic love of other people implies a love for what
makes them be and be as they are, their ground of being, God.”178
With respect to the connection between love of neighbor and love of God,
liberation theology uses two main texts: the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10: 2937) and the text of the last judgment in (Mat. 25: 31-45). The story of the Good
Samaritan presents two figures of the neighbor; both the one who approached the
wounded man and made him his neighbor and the one who fell into the hands of the
robbers. The neighbor is not only the one who one finds in one’s path, but also the one in
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whose path one places himself, the one who one approaches and actively seeks. To be a
Christian, for Gutiérrez and Sobrino, is to draw near, to make oneself a neighbor in taking
actions in history as Christians live their lives as beings in the world. God reveals his
human face in history through his Son Jesus Christ. Energized through faith in Jesus
Christ, Christians give witness to God’s will and become on earth, the instruments and
models of God’s love for humankind.
The last judgment text presents two fundamental points: loving one’s neighbors as
one loves oneself and the preferential option for the least of these. To live out these two
commandments is without a doubt life’s greatest challenge and highest purpose. The
context of the parable infers that the poor are the ones who have been hungriest, thirstiest
and most naked and so we must not fail to care for them. For liberation theology,
following the scriptures, how humans treat one another is a critical part of how we love
God. Thus, any act of love toward the others, especially the poor, marginalized, and
exploited ones, is an act of love toward God. Gutiérrez explains:
God is loved in the neighbor… To love one’s brother or sister, to love all persons,
is a necessary and indispensable mediation of the love of God… This holds to a
certain extent for every human person according to the important text of Matthew
25, which reminds us that an action on behalf of a human being is an action on
behalf of God. It is to love God: if you gave food and drink, you gave it to me; if
you denied it, you denied it to me.179
As Saint John puts it: “But if a man says, ‘I love God,’ while hating his brother, he is a
liar. If he does not love the brother whom he has seen, it cannot be that he loves God
whom he has not seen” (1John 4: 20). The strength of liberation theology is in its
compassion for the poor and its conviction that Christians should not remain passive and
unconcerned to the plight of their neighbors. The human person’s inhumanity to a fellow
179
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human is sin and calls for conversion and Christian resistance. Liberation theology is a
plea for costly discipleship and a reminder that to follow Jesus has practical social and
political consequences. Here is how Gutiérrez puts it:
Love of neighbor is an essential component of Christian life. But as long as I
apply that term only to the people who cross my path and come asking me for
help, my world will remain pretty much the same. Individual almsgiving and
social reformism is a type of love that never leaves its own front porch... On the
other hand my world will change greatly if I go out to meet other people on their
path and consider them as my neighbor, as the Good Samaritan did... the gospel
tells us that the poor are the supreme embodiment of our neighbor. It is this option
that serves as the focus for a new way of being human and Christian in today's
Latin America. But the existence of the poor... is not neutral on the political level
or innocent of ethical implications. Poor people are by-products of the system
under which we live and for which we are responsible... That is why the poverty
of the poor is not a summons to alleviate their plight with acts of generosity but
rather a compelling obligation to fashion an entirely different social order.180
What Gutiérrez seems to be saying here is that to follow Jesus leads to a concern for
social justice. This is an intrinsic form of authentic Christian faith, because it is the
determining form that structures faith’s love for other human beings. Haight’s words
explain exceedingly well how liberation theology understands Christian faith:
Active concern for other human beings on a social level, though never to the
exclusion of concern for the other levels of personal and transcendent freedom,
constitutes real union with God by an implied faith. And all faith that lacks this
concern as its forms is incomplete and suspect.181
Furthermore, for liberation theology, as Gutiérrez argues, the bond between love of
neighbor and the love of God
is not only valid for Christians, but for all persons who, in one way or another,
welcome the Word of the Lord into their heart… God is revealed in history, and it
is likewise in history that persons encounter the Word made flesh. Christ is not a
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private individual; the bond which links him to all persons gives him a unique
historical role.182
For liberation theologians, human beings find the Lord in their encounters with others,
and to be a human is to commit oneself in one way or the other in the process of the
respect of human dignity and emancipation. The centrality of the neighbor in liberation
theology lies in the fact that one’s action toward the other is at the same time an action
toward God. Again, liberation theology urges Christian theology to leave the climate of
the turn to the subject and move toward a consideration of the turn to the other that
constitutes the truth of Christianity: the concern for the humanity of every human being
created in God’s image. Haight argues that liberation theology’s commitment to neighbor
implies also a commitment to God’s ultimate transcendence:
The neighbor then is certainly the test and the criterion of authentic selftranscendence vis-à-vis God. But even more, the ‘others,’ he and she and they, are
the privileged near-at-hand mediating vehicle through whom, by responding
precisely to them, we respond to God. It is therefore true that while we are in
history the only way we can love God authentically is through the neighbor.183
Haight’s point is a valid one. Liberation theology, notwithstanding some excess in the
application of this theology in concrete situations, takes as its starting point the love of
neighbor as it constitutes the truth of Christianity. Every human person, especially the
poor, the stranger, the oppressed – the nonpersons – is an incarnation of God’s image in
the world and deserves to be treated with respect and dignity. And in so doing we meet
the divine transcendence who from eternity calls us to justice and love of neighbors.
There is a need to build up and enforce stronger political and local solidarity in the world.
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Conclusion
In Central and Latin America, this chapter noted, the challenge to Christian
theology was the political oppression and the socio-economic plight of “the ‘nonpersons,’ those who are not recognized as humans by the social order: the poor, the
exploited, those systematically and legally deprived of their status as human beings, those
who barely realise what it is to be a human being.”184 This led to the emergence of
liberation theology. It is a theology that stems from the meaning of love of neighbor in
Christianity in the midst of the tragic human situation; hence, the centrality of the
neighbor as the condition of an authentic self-transcendence vis-à-vis God in liberation
theology. It calls for the liberation of the neighbor and argues that it is in the works of
justice toward the other human person, in loving one’s neighbor, that the divine
transcendence is encountered in concrete life.
This chapter discussed the place of neighbor in liberation theology through the
eyes of Gutiérrez’s and Sobrino’s theological perspective. It argued that liberation
theology emerged as a response to the existence of a crucified people, the non-persons,
the poor and the oppressed of our world – whose suffering presents Christian faith with
an urgent demand – that we turn toward them in love and solidarity because they also are
children of God. The stress here is on the neighbor’s humanity, as created in God’s
image. Thus, love of neighbor is the first moment in the process of theological reflection
for Gutiérrez, Sobrino, and other liberation theologians. The examination of the social,
cultural, and ecclesial background of Gutiérrez and Sobrino has helped make sense of and
appreciate the theological origins of their thought in time and place. Furthermore, this
chapter has also shown that for Gutiérrez and Sobrino the human person, the poor, the
184
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stranger, the widow, the oppressed, the homeless, is the place for a possible divine selfdisclosure. As Gutiérrez and Sobrino analyze the human person in the light of the
Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ, this chapter argued that their theological reflections
are inspired by their Christologies and the experience of their social locations. Liberation
theology as presented by Gutiérrez and Sobrino stems from the “Christology from below”
and in this perspective, it is very concrete and social and calls for an ever-closer link
between faith and daily life, between theory and practice. Hence, liberation is seen as
dialectically linked with the humanization of the other human person, Levinas’s autrui
who bears the trace of the divine. For Gutiérrez and Sobrino salvation cannot be
dissociated from the real historical humanity in which humans live. This soteriological
perspective takes its content from Jesus’ command of love of neighbor, his ministry to
the poor and his opposition to oppression.
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CHAPTER THREE
Emmanuel Levinas and Liberation Theology in Dialogue: An
Intersubjective Model for the Radical Re-imagining of the
World
Introduction
The first chapter established that the core of Levinas’s philosophy is the
relationship between the other and the subject. As we have seen, Levinas articulates his
position on the issue of the other within the Western philosophical tradition and presents
ethics as first philosophy.1 He acknowledges his debts to Plato who first placed the Good
beyond being, to Descartes who opened thought to the idea of the infinite and to Kant
whose criticism had shaken up philosophical dogmatism.2 His aim has been to renew
twentieth century phenomenology by combining “a radical critique of Western
philosophy with a Platonizing retrieval of the pre-Platonic tradition of Israel.”3 Levinas
was dissatisfied with Western philosophy’s tendency to base all knowing, willing, and
meaning on the intentional consciousness of the subject, rejecting thus any possibility for
the existence of the other independent of the subject. In his work, responsibility is first an
ethical gesture, “set forth as the determinative structure of subjectivity”4 in its
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“relationship with the Good, which is over and beyond Being.”5 It is a command that
orders a being to act for the good of the other who presents him/herself as a face. The
face is an unrepresentable trace and calls forth the idea of transcendence.
Liberation theology – as developed by Gutiérrez and Sobrino – was the object of
the second chapter. This theology posits one’s responsibility towards the poor, the
stranger, the oppressed, etc, as constitutive of one’s subjectivity and relationship with the
divine transcendence. It sees in the faces of the crucified people of Latin America and the
Third World the face of Jesus Christ. Gutiérrez and Sobrino also insist on the necessary
link between the notions of kingdom of God, grace, and soteriology with the creation of a
better society – the radical re-imagining of the world.
The purpose of this third chapter is to examine the conceptual affinities of
Levinas’s philosophy with liberation theology. The thesis here is that Levinas’s
humanism – as opposed to the humanism of the Enlightenment6 – finds some conceptual
affinities with liberation theology and it is a revalidation of one of the truths of
Christianity and Christianity’s vision of human life and existence: the concern for the
humanity of every human being or love of neighbor.7 Levinas’s philosophy and liberation
theology, each in its own right, responds to the human situation at least in one
comparable way. Their respective work in philosophy and theology emerged as a
response to the twentieth century’s tragic human situation as at once transcendent yet
absolutely weak and exposed. They search for the divine transcendence in a life of
commitment to the other human person, find in the Judeo-Christian wisdom a distinct
5
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way of thinking of the subject and the other, and call for love of neighbor and justice.
Hence, they both view the turn to the other/neighbor as a power of genuine love opening
new avenues for the re-imagining of the world. What is fundamental for Levinas’s
thought and liberation theology is that they both bring forth one major characteristic: the
dimension of the divine opens forth in the human face. God’s transcendence emerges not
in the oppression and hatred of other human beings but in love of one’s neighbor.
This chapter will begin with an overview presentation of the movement from
modernity to postmodernity that constitutes the context for our philosophical and
theological reflection on Levinas’s ethics of responsibility and liberation theology. The
presupposition here is that the twenty-first century in which we live is a postmodern
world. It is a period that questions modernity’s overemphasis on individual subjectivity.
The term modernity as it applies to this dissertation stands for the Cartesian-Kantian
model of thought that celebrates the uniqueness of the thinking subject as the center of all
knowing and meaning. Yet, within the postmodern environment nothing seems to hold,
most foundational culture, intellectual and religious values are being questioned, and new
meanings are being born at the meeting of diverse ideas and worldviews.
While postmodernity, like modernity, has its negative and positive aspects, the
definition of postmodernity that this dissertation embraces is the one that emphasizes the
absolute necessity of relationality, interdependence, and solidarity, based on the
philosophical theology of otherness and difference, to use David Tracy’s words.8 It takes
the form of the turn to the other, resists modernity’s excessive focus on the subject, and
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offers a better prospect for a redefinition of subjectivity as being for the other. Since this
postmodern world is the context in which contemporary philosophical theology has to be
undertaken, this dissertation argues that a reconsideration of Levinas’s thought and
liberation theology, each in its own right, as they both view the turn to the other/neighbor
as a way to approach the otherness of divine transcendence, offers this prospect both
philosophically and theologically. Hence, the examination of commonalities and
differences that can be found between Levinas’s thought and liberation theology will
constitute the second moment of this chapter. It will be argued that the conceptual
affinities between Levinas’s thought and liberation theology – especially their turn to the
other/neighbor – can contribute toward a redefinition of subjectivity as “being-in-theworld” for the other human person. In today’s postmodern world, philosophy and
theology should turn around and face the other who is both God and every human being.
This turn to the other is most needed for any possible re-imagining of today’s world.
In order to further show the connection between Levinas’s philosophy and
liberation theology, this chapter will put forward some propositions as to how their
thought might be put in dialogue. In a sense, this chapter will assert that Levinas’s
transcendental ethics provides a viable philosophical anthropological framework that is
compatible with the centrality of love of neighbor in liberation theology. For Levinas to
argue that all human beings have by nature an essential desire for the Infinite who gives
himself in responsibility for the other human person is unquestionably a radical
awakening that differentiates his thought from abstract philosophies, bringing it closer to
liberation theology’s understanding of the human person. Similarly, this work will
suggest that liberation theology historicizes Levinas’s transcendental ethics of
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responsibility. It will be argued that liberation theology’s spirituality of conversion to the
neighbor bears witness to Levinas’s ethical responsibility. In the end, this chapter will
argue that the turn to the other/neighbor in Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology
is a precondition for peace, justice and good social order.
I. The Context for Philosophical and Theological Reflection: The Postmodern
World
It is usual for contemporary scholars to explain the late twentieth and this early
twenty-first century as a postmodern world.9 It is a new environment in which all
intellectual reflections take place, and this work is no exception. A number of terms have
been put forward to describe this new environment: information society, consumer
society, post-modernity, postmodernism, post-industrial society, post-capitalism, and so
forth.10 The debates around this new concept, as Anthony Giddens would contend, are
mainly centered on the philosophical and epistemological issues as initiated by JeanFrançois Lyotard.11
To be sure, the term postmodernity is most often used in opposition to modernity
to signify a kind of demarcation or distance from the modern era which put emphasis on
“individual subjectivity, interiority, and self-subsistent autonomy.”12 Situating the
9
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beginning of modernity in the sixteenth century, most scholars agree that modernity is the
result of the academic changes that occur with Galileo in physics and astronomy and
René Descartes in mathematics and epistemology. With their works appeared the concept
of the rationality in human dealings.13 From then onwards, rational methods became a
standard in thinking about nature and in dealing with the problems of human life and
society in decontextualized terms.14 Of course, any reasonable person would admit and
appreciate modernity’s contribution to intellectual, socio-political and economic values.
Not only did it transform the modes of social life in the Western world, but it had also
more or less influenced other parts of the globe. On the whole and in all fairness “the
development of modern social institutions and their worldwide spread have created vastly
greater opportunities for human beings to enjoy a secure and rewarding existence than
any type of pre-modern system.”15 Most twentieth century works in philosophy and
theology were influenced by this modern turn to the subject.16
Modernity also, however, contains negative aspects whose initial cause could be
attributed to Descartes’ agenda for modernity as it centered on a method grounded in the
subjects’ self-presence.17 In addition, cultures other than Western culture were not
considered as possessing history because they were primitive, archaic, and pre-historical.
They were “‘lesser’ copies of the modern drive to sameness, the modern ‘Western’
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scientific, technological, democratic culture that is culture and history.”18 Furthermore,
the degradation of the human other, visible in today’s world, has been partly the
consequence of modernity’s over-confidence on the individual subject’s capacity to
create, with the help of modern technology, a safe and secure society where order,
cohesion, and coherence will reign.19 Yet modernity’s courageous “claims for the idealist
self-subsistent rational self and its view of history as inevitably progressive have been
unsettled by the ‘terror of history’ which interrupts and disorients, calling into question
human conceptions of order, divine providence, indeed the very nature of God.”20 This
description could be said to characterize the breakdown of the modern turn to the subject.
The modern individual subject, whose structured cognitive functions were thought to
offer a foundation for integration and unity in self, and the starting point for the ultimate
human ordering of human relationships in societies, seemed to have failed to fulfill the
genuine yearnings of the human heart.21 Unfortunately, however, the influence of this
modern individual subject is still noticeable in today’s postmodern world.
As this study situates its discussion in the context of postmodernity, it does not,
however, deny the fact that postmodernity, like modernity, has its negative and positive
aspects. There are still today different accounts of postmodernity and intense struggles on
how to define this new turn in any particular field, as well as in general. Besides, the
unbalanced changes in social relations in recent years and the attempts of various
scholars at defining postmodernity in the context of their differing fields of inquiry have
characterized the puzzling and always challenged territory of postmodernity.
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Postmodernity is a period when nothing seems to hold, all consistent value systems seem
to collapse, new meanings are being born at the meeting of different elements, and more
importantly modern individual subjectivity is being questioned. As a result, conflicts of
all kinds are becoming more and more common.
In the present age as never before, Anselm Min Kyongsuk argues, the
globalization of the world has created two dialectics that invite humanity to new ways of
thinking the subject both philosophically and theologically: the dialectic of
differentiation, in which humans are made ever more aware of differences in nationality,
culture, religion, ethnicity, gender, class, language; and the dialectic of interdependence,
which forces them to find a way of living together regardless of differences.22 In addition,
political issues with reference to the incorporation or integration of strangers, the politics
of sexual category, the treatment of the poor by the rich, of the disabled by the healthy, of
non-Europeans by Europeans, not to talk of the crisis of ethnicity in Africa and so forth,
also seem to require a properly philosophical and theological skill in what looks like their
common root, that is, the human subject’s encounter with the human other.23 And this, to
be sure, is, as Roger Haight asserts, “the human and theological crisis of our epoch.”24
For Haight, “the massive human poverty and oppression in our time, both the amount of
it and the degree of the damage it does to human life, calls into question the very meaning
of human existence and hence our faith.”25 What is at stake here is the very meaning of
the human other in the postmodern situation that has been neglected in the Western
22
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philosophical and theological reflection which inspired modernity’s dominating and selfcentered subject.
Notwithstanding these divergences and contestations, this work wishes to argue
that how one defines postmodernity in contemporary history, whether one has a positive
or negative, simplistic or complex understanding of it, accounts both for a specificity of
one’s perspective and one’s vision of the humanity of humans. Given that the above
description represents both modernity’s overpowered subject and the present situation in
the world, the questions now become: what is the role of philosophy and theology in this
kind of world? What kind of discourse are theology and philosophy? Where should
philosophy and theology turn in their conversation with postmodern “wounded” culture?
While there are diverse accounts and intense struggles on how to define the
postmodern turn, the definition that serves the purpose of this work stems from a more
practical approach to philosophy, theology and natural science which will mark a return
to the concerns with otherness and difference.26 It calls for a new perspective of
coexistence, based on the consideration of the transcendental dimension of the human
person, and is “appreciative…of the indispensability of relationality, interdependence,
community, and traditions,”27 given the degradation of the dignity of the human other in
history. Thus, the definition of postmodernity this work embraces is, as David Tracy
argues, the one that
at its best is a fully ethical response to the ambiguities of modernity [that is] an
ethics of resistance – resistance, above all, to more of the same, the same
unquestioned sameness of the modern turn to the subject, the modern over-belief
26
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in the search for the perfect method, the modern social evolutionary narrative
whereby all is finally and endlessly more of the self-same.28
This orientation is what has been defined as the postmodern turn to otherness. Levinas’s
transcendental ethics of responsibility and liberation theology, each in its own right,
provide a possibility for this turn to the other who is both God and every human being.
They find in the Judeo-Christian wisdom the “prophetic-ethical sense for the other,
especially the preferred other of the prophets, the poor, the marginal, and the
oppressed.”29 In today’s postmodern world philosophy and theology are invited to
address the question of the other. David Tracy writes:
Genuine postmodernity begins not in ennui but in ethical resistance.
Postmodernity begins by trying to think the unthought of modernity. Beyond the
early modern turn to the purely autonomous, self-grounding subject, beyond even
the most recent turn to language (the first great contemporary challenge to modern
subjectism) lies the quintessential turn of postmodernity itself- the turn to the
other. It is that turn, above all, that defines the intellectual as well as the ethical
meaning of postmodernity. The other and the different come forward now as
central intellectual categories across the major disciplines, including
theology…Part of that return to otherness…is the return of biblical Judaism and
Christianity to undo the complacencies of modernity, including modern
theology.30
The least one can say is that the question concerning the subject’s relation to the human
other has tremendous significance for any theological enterprise attempting to face head
on the problem of inhumanity (poverty, injustice, exploitation, murder, war etc.) in a
postmodern context.
What is attempted here is not a comprehensive analysis of postmodernity, rather,
at best, an overview of the general horizon of the movement from modernity to
postmodernity and how in the postmodern period the other human person – in his/her
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irreducible otherness and difference – becomes the center of interest in the disciplines of
philosophy, theology and the natural sciences. The examination of the dialogue between
Levinas’s transcendental ethics of responsibility and liberation theology which proposes,
notwithstanding some divergences, the turn to the other/neighbor as an intersubjective
model for the radical re-imagining of the world, finds here its significance. The turn to
the other/neighbor opens a possibility for a better world in which the human other will no
longer be seen as a threat to the subject’s existence but rather as a necessary companion
for the subject’s existence in history. The suggestion that humans see in other humans the
dimension of the divine introduces the notions of surplus, transcendence and infinity that
could lessen the possibility of the hatred of the other person. With Gutiérrez, Sobrino,
and Levinas, this dissertation argues that – in today’s world – the claim the other makes
upon the subject ought to be the starting point of any reflection on subjectivity.
II. Areas of Affinity between Levinas’s Philosophy and Liberation Theology
One can be excused for reacting with skepticism to any proposal linking the
names of Levinas and liberation theology. One might understandably be doubtful that
significant convergences can be found between two such dissimilar approaches. Is it not
Levinas who insisted that his point of departure is not theological, and that it is not
theology that he does but philosophy?31 Is the use of the notion of experience in
liberation theology not already wedded to the ontological foundations of Western
philosophy and theological anthropology criticized by Levinas? What has liberation
theology to do with postmodern philosophy? Levinas’s thought and liberation theology
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are not engaged, of course, in the same project and present differences in approach, yet it
is certainly possible to hold the two in a kind of “productive tension.”
An attentive reader of Levinas’s philosophy would certainly agree that there are a
number of elements in his thought upon which a fruitful dialogue could be established
with liberation theology. The main focus here will be to establish areas of affinity
between these two approaches. As stated earlier on, the plausibility of discussing
Levinas’s philosophical conceptual affinities with liberation theology can be said to be
justifiable by a couple of aspects: each in its own right emerged as a response to the
situation of human suffering in history, each searches for the divine transcendence in a
life of commitment to the other human person, each finds in the Judeo-Christian wisdom
a distinct way of thinking of the subject and the other, and each calls for love of neighbor
and justice. They both view the turn to the other/neighbor in love as a prospect for the
creation of a better world.
Levinas, Gutiérrez, Sobrino, and the Human Historical Situation
As it was argued in the first chapter, Levinas was influenced by his experience of
the Shoah in the articulation of his philosophy. In condemning this incomparable atrocity,
he takes issue with modernity’s failure to address the horror of history, and most
especially, the rise of National Socialism in Germany as expressed through the
Holocaust. He saw the Nazis’ extermination of the Jews as completely opposed to the
Judeo-Christian concept of love of neighbor. The expressions such as alter-ego (Husserl)
and being-with (Heidegger) articulated Western philosophy’s inclination to posit the
subject to authenticate the existence of the other. In his new direction, Levinas defined
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the subject’s identity through the encounter with the face of the other that takes place in
diachronic temporality.32
While Levinas takes inspiration for his philosophy from his feeling and memory
of the sufferings of millions in the world, he advocates for a view of history that remains
transcendent (Infinity) with regard to the totality and the freedom of the individual
subject. He insists, however, that this transcendental movement takes place both “within
totality and history, within [human] experience.”33 Human history, for Levinas, has to be
understood as eschatological infinity whereby within human experience, the subject’s
desire for the other human person always breaks totality and calls the subject to infinite
responsibility in terms of affectivity and sensibility.34 Here the human other marks the
end of history as totality and opens up a world in which the human other is the condition
of possibility for the subject’s subjectivity. What Levinas is attempting here is an
asymmetrical relation both beyond and within human experience in history that has to
take “the form of giving the very bread I eat… and to give oneself in giving it.”35
Like Levinas, Gutiérrez and Sobrino, as presented in the second chapter, were
provoked by the political oppression and the socio-economic plight of the non-persons,
32
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the poor, the oppressed, the despised of Latin American society and the Third World. The
Kantian awakening to human reason which Christian theology embraced was no longer
adequate in the midst of human sufferings; it became imperative that Christian theology
awake from its deeper “sleep of inhumanity to a reality of humanity.”36 Gutiérrez and
Sobrino accepted to face the challenge of taking the “crucified people,” the poor and the
oppressed of the world down from the cross. Thus, their theologies emerged as an
invitation to Christian theology to leave the climate of transcendental subjectivity and
move toward a consideration of the human needs of the non-persons in concrete history,
hence the centrality of the neighbor in liberation theology. It is a wake up call for the
humanization of the victims of poverty, oppression, and marginalization. The human
condition in history has been the starting point for both Levinas and liberation theology.
Furthermore, the introduction of the third party in Levinas’s philosophy also
constitutes a point of affinity and dialogue between these two approaches. It opens
Levinas’s thought to the human situation in history by introducing the prospect of
“thought, consciousness, and justice”37 through the creation of political and juridical
institutions that reflect the nature of human fraternity.38 Here, the subject, who dedicated
itself in responsibility for the other, is called into responsibility by many others in society.
Levinas makes the subject extend its love for the other to all the others equally, launching
the basis of a society based on responsibility, justice and fraternity. The turn to the
neighbor in love that liberation theology calls for takes place, for Levinas, as a response
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to the call to justice that arises with the entry of the third party to the scene. Jacques
Derrida’s rereading of Levinas, especially in Totality and Infinity and other lesser-known
Talmudic readings, in terms of “hospitality, responsibility, and justice,” explains how in
concrete life, Levinas “never turned his eyes away” from the “violence” and “distress”
experienced by the “foreigner, the immigrant (with or without papers), the exile, the
refugee, those without a country, a state, the displaced person or population.”39 This
reinforces the view that Levinas gets inspiration for his philosophical discourse not only
from the tradition of Jewish religious texts, but also from human concrete conditions,
both bodily and interpersonally in society.40 Yet Levinas insists on the asymmetrical
nature of his philosophy which is beyond ontology.
Divine Transcendence and Responsibility for the Neighbor in Levinas’s Philosophy and
Liberation Theology
Another aspect of affinity is found in their understanding of the subject-other
relationship as a place of divine transcendence. Levinas’s thought and liberation theology
find divine transcendence in the subject’s life of commitment to the other human person.
They all start from the ethical encounter with the human other and from there work
toward the encounter with the trace of the Divine other. What comes first in Levinas’s
philosophy and liberation theology is the notion of the human, because it is the human
person whom they know. They think God in thinking about human relationships. For
Levinas, the other most mysterious is the human other who is ethical mystery par
excellence, a human whose infinity comes from God. He/she does not belong to the same
genus as the subject. For liberation theology, the other is the other human being, the
39
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original bearer of God’s image through Jesus Christ. Yet for both Levinas’s thought and
liberation theology the human other is the neighbor, the stranger, the orphan, the poor, the
marginalized, the widow, the way to approach the otherness of the divine transcendence.
The other’s otherness and difference is tied to his/her transcendental dimension.
Liberation theology asserts the locus of human encounter with God to be the crucified
people of Latin America and the world. Any life of commitment to God entails the
respect of the life of every human person who bears God’s image. According to liberation
theology, love of neighbor is the necessary condition for encountering God. Like
liberation theology, Levinas keeps the human neighbor between the human subject and
God, such that we cannot too readily approach the invisible God without first
encountering the height of our neighbor.41 To express this, Levinas asks the question:
Is morality possible without God? I answer with a question? Is divinity possible
without relation to the human other? Is such a thing possible in Judaism?
Consider Jeremiah, chapter 24, or Isaiah 58:7 ‘to bring to your house the poor
who are outcast.’ The direct encounter with God, this is a Christian concept. As
Jews, we are always a threesome: I and you and the Third who is in our midst.
And only as a Third does He reveal himself.42
Levinas, although not speaking theologically, argues in De Dieu qui vient à l’idee43 that
the moment at which the word of God is heard is inscribed in the face of the other, in the
encounter with the other. He affirms that it is in the form of ethical order, an order to
love, that the descent of God takes place. He writes:
I can not describe the relation to God without speaking of my concern for the
other. When I speak to a Christian, I always quote Matthew 25; the relation to
God is presented there as a relation to another person. It is not a metaphor: in the
other, there is a real presence of God. In my relation to the other, I hear the Word
of God. It is not a metaphor; it is not extremely important, it is literally true. I’m
41
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not saying that the other is God, but that in his or her Face I hear the Word of
God.44
Levinas sees the obligation or the order to act with love toward the other as
the first word of God. For me [he argues] theology begins in the face of the
neighbor. The divinity of God is played out in the human. God descends in the
“face” of the other. To recognize God is to hear his commandment “thou shall not
kill,” which is not only a prohibition against murder, but a call to incessant
responsibility with regard to the other. It is to be unique, as if I were elected to
this responsibility, which gives me as well the possibility of recognizing myself as
unique and irreplaceable, of saying “I.” Conscious that in each of my human
endeavors – from which the other is never absent – I respond to his existence as
unique being.45
Sobrino and Gutierrez also posit the encounter with the human other in love as
constitutive of the human person and his/her relationship with divine transcendence.
Therefore, ethical responsibility is integral to faith itself, and not a secondary by-product.
Gutiérrez writes:
We stand before something which challenges our categories, the mystery of God
who will not be reduced to our mode of thinking, and who judges us on the basis
of our concrete, historical actions toward the poor…Now we face a God who
blocks the path of a false love which forgets sisters and brothers while claiming to
direct itself spiritually toward God, more to domesticate God than to feel itself
questioned by God’s word.46
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The God of liberation theology, although incomprehensible and mysterious, is always in
relationship with his people and is fundamentally concerned with creation and the
achievements and failures of humankind. He is not only with us and for us, but in the
incarnation of Jesus as the Word of God, has even become one of us. For liberation
theology the stranger, the oppressed, the poor one, is the incarnation of God. Hence, to
know God is to love one’s neighbor and to act with justice.
For Levinas’s philosophy and for liberation theology divinity is not possible
without relation to a human other. Both argue for a philosophical theology of life that
understands the subject’s self-transcendental experience in terms of love of neighbor.
Thus, “transcendence is no longer the ascent to a heaven of the ideal or the sublime but
the humble endurance of everyday life, touched, affected, burdened, wounded, obsessed,
and exhausted by the other’s proximity.”47
Levinas’s Philosophy, Liberation Theology and the Judeo-Christian Wisdom
The Judeo-Christian wisdom in both Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology
can hardly be missed. Levinas’s thought and liberation theology find in the JudeoChristian’s “prophetic-ethical” call for love of neighbor a way out to a hopeful humane
world. In the background of Levinas’s transcendental philosophy there is obviously the
influence of Jewish theology. Levinas takes the Bible as a model of ethical transcendental
philosophy. He affirms that all philosophy, all rationality and all intelligibility stem from
the book of books, namely from the Hebrew Bible.48 He thinks with the Hebrew Bible in
elaborating his philosophy. His claim that the subject’s only way toward God is to be
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ethically responsible for the other person echoes the God-human relationship in the
Hebrew Bible. From the perspective of the Torah, each face represents God’s law to his
people, more importantly, the sixth commandment Thou shall not kill. He often refers to
this ethical responsibility as being “the essence of Jewish conscience”, which, he
believes, is also “the essence of the human conscience”: ‘All men are responsible for one
another, and ‘I more than anyone else,’” quoting Dostoïevsky’s Brothers Karamazov.49
This is, for Levinas, the path to new humanism; it centers on the ethical enactment as
bearing the trace of God at once distant and invisible (YHWH) and at the same time close
to the world and human beings (Elohim).50
Liberation theology is a theological method based on praxis in the light of the
Bible, to use Gutiérrez’s words.51 Its concern for the poor and the oppressed is rooted in
both the Old Testament and in the New Testament. In the New Testament, Liberation
theology takes seriously Jesus’ instructions to his disciples about the love of God and
love of neighbor (Mt. 22: 36-40). These two commandments summarize all the ethical
teachings from the Old to the New Testament. Those who do not love one another cannot
love God, and those who love God have to love one another (1Jn. 4: 7-8, 12, 19-21). This
biblical reference makes clear the fact that the human person is ordained to total
communion with God and to the fullest fellowship with all other persons. This is clear in
Matthew’s eschatological discourse which has been interpreted as the summary of Jesus’
teaching.52 “Anything you did not do for one of these, however humble, you did not do
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for me” (Mt 25:45). Hence, Liberation theology’s association of faith in God and love of
neighbor is an old tradition of Christianity.
Besides, in the subject’s response to the ethical command which he/she
encounters in the face of the neighbor, the subject is called to substitute himself/herself to
the point of death and beyond. This, in liberation theology, corresponds to Jesus’
commandment to his disciples: “Love one another as I love you. No one has greater love
than this, to lay down one’s life for one’s friends.” (John 15: 12-13). Levinas’s position,
which is more of caring for the other than knowing God, is not essentially opposed to
liberation theology’s appeal to respond to the objective needs of the neighbor in imitation
of Jesus’ kenosis in the Scripture. Levinas’s thought and liberation theology, each in its
own right, definitely agree that to be a free human person is to be always given to the
other in responsibility, and this is a difficult freedom, to use Levinas’s words.
Still, another rapprochement with regard to the Judeo-Christian wisdom would be
on the issue of the “suffering servant” in the Bible, who is identified in Christian theology
as Messiah, the Christ. The suffering servant for Levinas is a personification of the
subject’s subjectivity. This, he makes clear in the preface of Totality and Infinity. The
subject realizes or fulfils his/her identity by welcoming and being hospitable to the
other.53 This is crucial for understanding Levinas’s project. For Levinas, the subject is
from the outset elected to act as the suffering servant of Isaiah 53 who takes
responsibility for the other to the point of persecution and death.54 The election is a
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surplus of responsibility, not a privilege; “it is the fundamental characteristic of the
human person as morally responsible.”55 This is for Levinas humanity rightly understood:
I think prophetism as a moment of the human condition itself. For every man,
assuming responsibility for the Other is a way of testifying to the glory of the
Infinite, and of being inspired. There is prophetism and inspiration in the man
who answers for the Other, paradoxically, even before knowing what is
concretely required of himself. This responsibility prior to the law is God’s
revelation. There is a text of the prophet Amos that says: “God has spoken, who
would not prophesy?,” where prophesy seems posited as the fundamental fact of
man’s humanity.56
With this reference to the Hebrew Bible, Levinas’s subject, as the suffering servant, takes
upon himself/herself the sufferings of others. The subject will suffer as a result of his/her
commitment to the task of bearing the rebukes, reproaches, and wounds of his/her
fellows. Here comes in the idea of kenosis, the humility of God in the Christian tradition,
which for Levinas has nothing to do with the Jesus Christ which St Paul’s letter to the
Philippians (2:6-8) portrays. The Messiah, for Levinas, is not the intervention of the Son
of God, Jesus Christ.
God’s kenosis in Judaism, as interpreted by Rabbi Haim of Volozhin and also by
Levinas, has to be understood as the humility by which the Infinite God subordinates his
greatness to human ethical consent.57 Subjectivity is substitution; the fact of emptying
one’s being for the sake of others. Substitution is messianic whenever the subject acts
with love and responsibility for the other. God does not intervene in the life of humans.
He only reigns “by the intermediary of an ethical order, an order in which one being is

55

Levinas, “Philosophy, Justice, and Love,” in Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-other, 119.
Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 113-114.
57
Levinas, “Judaism and Kenosis,” 114-132.
56

148

answerable for another…the human is the possibility of a being-for-the-other.”58 Every
human person is urged to act as if he/she were a suffering servant, the Messiah. Levinas
finds in the messianic texts of the Talmud a description of what it means to be human. He
writes: “the Messiah is Myself [Moi]; to be Myself is to be Messiah… The fact of not
evading the burden imposed by the suffering of others defines ipseity itself. All persons
are the Messiah.”59 It takes shape here and now in the presence of the other person
whenever one’s subjectivity in the world is questioned. Levinas would certainly reject
Liberation theology’s view of the eschatological Messiah who is the fulfillment of
history. He would fear that this kind of Messiah would end the subject’s state of
insomnia/wakefulness60 or what we would call vigilant insomnia.61 It is a state of
watchfulness characterized by an impossibility of sleep. For what keeps the subject
awake and always in permanent responsibility for the other in love is precisely his/her
state of watchfulness. Before even the subject could express his/her freedom, he/she is
already met with this obligation to the other. Hence, Levinas asserts, “ethical freedom is
difficile liberté.”62
Levinas says of human subjectivity what liberation theology says of Jesus Christ.
The notion of substitution in liberation theology makes reference to the life, death and
resurrection of Christ. Christ reveals thus that the essence of human responsibility stems
from the meaning of human life, taking the sufferings of other human beings upon
58
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oneself. The human person can only realize himself/herself or his /her true vocation by
understanding responsibility in imitation of Christ as a radical openness to the needs of
others, thus a self-emptying. Substitution becomes, therefore, a radical expression of
solidarity with others, most especially, with the victims of inhumanity to others. In
history, Gutiérrez and Sobrino argue, Christians in particular and human beings in
general, have the responsibility to act as Christ, the suffering servant. Levinas’s idea of
incarnation is a re-evaluation of subjectivity in terms of substitution, responsibility and
expiation for others. To be a subject is to be for the other person. This is what Jesus
Christ as the prophet of God did so well, and this is what Christian love is all about: to be
human is to love one’s neighbor as God does; it is to bless, care for the poor, the
abandoned, the orphans, and the oppressed; to pray for, and then turn the other cheek to
the enemy.
Now, as this dissertation does not claim a perfect matching between these two
approaches, a couple of points can be noted in terms of divergence. For instance, while
for liberation theology the stranger, the oppressed, the poor one, is the incarnation of
God,63 for Levinas, he/she only manifests the height in which God is revealed as God is
maintained in the trace. The event of revelation of the absolute other (Autre), for Levinas,
takes place through the face of the other whenever the subject takes the prophetic stance
which says “Here I am,” and stands accused, hostage, and responsible for the other,
witnessing, thus, to the Infinite. The infinite discloses itself to the ethical subject through
the trace which passes – without ever being present – in the face of the stranger, widow,
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orphan for whom I am responsible.64 Levinas’s non-representable trace of God remains
unthematizable. God comes to the idea, falls into meaning in responsibility for the
other.65 The neighbor, in liberation theology, is sacred and holy because he/she is an
Imago Dei. Imago Dei in Levinas is about being found in God’s trace, but it is not being
an icon of God, for
God who has passed is not the model whose face would be the image. To be in the
image of God, does not mean to be the icon of God, but to be in his trace. The
revealed God of our Judeo-Christian spirituality preserves all the infinity of his
absence which is in order with his person. He shows himself only by his trace, as
in chapter 33 of Exodus. To go towards Him, is not to follow this trace which is
not a sign; it is to go towards the Others who are held in the trace.66
While, for Levinas, the relation to the face takes place on the asymmetrical level, for
Sobrino and Gutierrez, it occurs in the reality of history in conditions of extremity, each
of which cries out for ethical engagement.
Levinas also departs from Christian theology on the meaning of revelation. He
criticizes theology for positing God as being and God’s revelation as the manifestation of
being.67 For him the God of the Scriptures cannot be defined or confined in theological
language; even the superlatives often used to approach God’s reality are all misleading.
This, of course, is a direct attack on the Christian tradition for its use of superlatives to
describe God and its belief in the incarnation of God in the person of Jesus Christ. Christ,
in the Christian tradition, is incarnate in the life of Christians, while for Levinas, true
incarnation is subjectivity rightly understood. Levinas’s God is not an omnipotent God of
64
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the Christian tradition, encountered both in a one on one contemplative experience and in
the human other. In his philosophy, God’s self-disclosure carries first of all an ethical
signification rather than a theological one.
Another point of divergence is that Levinas operates on the level of philosophy
that runs counter to much of the Western philosophical and theological tradition. He
writes:
The philosophical discourse of the West claims amplitude of an all-encompassing
structure or of an ultimate comprehension. It compels every other discourse to
justify itself before philosophy. Rational theology accepts this vassalage. If, for
the benefit of religion, it reserves a domain from the authority of philosophy, one
will know that this domain will have been recognized to be philosophically
unverifiable.68
Evidently, for Levinas, much theological reflection is ontologically based which, by
privileging and celebrating the uniqueness of the thinking subject over ethical
responsibility renders the other defenseless to whatever possible violence this subject
might exercise on the other. Liberation theology in constructing its theological project
lies resolutely within the ontological tradition of Western philosophy criticized by
Levinas. It analyzes the issue of otherness within the Christian theological tradition to
revitalize the theological agenda from where Rahner left it.
Liberation theology, however, by focusing on the human other left the climate of
the turn to the subject (excessive emphasis on the human subject) and moved a step
forward toward a consideration of the turn to the human other/neighbor that Levinas
speaks about. With liberation theology, the meaning of being is now located in
exteriority, that is, in what is other than self. To be human in the world is to be affected
by the neighbor à la Levinas. Against the accusation that liberation theology was a
68
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“political reduction of the Gospel,”69 liberation theology has persistently maintained that
the legitimacy of theology will always be evaluated by the practice of ethical action and
justice. “Any attempt,” Gutiérrez says, “to separate the love of God from the love of
neighbor gives rise to attitudes which impoverish the one or the other.”70 In its
conceptually thematized categories of being, it posits the subject not as “ontologically
constituted,” but rather, as “ethically enacted” through a “relativization of
intentionality.”71 This perspective offers a new possibility for understanding human
subjectivity. Thus, to be a subject for Gutiérrez, Sobrino, and Levinas is to go beyond
moral obligations to the affirmation of what it means to be human. They are concerned
with the humanity of the other person, which is infinite and cannot be contained by any
human subject. Levinas himself referred to liberation theology as a concrete example of
the application of his thought in the real time of history.72 Gutiérrez on his part refers to
Levinas as a philosopher who shares liberation theology’s perspective. He writes:
That is why we need an ethics of solidarity. An important Jewish philosopher,
Emmanuel Levinas, has written of this matter eloquently. Based on Scripture, he
states that the “other” comes first, as we saw in the parable of the Good
Samaritan. For Levinas, the first philosophy is ethics, and I think it is a very
demanding one. For Levinas and for Christians, the “other” is first because he or
she is made in God’s image. We should have the faith to recognize Jesus Christ in
the face of the poor. To have a Christian perspective, we should have a very deep
commitment to this ethics of solidarity.73
Thus, notwithstanding some divergences, Levinas’s thought and liberation theology are
conceptually related in their effort to bring forward the dimension of the divine that opens
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forth in the human face. God’s transcendence emerges not in the oppression and hatred of
other human beings but in love of one’s neighbor. The effort of Levinas, Gutiérrez, and
Sobrino is to redefine what justifies subjectivity, both philosophically and theologically.
They establish that the human other is the condition for the possibility of the subject’s
subjectivity in the world. For what constitutes the human person’s very humanity is the
concern for the death of another, not its concern for its own death. To posit the other is to
understand the subject whose existence is justified in his/her responsibility to others.
Thus, the subjectivity of the subject depends on the other and that of the other depends on
the subject’s. Heidegger’s “being-with” the other in the world is now a “being-for” the
other, because humans are all responsible for the well-being of one another, but the
subject more than any one else. Again, there is certainly not a perfect matching between
these two approaches. Yet all noticeable affinities and divergences make these two
approaches complementary and ascertain an opportunity for dialogue. In the following
section this work will examine how these approaches could complement each other.
III. Levinas’s Philosophy and Liberation Theology: Complementarity and Dialogue
Thus far, this study has established some conceptual affinities between the
philosophical project of Levinas and liberation theology. Our contention in this section is
that Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology could complement each other in their
respective field. This work will suggest that Levinas’s philosophy presents a practical
philosophical framework for liberation theology as it is compatible with one of the truths
of Christianity: the concern for the neighbor. Besides, it will also show that liberation
theology’s spirituality of conversion to the neighbor bears witness to Levinas’s ethical
responsibility in the real time of history. Yet, the turn to the other/neighbor in Levinas’s
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philosophy and liberation theology offers a promising perspective for human coexistence
necessary for the prospect of a humane world.
Levinas’s Transcendental Ethics: A Viable Philosophical Framework for Liberation
Theology
Levinas’s transcendental ethics, as it was argued in the first chapter, emerged in
response to Western philosophy’s ontological tendency that understood the human
subject in terms of knowledge and comprehension. In this focus on ontology, he argued,
the consciousness of the subject in relation to the other is autonomous and occupies the
first place in the principle of intelligibility. As he became displeased with this
interpretation of the consciousness of the subject, he proposed a different philosophical
framework in which the consciousness of the subject in the relationship with the other
loses its first place. It is a new philosophical framework that keeps the subject awake to
humanity that is no longer constituted by his/her powers, but rather, enacted by his/her
responsibility “in passivity, in reception, in obligation with regard to the other.” Here “it
is the other who is first and there the question of my sovereign consciousness is no longer
the first question.”74 Levinas’s philosophical project here offers to liberation theology and
the entire Christian common consciousness a philosophical structure of human
consciousness which goes beyond human freedom. Levinas believes that a true human
consciousness is a movement toward the divine through uprightness (droiture) of life, not
a return to the self. For him consciousness is
the urgency of a destination leading to the Other and not an eternal return to
self…an innocence without naivety, an uprightness which is also absolute selfcriticism, read in the eyes of the one who is the goal of my uprightness and whose
look calls me into question. It is a movement toward the Other that does not come
back to its point of origin the way a diversion comes back, incapable as it is of
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transcendence – a movement beyond anxiety and stronger than death. This
uprightness is called Temimut, the essence of Jacob.75
Levinas’s description of human consciousness awakens Christian consciousness to the
infinite heteronomy in the subject’s relationship with the other. It is a philosophical
construction that finds inspiration from the Scripture and breaks with the ontological
autonomy of the subject’s consciousness. It posits a mode of being human for the other
and emphasizes the subject’s consciousness of responsibility as an awakening to
humanity.76 Liberation theology will certainly benefit from this philosophical perspective
as it argues for the primacy of the other and calls the subject’s consciousness to love and
responsibility for the other/neighbor.
More pertinent to liberation theology and Christian theology would be Levinas’s
concept of insomnia or wakefulness. The search for the anthropology of unity and
equality, in the sense of sameness, has been the characteristic of Western philosophical
and theological anthropology. This for Levinas, as this study argued above, has been the
source of violence, wars and conflict of all kinds. One might see in liberation theology
the danger of articulating its turn to the existence of the victims of history in terms of
rights, freedom, and autonomy given to the human person by modernity’s turn to the
subject. It might be emphasizing sameness, equality, and fusion more than the uniqueness
of each individual in ethical responsibility for the neighbor. Liberation theology is
challenged to reconsider its theological anthropology by opening up to Levinas’s view of
the human person who is always in the state of vigilant insomnia. It is an expression of
the true life of the subject in the world in which the other always keeps the subject awake

75

Emmanuel Levinas, Four Talmudic Readings, translated with an introduction by Annette Aronowicz
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 48.
76
Levinas, “Philosophy, Justice, and Love,” in Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-other, 111-112.

156

in an experience of rupture; he/she never gives the subject a possibility to have a feel of
totality, rather, always a feeling of infinity – of desires that are infinite, questions that are
always opened out eternally, longings that are never satisfied. It keeps the human person
away from any illusion of sameness, equality, self-centeredness, self-satisfaction, and self
completeness, until he/she turns toward the “other,” the “elsewhere” and the “otherwise,”
leaving the security of “at home with oneself” (chez soi), “which [we] inhabit, toward an
alien outside-of-oneself [hors-de-soi], toward a yonder.”77 In this movement outside of
oneself in vulnerability and exposedness, Levinas’s philosophy finds what opens up the
subject to the revelation of God and makes him/her a prophet: “Here I am.” Hence
Levinas describes
ethical responsibility as insomnia or wakefulness precisely because it is a
perpetual duty of vigilance and effort that can never slumber. Ontology as a state
of affairs can afford to sleep. But love cannot sleep, can never be peaceful or
permanent. Love is the incessant watching over the other; it can never be satisfied
or contented with bourgeois ideal of love as domestic comfort or as the mutual
possession of two people living out an egoisme-á-deux.78
For Levinas, prior to all systems of reasoning, which are necessary for the development
of thought, exists an ethical subject at all times turned toward the needs of the other. The
idea of asymmetry is meant to emphasize the other’s transcendental dimension that
obligates the subject to love in responsibility. This is how being justifies itself. Hence,
ethical responsibility for the human other ought to be the ground for any possible
ontologically based philosophical and/or theological discourse. In some sense, Levinas
recognizes the transcendental power of human historical reality.79 This is an event of
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meaning, not of cognition or comprehension, which characterizes the human person
rightly understood and necessary for the re-imagining of the world. Levinas’s
transcendental ethics provides liberation theology with a viable philosophical framework
of human intersubjectivity that emphasizes human subjectivity as fundamentally
orientated toward the other in love and responsibility. The subject’s responsibility for the
other person or love of neighbor is non-reciprocal and endless. The other’s otherness and
difference urges the subject always to do more for the other, more than anyone else; and
no one is exempt from this ideal.
Specifically, the dissertation argues that Levinas’s transcendental ethics is an apt,
if not wholly adequate, approach from the Christian perspective, for representing human
engagement with the other who bears the trace of the divine goodness that is beyond
being. In today’s world, as Veling argues, “to turn around, to face the other, is the
conversion required of theology.”80 This study sees in Levinas’s discovery of ethics as
first philosophy a new direction that all serious Christian theology should consider; this
is, as David Tracy would argue, “the prophetic-ethical form that has characterized not
only earliest Christologies, but also liberation and evangelical Christologies.”81 And
“surely,” he continues, “on the central question of transcendence, this ethical route to the
Absolute Other only by way of interrelationships of human others is Levinas’ most
original, and daring, and for Jewish and Christian theology, both promising…and
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controversial move.”82 Since all subjectivity is prophetic, philosophy and theology may
meet outside of both of their own homes, on a journey toward the other, in ethics.
Liberation Theology as Conversion to the Neighbor in History: Bearing Witness to
Levinas’s Transcendental Ethics of Responsibility
The basis of Levinas’s philosophy is the ethical relationship between the subject
and the other. It is a relationship that takes place in atemporal temporality in terms of
sensibility, hostage, vulnerability, exposure, proximity, obsession, trauma, persecution,
substitution, obligation, and responsibility. The other, who is totally different, has always
already transcended, disturbed the imaginary self-centered totality of the same in a time
that goes contrary to the linear and synchronic time of being and history.
At this point one finds oneself faced with a recurrent question of the availability
of Levinas’s philosophy within the real time of history. Should all genuine modes of
encounter with the other be reduced to an unmediated, unthematized face to face
relationship? Is this a tenable position in the world of conflicts and injustice? Is it
possible to conceive of the human subject as ethically responsible within the ontological
system of thinking? Can’t an ontologically based system, such as liberation theology,
embody an ethical responsibility that recognizes the uncompromised value of the other
human person? As such, the non-ontological dimension of Levinas’s philosophy has been
questioned.83
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Liberation theology, in our estimation, offers elements that can critically
complement Levinas’s transcendental ethics of responsibility. The priority it gives to the
human neighbor in his/her relationship with the subject over and against dogmatic
principles and transcendental subjectivity, opens a possibility for understanding “human
subjectivity as ethically enacted rather than ontologically constituted” in the real time of
history.84 For liberation theology, being is not only knowledge or comprehension, but
also sensibility and affection. A purely metaphysical discourse of the turn to the
other/neighbor does little to advance the actual lives of the victims of human inhumanity
to humans. The point here is that Levinas’s “ideal of holiness” over and against “the laws
of being,” cannot of itself act; it remains on the level of an ideal. It has, obviously, the
merit of positing Infinity as that “which cuts through and perforates the totality of
presence and points towards the absolutely other,”85 but falls short of translating it within
the real time of history where justice might be done for others. Humans relate to one
another and relate to God or to God’s trace only as subjects of the historical world.
Liberation theology bears witness to Levinas’s philosophy by arguing for
conversion to the neighbor or love of neighbor. It articulates in the real time of history a
possibility for the subject to act with sensibility and affection toward the other and calls
the subject to infinite responsibility à la Levinas. Hence, love of neighbor becomes
affective responsibility toward the other. It functions within human history as Michael
Purcell’s being otherwise86 and breaks every inclination to totality through the dimension
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of divine transcendence. As with Levinas, liberation theology insists that the neighbor’s
existence (the poor, the oppressed, the orphan, the stranger etc.), takes the first place and
awakes the subject to humanity that is no longer the subject’s powers, but rather, the
subject’s responsibility in obligation to the other. Its insistence on love of neighbor is
about responsibility for the neighbor in concrete history through liberation.
Liberation theology’s spirituality of conversion to the neighbor is an unending
process of turning toward the other person in affective responsibility. And this affective
responsibility or love of neighbor is possible only through the ‘more’ which destroys and
awakens the ‘less’ in the subject, turning him/her away from self-centeredness. It is a turn
that recognizes within the real time of history the absolute presence of God in the other
human person. It is an option that stems from the Judeo-Christian wisdom of which
Levinas is a part and finds some inspiration. It finds full meaning primarily in the life of
commitment to those who are subject to unjust suffering and death. This is God’s attitude
toward humankind, mostly toward the less privileged, and it must serve as a model for all
humans. It is an ethics of solidarity.87
Besides, Levinas’s philosophical framework in which the consciousness of the
subject in the relationship with the other loses its first place could find some resonance in
liberation theology. Its call to uprightness of life, as noted above, could be read in line
with liberation theology’s demands for theological responsibility. For liberation theology,
theological responsibility is founded on the eschatological promises of the scriptural
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tradition: love, peace, justice, reconciliation, and transcendence. 88 It urges Christians to
give account of the hope that is in them through commitment to the neighbor in human
society. It involves practical commitment in human concerns in history and it precedes
self-transcendence. Liberation theology certainly has the merit to have awakened to this
call to responsibility by taking theological reflection back to its original truth of being at
the service of love. In a sense, liberation theology’s centrality of the neighbor functions
as a form of justification of Levinas’s philosophical framework.
Levinas himself acknowledged the exaggerated non-ontological perspective of his
thought and was ready to concede that his philosophical reflection, insofar as it is
knowledge, has to be conceived ontologically. Objectively, a great part of human verbal
communication and thought is, in one way or the other, systematic and logical. He
comments: “I do not deny that philosophy is a knowledge, insofar as it names even what
is not nameable, and thematizes what is not thematizable. But in thus giving to what
breaks with the categories of discourse the form of the said, perhaps it impresses onto the
said the traces of this rupture.”89 In the same vein, he continues “an event of unlimited
responsibility for another certainly has a historic meaning; it bears witness to our age and
marks it…I do think that the unlimited responsibility for another, as an enucleation of
oneself, could have a translation into history’s concreteness.”90 Levinas here
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acknowledges the possibility of translating what he calls the utopia of conscience91 within
the real time of history and cites the South American student priests in Louvain as an
example. He writes:
I was taken one day, in Louvain, after a lecture on these ideas [ethical
responsibility], to a student house that is there called “pedagogy.” I found myself
surrounded by South American students, almost all priests, but above all
preoccupied by the situation in South America. They spoke to me of what was
happening there as of a supreme trial of humanity. They questioned me, not
without irony: where would I have encountered concretely the Same, preoccupied
by the Other to the point of undergoing a fusioning of itself? I replied: at least
here. Here, in this group of students, of intellectuals who might very well have
been occupied with their internal perfection and who nevertheless had no other
subjects of conversation than the crisis of the Latin American masses. Were they
not hostages? This utopia of conscience found itself historically fulfilled in the
room in which I found myself. That history should be concerned by these utopias
of conscience, I believe seriously.92
Again, as it was shown above, it is certainly the entrance of the third party (tiers) to the
scene, the whole of humanity that brings Levinas’s project down to earth, to the realities
of human communities. But in so doing, it also brings to bear the subtle ambiguity of a
human subject: good and bad. Beyond the unique singularity of the subject’s prophetic
orientation, he/she can also be the source of violence, hatred, and war. Hence the
inevitable need for justice through laws, institutions, and States. Love of neighbor
without concupiscence in concrete human community demands justice. This is a more
tangible moment where Levinas’s ethical responsibility opens up to ontological
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discourse.93 Justice, Levinas argues, originates from the subject’s “Here I am”, that is,
from “its gratuitousness or grace or unconditional charity.”94 It arises to temper the
other’s privileges, because next to the one who is an other to the subject, is another other
to the same subject.
While justice arises in history to temper the other’s privileges, it does not,
however, address the issue of human weakness and evil that Levinas recognizes in the
human person which might prevent him/her from awakening to the human other in
responsibility.95 To awaken to the human other is constitutive of humanity rightly
understood. This, for Levinas, is the “ideal of holiness” expected of every human
person.96 Yet Levinas offers no alternative to how in reality one is to deal with elements
of weakness and evil in the human person that might prevent one from awakening to the
human other. This is a fact of human nature as we experience it. Here again liberation
theology could complement Levinas’s transcendental philosophy as it suggests the
spirituality of conversion to the neighbor as the way to remain focused on the divine call
to a life of uprightness, expressed through the prophetic attitude of “Here I am” in the
real time of history. The spirituality of conversion to the neighbor offers Levinas’s
transcendental ethics a possibility to keep humans in check in their daily dealings with
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one another, “without letting [themselves] be guided by”97 menacing possibilities of not
awakening to the human other. While the never-ending responsibility of the subject –
through wakefulness or unremitting watching over the other – in Levinas is expressed
asymmetrically, Liberation theology’s spirituality of conversion to the neighbor offers
human beings a possibility in history of redirecting everlastingly their eyes toward the
“ideal of holiness” Levinas speaks about. It opens up a possibility for the subject to
remain in a state of vigilant insomnia and act in ethical responsibility for the
other/neighbor in the real time of history. Levinas’s “ideal of holiness” in liberation
theology’s perspective would be understood in terms of a spirituality lived in the spirit of
Jesus Christ. It is a spirituality of a life given for the sake of the neighbor.
Besides, liberation theology’s conversion to the neighbor also offers a possibility
for forgiveness through love of the oppressors, those who did not awaken to God’s call to
uprightness of life in the form of ethical responsibility. The victims’ love for the
oppressors seeks the conversion of the oppressors to the others/neighbors’ humanity. At
the same time, it reminds the victims themselves of the unlimited nature of the prophetic
attitude of “Here I am” that constitutes their true subjectivity. The victims of poverty,
oppression, and marginalization become the locus of conversion to the neighbor for the
oppressors, and their attitude calls for the universal setting for God’s question: what have
you done to your brother or sister? Hence, for Gutiérrez and Sobrino, the non-poor, the
oppressors, and those who participate in the oppression by their passivity are called to
respond and correspond to the God of the poor and marginalized revealed in the biblical
tradition. As the God of biblical revelation is known through inter-human justice, both

97

Levinas, “Philosophy, Justice, and Love,” in Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-other, 114.

165

the oppressed and the oppressors are invited to a never-ending conversion to the neighbor
expressed in responsibility for the other.
The Turn to the Other/Neighbor: A Precondition for Peace, Justice, and good SocioPolitical and Economic Order
The study of the dialogue between Levinas’s transcendental ethics of
responsibility and liberation theology, both of which propose the turn to the
other/neighbor as an intersubjective model for the radical re-imagining of the world,
shows their significance for addressing critical issues such as poverty, racism, terrorism,
civil wars, oppression, marginalization, xenophobia, and intolerance in the postmodern
world. Levinas’s ethics of responsibility and liberation theology propose a new way of
understanding human subjectivity and take our philosophical and theological reflection to
a dimension of ethical engagement which is necessary in today’s world.
They propose, in our estimation, a fundamental avenue for a long-term resolution
of crisis in today’s wounded world. Their suggestion that all subjectivity be described as
inspired by the other and that humans see in other human persons the dimension of the
divine could lessen the possibility of the hatred of the other person.98 The human person
rightly understood is the one who acts in ethical responsibility toward the neighbor.
Human eyes should always be focused on the “ideal of holiness” which is to go toward
the other. Both philosophically and theologically, self-centeredness has to give way to the
primacy of responsibility for the well-being of other humans, one’s neighbor who bears
the trace or presence of God. In their separate fields, as Jacob Meskin helpfully puts it,
liberation theology and Levinas’s transcendental ethics of responsibility “reveal to us a
98

Emmanuel Levinas, Autrement qu’être; ou, au-delà de l’essence (La Haye : M. Nijhoff, 1974), 180; see
also Michel Vanni, “Messianisme et Temporalité Eschatologique dans la Philosophie d’Emmanuel
Lévinas,’’ Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 130 (1998) : 37-50, 45.

166

portrait of late twentieth-century intellectual work which refuses to abandon
eschatological urgency,”99 because the kingdom of God is ethics fully realized in human
relationships. In today’s postmodern world, Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology
propose a path to peace, justice, and good socio-political and economic order. Levinas’s
philosophy and liberation theology’s approach awaken today’s world vehemently to the
practice of responsibility, justice, and love. Their emphasis on the turn to the
other/neighbor is most needed for any possible re-imagining of today’s world.
Conclusion
Certainly this concise synopsis of the dialogue between Levinas’s philosophy and
liberation theology, as presented by Gutiérrez and Sobrino, does not reflect either the
complexity or the density of their thought. Rather, in these pages this chapter has
presented two different approaches that share some conceptual affinities and remain
relevant to the situation of the degradation of the human other in history. The main focus
of this chapter has been on the dialogue between Levinas’s transcendental ethics of
responsibility and liberation theology. The thesis here is that Levinas’s humanism finds
some conceptual affinities with liberation theology. This chapter argued that both propose
the turn to the other/neighbor as an intersubjective model for a creation of a better world.
The devastating experiences of Holocaust, oppression, the plight of the stranger and
poverty, have been, this chapter had argued, the major motivation for Levinas, Gutiérrez
and Sobrino’s attempt to reflect on the self-other relationship.100 They argued that the
divine is encountered in a life of commitment to the neighbor and call for love of
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neighbor and justice. Each in its own right insists on the centrality of the human person in
God’s discourse. They find in the ethical readings of the prophetic nucleus of the JudeoChristian tradition a way forward for the creation of a world in which the hatred of the
other person becomes less and less possible. As in the Hebrew Bible, the neighbor for
Levinas is linked to the stranger, the widow, the orphan, and the poor, asserting their
uniqueness as others to be faced in responsibility. Liberation theology finds in the life,
death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ the prophetic attitude of concern for the neighbors.
In the Scripture, the total work of God is geared toward the respect for the humanity of
the other person. It contends that the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ
constitute the hermeneutic principle that exemplifies the “prophetic-ethical” attitude
needed for the re-imagining of the world. Love of neighbor is seen as dialectically linked
with salvation, and Christian faith with the practice of justice. Levinas’s philosophy’s and
liberation theology’s key prophetic-ethical orientation echoes a stance that seeks to
protect the neighbor from being assimilated or dominated and, at the same time reveals
the divine in history in the case of liberation theology, while for Levinas, it brings the
idea of God to mind as the matching part of the justice rendered to the other human
person in an asymmetrical relation.
This chapter also noted that despite some affinities between these two approaches,
they come from different philosophical and theological perspectives. A couple of
underlining divergences were mentioned in this chapter. It was noted that liberation
theology is ontologically based reflection, while Levinas’s thought is philosophical in the
phenomenological tradition with the influence of the Jewish tradition. Besides, while
Levinas was suspicious of Christian theology in general for its reliance on an
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ontologically based system of thought, he was nevertheless more sympathetic to
liberation theology’s approach as one of the examples, in concrete history, which bears
witness to his transcendental ethical responsibility. As this chapter mapped out the
thought of Gutierrez, Sobrino, and Levinas, it showed that Levinas’s transcendental
ethics, which conceives God as the goodness that is beyond being and calls humans to
responsibility for the neighbor, provides a viable philosophical framework that remains
vital to a justification of one of the truths of Christianity: the concern for neighbor. It also
argued that liberation theology’s spirituality of conversion to the neighbor bears witness
to Levinas’s ethical responsibility.
What is fundamental to both liberation theology and Levinas’s ethical
responsibility is that they both bring forth one major characteristic: the dimension of the
divine opens forth in the human face. For Levinas, Gutiérrez, and Sobrino, commitment
to the neighbor is the necessary context for understanding God. The ethical command of
“love thy neighbor” which can be seen as foundational for Levinas’s ethics of
responsibility, finds conceptual affinities with liberation theology’s concern for the nonpersons, the others. In a world of deadly ethical struggles, hardening divisions among
people, and in the time when tens of millions of refugees have no place to call home,
liberation theology and Levinas’s transcendental ethics, each in its own right, call for a
redefinition of “human subjectivity as ethically enacted.”101 For Levinas, Gutiérrez, and
Sobrino, ethical subjectivity for the human other is a primary expression of humans’
relationship to God.
From this perspective, this chapter argued that the works of Levinas, Gutiérrez,
and Sobrino, offer great promise to our postmodern “wounded” culture. Their turn to the
101
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other/neighbor as an intersubjective model for the radical re-imagining of the world,
offers a possibility of a peaceful world. Their suggestion that humans see in others the
dimension of the divine could lessen the possibility of the hatred of the other person. By
examining Levinas’s philosophical conceptual affinities with liberation theology as a
promising project, this dissertation hopes to contribute to on the ongoing significant and
positive conversation between Christian theology and postmodern philosophy. What
matters in today’s world is not so much the question of the meaning of life, but the
question of ethics. What matters is not so much our separation from God and the desire
for mystical participation; rather, what matters is our regard for each other, and the desire
for sociality, for ethical responsibility.102 This provides a compelling case for rethinking
the place of the other in the world, more importantly in Africa as this dissertation will
argue in the fifth chapter. For the moment, the next chapter will examine how some
scholars developed Levinas’s phenomenological insights more explicitly in a
philosophical and theological direction, again without assuming that Levinas is a
theologian.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Enrique Dussel, Jean-Luc Marion, and Michael Purcell on
Emmanuel Levinas’s Ethics of Responsibility and Christian
Theology
Introduction
Having laid out the complex dimension of Levinas’s philosophy’s conceptual
affinities with liberation theology in the third chapter, this chapter examines how such
similarities hold up in the views of three respected contemporary Christian scholars,
Enrique Dussel, Jean-Luc Marion, and Michael Purcell, who have been influenced by
Levinas. Their work shows how Levinas’s turn to the other can serve Christian theology.
Levinas’s ethics of responsibility, they argue, opens a possibility of breaking out of a
theology developed on the basis of an anthropology and categories mainly influenced by
nineteenth century modern philosophy.
Enrique Dussel, a Mexican philosopher and theologian of liberation, develops his
thought as a challenge to the neocolonialism of Eurocentrist philosophy and brings Latin
American/Third World lived experiences to the core of critical philosophical reflection.
He embraces Levinas’s idea of alterity as the starting point and argues for an ethics of
liberation that places at the center of its discourse the vulnerability of the others, the poor
and the oppressed. Jean-Luc Marion, a French phenomenologist of religion, is known for
his attempt to address the issue of God in a more or less different direction than that of
the metaphysical tradition. For him, theology as reflection on revelation has been too
dependent on a traditional view of metaphysics. He proposes to overcome metaphysics,
using a phenomenology that is nonetheless willing to dialogue with theology. In a non-
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metaphysical way, Marion articulates the notion of God in theology and philosophy, not
in terms of Supreme Being, but in terms of agape, echoing the prophetic voice of Levinas
for whom God gives himself to be known through one’s love for the other or through
ethical responsibility as an event that enacts one in his/her subjectivity. Michael Purcell, a
leading senior lecturer of theology and ethics at the University of Edinburgh, has
published books and articles on the significance of Levinas’s philosophy for Christian
theology. Purcell finds in certain themes of Levinas’s thought, such as infinite,
awakening of the subject, desire, responsibility, love, justice, and holiness, a possibility
for a fruitful dialogue. Besides, for him, Levinas’s philosophy and Christian theology
share one major common point of departure, that is, they share the same meaning of
human existential experience. Levinas’s insistence on the priority of ethics, Purcell
argues, challenges Christian theology to be less theoretical and more committed to the
service of love.
These scholars, although interpreting the relevance of Levinas’s thought for
theology from different perspectives, see in Levinas’s ethics of responsibility a
philosophical framework that might illuminate or inform the content of Christian
theology, and thus, open a possibility for a fruitful dialogue with Christian theology. In
this, they helpfully serve the goal of this dissertation.
I. Enrique Dussel
Professor Enrique Dussel was born in Mendoza, Argentina in December 1934. In
1975, he was exiled to Mexico where he later acquired citizenship and taught for a
number of years. He studied philosophy, history, and theology and received several
degrees from prestigious universities in Europe and Latin America. He is the author of
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numerous books and articles in different languages. His teaching experience goes as far
back as 1966, and since then, he has been a visiting lecturer to many universities in Latin
America, Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America. His research field has been in the
areas of history, philosophy, theology, and ethics.
As a South American, he is concerned with the plight of the poor and the
oppressed in that part of the world and in the entire so called Third World countries. Ever
since he was a boy in Mendoza, Dussel was already particularly sympathetic to groups
engaged in social activities. His first work in sociology in the Department of Philosophy
at Mendoza was about the marginal neighborhoods in Argentina.1 Dussel later moved to
Madrid, Spain for his doctoral studies (1957-1961). He defended his dissertation in June
1959, and immediately traveled to Israel to join the community of manual laborers led by
Paul Gautier (1960-1961). While in Israel, Dussel came into contact with the Jewish
concern for the humble, the downtrodden, the poor, the miserable, and excluded. His
experience in the Holy Land became an existential one as it informed all his future
intellectual work. Quickly, he became suspicious of Greek philosophy for its emphasis on
the intellectuals and the wealthy, and praised Semitic culture for its passion for the poor,
the abandoned and the marginalized. Upon his arrival in Europe (France) from the
Middle East to begin his theological studies, Dussel studied phenomenology, especially
the works of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur, and Martin
Heidegger, before he met with Levinas in the early 70s.2
1
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His early interest for the marginalized of history will take a decisive turn with his
encounter with Levinas. Dussel recalls his discussion with Levinas and a group of
students in 1972, in Louvain, as a crucial moment of truth that shaped his philosophy of
liberation. At this meeting, he asked Levinas whether “the fifteen million Indians
slaughtered during the conquest of Latin America, and the thirteen million Africans who
were made slaves” were not also the other he (Levinas) spoke about. Levinas looking at
him in the eyes replied: “that’s something for you to think about.”3
From then onwards, he embraced Levinas’s critique of Western philosophy and
his turn to the other/exteriority as the starting point and argued for an ethics of liberation
that places at the center of its discourse the turn to the other – those who are despised,
poor, oppressed, neglected, and barred from present socio-political, economic, or cultural
systems. His philosophy of liberation draws upon the everyday experiences of poverty
and oppression in the Third World and rejects the Western view of modernity and
globalization as the root cause of most inhuman behaviors in today’s world. The concept
of the other became, for Dussel, the reference point for his interpretation of history,
economics, philosophy, and theology. While he integrates Levinas’s concept of the other
to a certain extent, he nevertheless disagrees with his view of history. In what follows,
this work will examine how Dussel developed his thought in terms of Levinas’s
phenomenology of the other and how, at the same time, he transforms and surpasses
Levinas’s thought by locating the other in the context of Latin America, the Third World,
and the current system of capitalist economy, globalization and postcoloniality.
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Embracing Levinas’s Challenge: Dussel’s Critique of the Western Ontological Horizon
Before embracing Levinas’s philosophy of the other and developing his own
philosophy of liberation, Dussel went through a cycle of change that later defined his
anthropology. At the center of this are his studies of Hellenic and Semitic philosophical
anthropologies, the Hegelian dialectic, and the Heideggerian account of philosophical
anthropology. He finds in Heideggerian thought an understanding of anthropology that
situates the meaning of the human person’s existence within the sphere of a certain precomprehension of the world which diverges from one cultural group to another.4 Dussel
appreciates Heidegger’s efforts in trying to posit human beings as already in the world.
He even uses Heideggerian anthropology to criticize modernity, Descartes, Kant, Hegel,
Marx Scheler and others. But in his estimation, Heidegger did not go far enough. He
finds the Heideggerian fundamental ontology on the unity of the human person wanting
and rejects the Western philosophical tradition for its neglect of this aspect.5
Now, an appreciation of Dussel’s rupture with Western philosophical thought has
to be situated in the global context from which he began his intellectual work. His ethical
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5
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hermeneutic developed as a reaction to Latin America’s history of colonization,
oppression, poverty, and marginalization. In today’s world, these vices are reflected in
the present international order of globalization which, in his view, has its root in the USEurocentrist desire to dominate countries of the periphery. The US-Eurocentrist alliance
has divided the world into two different cultures: the culture of the center (USEurocentrism) and the culture of the periphery (Latin America, Africa, and Asia, to which
he includes the marginalized groups of our societies, women and children). For him,
Western socio-political and economic domination of those who exist at the periphery is
the result of their ontologically based system of thought. He writes:
The conquests of Latin America, the enslavement of Africa and its colonization,
as well as that of Asia, are the dominating dialectical expansion of “the same” that
assassinates “the other” and totalizes “the other” in “the same.” This huge
dialectico-ontological process of human history simply went unperceived by the
ideology of ideologies (even though it claims to be the critic of ideologies) –
modern and contemporary European philosophy.6
The ontologically based system has made the West believe and claim universal
knowledge and legitimated its control of Third World nations. For Dussel, the Western
dialectical method is incapable of envisioning the existence of alterity expressed in the
face of the poor, the oppressed, the widow, the orphan, and the foreigner who live beyond
or outside the world or categories of its ontological horizon. It defines itself as the center
of the world and neglects those in the periphery.7 In view of this, Dussel argues, it
became necessary that those in the periphery set out for themselves a method of
philosophizing which takes its starting point from the historical situations of poverty,
oppression, and marginalization which they were forced into by the dominating
6
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subjectivity of the West. The construction of a just world order is possible only through
the liberation of nations of the periphery and the articulation of a non-ontologically based
philosophy which focuses on the exteriority of the other. Dussel uses the concept of the
other to make a case for his philosophy of liberation. Here he is aided by Levinas’s
phenomenology of the other, adjusting it with insights from Marxism and dependency
theory.
Dussel’s Anadialectical Method in terms of Levinas’s Phenomenology of the Other
It is in Levinas that Dussel finds a philosopher who made an important move
beyond Heidegger’s helpful insight into human existence in the world. He discovers in
Levinas’s phenomenology of the other that which outshines the entire philosophical
tradition of the West by focusing on the human other who is beyond the horizon of being,
the world, and ontology. Levinas’s arguments about the absolute uniqueness or otherness
of the other set the stage for Dussel’s own philosophical method which he calls
anadialectical or analectical.8 Dussel did not only embrace Levinas’s thought, he also, at
the same time, gave it a new dimension by applying it to the Latin American environment
and “developing his own analectical method, which begins with the Other, recognizes the
analogical character of the Other’s word, unmasks false universals imposed upon the
Other, and expands rationality through exposure to the Other.”9 He defines the analectical
method as follows:
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The analectical refers to the real human fact by which every person, every group
or people, is always situated ‘beyond’ (ano-) the horizon of totality. Negative
dialectic is no longer enough. The analectical moment is the support of new
unfoldings. The analectical moment opens us to the sphere (which is not the ontic
one of the factual sciences or the ontological one of negative dialectic), referring
us to the other. Its proper category is exteriority. The point of departure for its
methodical disclosure (a method that is more scientific than dialectic) is the
exteriority of the other. Its principle is not that of identity, but separation,
distinction.10
This method is intended to go beyond the Eurocentric method of dialectic, the proper
sphere of totality. It affirms the priority of the existence of the other or exteriority as the
very starting point of philosophy. In Dussel’s articulation of this method, Levinas’s terms
such as other, exteriority, totality, face, proximity and sensibility, are re-appropriated and
utilized in the context of the Third World, most especially of Latin America. Dussel’s
anadialectical method is a combination of the Western dialectical tradition and the Latin
American historical lived experience. The result is a new form of ontology that
transcends the European ontology of totality so as to express and articulate a Latin
American philosophy of the other.11
Inspired by Levinas’s phenomenology of the other, Dussel discovers in the term
person more than a simple unified being and argues that the concept of person evokes
alterity, the other who is beyond the horizon of being and ontology. The other is given as
unity and cries out to the subject prior to any philosophical considerations, be it the
Hellenic dualistic view of the human person. He/she is the paradigm from whom the
moral world is constituted.12 The exteriority of the other now turns out to be the place of
the judgment of the totality and affirms his/her absolute rights that stem from the fact of
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being a person. This starting point is deep-seated in the Judeo-Christian tradition in which
Dussel is a part. Thus, in Dussel’s philosophy of liberation, the exteriority of the other is
mystery which reason can never have a hold on; it interrupts Western totality and
exaltation of reason.13 He also insists on the prophetic nature of one’s service to the other
in justice. The one who takes the defense of the other is a prophet, and his/her attitude
breaks with every system of totality. In the articulation of this new philosophical method,
Dussel sees “the relationship of the living God with the poor human being, and of this
poor human being with the living God, [as] the theme of the Bible and theology.”14 Thus,
the anadialectical method calls for an anadialectical theology in which faith is concrete
and practical.15 Hence, with the help of Levinas’s philosophy, Dussel insists on the
centrality of the exteriority of the other, that is, the other’s transcendental dimension in
his analectical philosophy of liberation.
Now, for Dussel the suffering of the other in history turns into an interpellation of
the capitalist system. He sees in this system the main cause of the hardships of the Third
World countries. Such a historical analysis led him to complete Levinas’s
phenomenology of the other with insights from Marxism and dependency theory. Most
important, in Dussel’s turn to Marxist’s thought, is the concept of “living labor” which he
regards as the necessary principle of Marxist ethics and theoretical construction. “Living
labor” is the creative source of surplus-value which exists outside of exteriority, prior to,
and valorizes capital. For Dussel, “the logico-dialectical grounding of Marx’s concept of
13
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capital is not totality, but exteriority; the absolute exteriority to the totality of capital as a
system is the ‘living labor’.”16 Accordingly, for Dussel, in Marx’s concept of “living
labor” is the recognition “of the life of the other as the living labor of the worker.”17
While Dussel acknowledges his profound debts to Levinas’s phenomenology of
the other, he still expresses his dissatisfaction with Levinas’s reduction of history to
consciousness, his reluctance in embracing the other of the global periphery, and his
equivocal understanding of the absolutely other. In a couple of writings, he explains how
and why his philosophy goes beyond Levinas’s.18 Dussel finds Levinas’s phenomenology
of the other wanting in so far as it provides no expressive political philosophy capable of
transforming situations of oppression and injustice into better socio-political and
economic conditions that recognize human dignity. He insists on the concrete reality of
ethics. Ethics of liberation should address the lived experiences of those oppressed and
excluded from the dominant Eurocentric method of dialectic, because the present
capitalist system and the phenomenon of globalization continue to suppress nations at the
periphery. Furthermore, he argues for an analogical nature of philosophy over and against
Levinas’s equivocal and univocal absolutely external other. For him, the analogical
method offers a possibility for “conviviality,” “engagement in solidarity,” and “historical
communication” between the “same” and the “other” in the real time of history.19
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Nevertheless, Levinas’s phenomenology of the other clearly provides Dussel with
theoretical tools to articulate his philosophy of liberation. With Levinas’s insistence on
responsibility for the other person, Dussel could argue for a “mutual fulfillment of the
analectic

solidarity

of

center/periphery,

woman/man,

mankind/earth,

western

culture/peripheral postcolonial cultures, different races, different ethnicities, [and]
different classes.”20 Like with Levinas, love of the other person, especially those
excluded from the center of modernity, and the exterior transcendence of the other
person, are at the center of Dussel’s ethics of liberation. Dussel finds in Levinas’s
philosophy a legacy that has much to offer to Christian theology and to humanity as a
whole.

least implicitly, referred to all the oppressed and persecuted people of the world as being the “others”
toward whom ethical responsibility should be exercised. This undisputable universal dimension of his
thought is perceptible in the preface of Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence when he writes: “To the
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II. Jean-Luc Marion
Marion has often acknowledged his indebtedness to Levinas’s phenomenological
approach in his attempt to secure, in postmodern context, a relationship between
phenomenology and theology, with phenomenology being the groundwork for a better
understanding of theology.21 In examining Marion’s thought this study does not intend to
give a thorough analysis of his work and its significance for contemporary thought. It will
suffice here to highlight some aspects of Marion’s writings that echo his use of Levinas’s
philosophy in his rejection of the onto-theological tradition and his proposed new way for
doing theology in terms of agape.
The background for Marion’s philosophical theology is the French continental
philosophical environment within which he began his career as a philosopher. Born in
Meudon, Paris, in 1946, Marion’s philosophical project began with his meeting with
French philosophers of the time, when he studied at the University of Nanterre, at the
Sorbonne in Paris, and at the École Normale Supérieure. It was then that he came into
contact with the movements known as structuralism and post-structuralism. These
movements later became significant for the emergence of the movement called
postmodernity, at least in French continental philosophy. Upon receiving his doctorate in
1980, he began his profession as a philosopher and a specialist of Descartes, and has
written comprehensively on him. He worked at the University of Poitiers which happened
to be Descartes’ alma mater and an institution where Levinas taught between 1963 and
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1967. Marion will later become the director of philosophy at the University of Paris X at
Nanterre, where Levinas had been for six years (1967-1973).22
Marion’s mastery of both the philosophical and theological tradition has earned
him respect and admiration from his supporters and critics worldwide. Not only was he
well-read in philosophy and theology and wrote several books and articles in the mid1980s, he also played a significant role in the field of phenomenology as he started
research on Husserlian phenomenology which appeared to be significant for his
understanding of the thought of Heidegger. Hence, Marion’s work is undeniably
philosophical and phenomenological. In addition to teaching at the University of
Sorbonne Paris IV, he is a visiting professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago
and at Boston College. Being a Roman Catholic, his philosophical work as a whole has
been influenced by his faith trying to address the question of the relationship between
philosophy and theology.
The Demise of Metaphysics: Toward Marion’s Phenomenological Approach
Marion’s work emerges in the context of the questioning of traditional
metaphysics by contemporary continental philosophy in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. He expresses his dissatisfaction with a traditional view of metaphysics
articulated from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas which attempts to found knowledge of
what is in terms of “an unchanging ousia” (substance/essence), called “being, the divine,
the first cause, and knowing subject.”23 Such metaphysics, he argues, is onto-theology,
22
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that is, it focuses on the highest being that is the source and meaning of all being and
gives this being metaphysical attributes which serves its own purpose.24 It reaches its
peak in the form of modernity through the claim of the will to power. Modern subjects,
aided by scientific and technological progress, develop a dream to have everything under
human control. There is here a manifest desire to depart from the onto-theological
tradition and rational subjectivity that began with Descartes and was clarified by Kant. In
this context of crisis on the issue of the foundation of knowledge, continental
philosophers proposed phenomenology and hermeneutics as a response to the
metaphysical question of the foundation of first philosophy, overcoming at the same time
the distinction between subject and object developed by Kant’s metaphysics.25
Phenomenology appears, for Marion, the only method capable of providing
legitimacy to philosophy as a way forward for a non-metaphysical thought. As a
discipline of philosophy, phenomenology emerged in the tradition of continental
European philosophy in the early twentieth century and was championed by Edmund
Husserl. Heidegger reacts to Husserl’s phenomenological reduction by redefining
phenomenology in terms of Being.26 For Marion, not all types of phenomenological
approach could succeed in achieving the goal of providing legitimacy to philosophy. All
English edition of his God Without Being, Marion gives some clarifications in a few arguments. He makes
a distinction between Aquinas’ esse which Aquinas assigns to God and the metaphysical tradition ens
commune, the objective concept of being. He insists that Aquinas’s esse “does not chain God to Being
because the divine esse immeasurably surpasses (and hardly maintains an analogia with) the ens commune
of creatures, which are characterized by the real distinction between esse and their essence, whereas God,
and He alone, absolutely merges essence with esse: God is expressed as esse, but this esse is expressed only
of God, not of the beings of metaphysics. In this sense, Being does not erect an idol before God, but saves
his distance.” God Without Being, xxiii.
24
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Caputo (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001) and in God Without Being that Marion set the tone
for his desire to engage modern metaphysics, criticizing the idolatrous concepts of God in modernity as
both causa sui and as source of morality. See Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction, 6162.
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the great phenomenologists, after Husserl and Heidegger, in his estimation, have failed
both to move beyond objectness and beingness and to claim phenomenology as first
philosophy. Yet only one successor of Husserl, Levinas, has been successful. He writes,
“it goes without saying that we owe it to Emmanuel Levinas to have ingeniously
reconfigured phenomenology so as to let it finally reach the Other as saturated
phenomenon.”27 Different from Husserl and Heidegger, Levinas defines phenomenology
in terms of intersubjective relation and posits the subject’s ethical encounter with the
other person as the original philosophical experience.28 Thus, in his articulation for a new
direction in phenomenology, Marion embraces Levinas’s phenomenological method over
and against certain aspects of Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology and sees in it
foundational insights which are helpful for the renewal of phenomenology and his
investigation into the question of God and human beings’ relationships to one another.29
Levinas, Marion asserts, has the merit to have taken “explicitly as his
responsibility the revindication of Husserl. For in bringing to the foreground the
fundamental dignity of ontology, or rather in order to threaten it better, he concluded his
27
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exemplified in the way in which, for Lévinas, the subject (I or ego) is always subsequent to a more basic
‘me,’ who is constituted by the call of the other rather than self-constituting.” See her Jean-Luc Marion: A
Theo-logical Introduction, 40-41.
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In Horner’s view, Marion considers himself as an intermediate postmodern thinker as he joins
Heidegger, Levinas and others to move beyond metaphysics. Marion’s “concerns include the nature and
limits of metaphysics, and questions about hermeneutics, subjectivity, alterity (otherness), relationships,
and responsibility.” Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction, 13-17.
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demonstration in these terms: ‘Ethics is not a branch of philosophy, but first
philosophy.’”30 For Marion, only Levinas before him took seriously Husserl’s “principle
of principles” in articulating a new direction for phenomenological method that would no
longer belong to metaphysics, but would constitute a “breakthrough” for a “new start,” a
“first philosophy.”31 What, then, does Marion draw from Levinas’s ethics of
responsibility in elaborating his phenomenological approach that would better define
theology as a non-metaphysical possibility? The answer to this question would require
that Marion’s work be examined more closely.
Marion’s Givenness, Saturated Phenomena or Paradoxes and Levinas’s Ethics of
Responsibility
In his thinking about overcoming traditional metaphysics (ontology, onto-theology) with
phenomenology, Marion argues for a “rethinking of God: not as a conceptual ‘idol,’ and
not through the heavy metaphysical language of ‘Being’ or substance or essence, but,
instead, in terms of phenomena such as love, gift, and excess.”32 Marion’s method of
phenomenological reduction is summarized in the expression: Autant de réduction,
autant de donation (As much reduction, as much givenness), with givenness being the
key principle for phenomenology.33 Here he proposes a new, post-metaphysical and
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Marion, In Excess, 15.
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Dermot A. Lane, “Foreword,” Givenness and God: Questions of Jean-Luc Marion, edited by Ian Leask
and Eoin Cassidy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), xv.
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This is the principle that Marion adds to Husserl’s principles, see his Being Given, 14-19, 38; In Excess,
16-23. Marion notes that Husserl’s principles have failed because of their limited formulations of the issue
of the “originariness” of givenness. In those principles, objectness and beingness are the sources from
which stems givenness. Hence, the need for the fourth principle which Marion considers to be the “first
principle of phenomenology;” that is, “givenness”: “as much reduction, as much givenness.” This principle,
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efficiently defending the givenness of the phenomena. The connection between reduction and givenness is
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phenomenological approach that opens up the possibility of thinking otherness by way of
givenness and saturated phenomena. From now on, Marion’s renewal of phenomenology
is defined in terms of givenness and saturated phenomena. Givenness is the way a
phenomenon gives itself unconditionally and on its own terms to a recipient. It is the only
principle capable of protecting the self-giving of the phenomenon beyond objectness and
beingness. A saturated phenomenon is a phenomenon in which the intuition always
“exceeds and decenters” every intentionality.34 In this phenomenon, the “intuition always
submerges the expectation of the intention, in which givenness not only entirely envelops
manifestation but, surpassing it, modifies its common characteristics.”35 Marion identifies
four saturated phenomena: the event, the idol, the flesh, and the icon. His rethinking of
phenomenology by means of givenness and saturated phenomena entails an attempt “to
show the possibilities within phenomenology to open onto thought that is excessive,
which gives theology a new philosophical context.”36 While phenomenology is a way
forward beyond metaphysics, theology, for Marion, is the ultimate fulfillment of all
thought, including phenomenology. He believes that philosophy’s basic understanding of
love in terms of lived experience and one’s own consciousness was flawed and needed
some phenomenological redefinition that is open to the theological.37 Theology, for
Marion, is caritas/agape, and it is resonant with Levinas’s ethical responsibility. A close
examination of Marion’s categories of givenness and saturated phenomena will help to

that they attain real givenness before appearing. And givenness cannot be thought of without that givenness
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see Levinas’s influence on Marion’s articulation of his new direction for theology or his
“theological phenomenology”38 which is based on caritas or agape.
For Marion, the appropriate horizon of phenomenological reduction is givenness,
not presence or being. A phenomenon gives itself from itself as something that gives
what is given, and defines every phenomenon through a movement of appearing and
withdrawing without limiting it either to some horizon or to a transcendental I. To be
sure, in Marion’s view, the horizon is no longer limited as in Kant and Husserl. It is
quasi-absolute and yet opens to a hermeneutics of multiple possibilities.39 For Marion,
because phenomena are given without limited transcendental conditions, the given is
given intrinsically, irrevocably, and radically in an intuitive excess as a gift. Now, to
whom is this givenness given? Givenness, Marion asserts, is given to the subject as to the
l’interloqué (the receiver, the witness) or l’adonné (the gifted one); the gifted is
constituted by the call of what gives itself, that is, the given. The subject as l’adonné or
l’interloqué receives itself from what he/she receives. He/she is the screen upon which an
event gives itself to be seen.40 What Marion understands by call stems from Levinas’s
“inversion of intentionality” in terms of “responsibility for the Other, going against
intentionality.”41 The subject receives a call, an appeal (appel) and therefore he/she is
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Marion, xvi.
39
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Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion,” God, the Gift and Postmodernism, edited by
John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 66. For helpful
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188

called “forth as gifted.” Givenness as saturated reverses intentionality, and as a result
makes the call possible and undeniably certain. Here the gifted one goes before the
transcendental, self-identical, self-constituting subject.42
Thus, for Marion, every given is a gift in the sense that it is a “privileged
phenomenon,” “the figure of all phenomenality.”43 The gift shows itself following
different determinations and more importantly with saturated phenomena: the event, the
idol, the flesh, and the icon. To these four saturated phenomena, Marion adds the
phenomenon of revelation, which, for him, is central because it blends and summarizes
all the other four and opens them up to a hermeneutics of multiple possibilities. It is the
last possibility as it constitutes the maximum point of saturated phenomenality. It is also
the highest point because it accomplishes the saturation of saturation that is, “saturated at
the second degree,” even though, Marion initially, assimilated it to the phenomenon of
the icon.44 Besides, in other writings he also defines the phenomenon of revelation
phenomenologically to mean “what gives itself in what shows itself.” Yet, Marion sees
this as theology’s task, not phenomenology’s.45 Here Marion sees in the epiphany of
Christ the paradigm of the phenomenon of revelation that well-characterizes each of the
four modes of saturation.46 Saturated phenomena are essentially pure event, without
horizon or context. They cannot be contained, conceptualized, predicted, controlled, or
grasped not because of any deficiency on the part of the intuition but rather because of

doing so, appears,’ En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (Paris, 1949), 134 (emphasis in
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the excessive nature of their giving. They demand an endless hermeneutic and are
recognized only by the effect they produce in their witness.47
What transpires from Marion’s phenomenology is the capacity of the concept of
saturated phenomenon to address what metaphysics failed to properly grasp as an
exception, namely, the phenomenology of love that questioned the uniqueness of the
thinking subject and the primacy of being. Each of these phenomena accomplishes a
saturation or paradox in terms of quality, quantity, relation, or modality, which can never
be constituted as objects within a horizon and by an I.48 There is no transcendental I or
the ego who would constitute any of these phenomena as an object. There is only a “me”
à la Levinas, in Marion’s estimation, who receives the event, the idol, the icon, and the
flesh. In analyzing each of these phenomena one can see that Marion is a careful reader
of Levinas in the way he incorporates some aspects of Levinas’s thought in his
phenomenology.
Marion defines the saturated phenomenon of the event in the form of an
unforeseeable historical phenomenon. It has no transcendental I that would constitute its
giving and showing when considered phenomenologically. It gives itself prior to showing
itself and has its own self and shows itself on the basis of its own self. It occurs
instantaneously in the happening starting from itself and arises from its own
phenomenality as a fait accompli. Thus, the subject does not constitute it, rather finds
itself as constituted by it.49 The subject is the “me” that receives it, reminiscent of
Levinas’s “me voici.” As with Levinas’s ethical responsibility as an event that enacts the
subject in his/her subjectivity, Marion’s saturated phenomenon of the event enacts the
47
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recipient or l’adonné or l’interloqué (the “me”) in its subjectivity as a constituted witness.
Here the subject cannot allege to be the producer of truth; it is “stripped of the
characteristics that gave it transcendental rank.”50 With the positing of the “me” both
Marion and Levinas oppose Descartes’ subject and Heidegger’s effort to overcome it. For
both Levinas and Marion, the subject “me – accusative” (Levinas) or “to me – dative”
(Marion) is enacted into being upon receiving the event (saturated phenomenon –
Marion) or (ethical responsibility - Levinas).51
The saturated phenomenon of the idol suggests “aspects of the unbearable and
bedazzlement”52 close to what Plato describes in relation with the myth of the cave,
where the idea of the Good offers itself as difficult to be seen, not by any imperfection or
limitation, but rather “by excess – because the soul is incapable of seeing anything …
saturated by an extremely brilliant bedazzlement.”53 The brilliance of this phenomenon
impedes intentionality and characterizes what the subject’s gaze cannot bear. The idol is
now a phenomenon capable of looking at and of displaying an excessively visible quality
that no single hermeneutic can exhaust.54
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As with the idol, the analysis of the icon as a saturated phenomenon has both
theological and phenomenological foci. It appears under the characteristics of
“irregardable and irreducible,”55 of the invisible that cannot be looked at because it
breaks off visibility by excess. The icon points the person’s gaze to something beyond the
person’s mastery, to the infinite gaze. The gaze is called upon to go beyond itself by
never stopping, freezing, settling or resting at the point of visibility. Yet it is a visible
reference to the invisible. The icon makes visible the gaze of the invisible other who in
turn looks at one’s gaze, or whose look traverses one’s gaze.56
Marion soon sees in Jesus Christ the definitive icon whom Paul depicts as “the
image of the invisible God” (Colossians 1:15). He goes as far as to identify the icon with
the cross of Christ/God which functions as the measure of all icons.57 In the icon, God
gives himself to contemplation yet maintains the necessary gap with humanity. This gap
is what Marion calls distance. The distance between the invisible God (the icon) and
humanity in Marion’s phenomenology takes a number of meanings as his work
progresses. Yet, the fundamental meaning expresses both the interruption of thought and
God’s withdrawal, that is, God’s way of entering into thought. The interruption of
thought is for Marion the human’s impossibility to think that which is absolutely
excessive. Distance preserves the necessary and infinite difference between humans and
55
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the divine; it also takes place among humans themselves and underlines their differences.
It makes relationships possible and prevents any totalization of those relationships.58 Here
Marion finds inspiration from Levinas’s use of the term distance.59 He often uses the
word “distance,” as Horner helpfully argues, “the same way as Lévinas, trying to think
relationship in terms of a distance that protects the infinitude of the other, whether that is
God or a human other.”60 Paradoxically the unbridgeable gap created by this distance is
also the place and moment of God’s self-giving to humans in a relationship of proximity
and intimacy.61 Thus Marion’s distance is both the gap and God himself, definable and
yet indefinable. And God is an icon of distance. Distance is what characterizes human
beings’ relationship with God in terms of possibility of receptivity, participation and
goodness. It surpasses the human capacity to conceptualize God as it precedes every
conception.62
Marion’s analysis of flesh as a saturated phenomenon expresses the way in which
the ego and the world are phenomenalized.63 His analysis of the issue of the givenness of
the self or flesh is to be understood in relation to the givenness of the icon/face. The ego
“does not fix itself to its own flesh; it fixes itself to itself as flesh” and as “first self.”64
With regard to the other person, the ego gives itself without relation as body, in passivity
and receptivity, in suffering, pleasure and aging. This self-fixing of the ego in Marion’s
58
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thought, especially his analysis of the relationship between time and flesh, is reminiscent
of Levinas’s examination of insomnia and nausea.65 Thus the ego taking up flesh is an act
of facticity and accomplishes his/her individuation by the “‘unanimous white conflict’ of
the one with the other – precisely by the taking of flesh….I do not give myself my flesh,
it is it that gives me to myself. In receiving my flesh, I received me myself – I am in this
way gifted [adonné, given over] to it.”66
What then links the saturated phenomenon of flesh with that of icon as Marion
understands it? The answer is to be found in Marion’s consideration of the relationship
between time and flesh. For Marion “the weight of time is accumulated…where my flesh
is most openly visible – on my face. Actually, it is in my face that time prefers to leave
traces, its traces.”67 This means that “the face shares the privilege of flesh” as “it gives
itself to be seen in seeing itself” just like “the flesh feels in feeling itself feeling.”68 What
differentiates the face from the flesh is the additional characteristic of the face of
“looking without having to be looked at;” hence the definition of the face – “what looks
at me [but] I cannot see it, nor look at it in its turn.”69 Now, Marion’s phenomenological
icon is understood in relation to the face of the other as it is in Levinas. The icon, that is,
the face of the other opens onto invisibility by interrupting visibility by the excess of
intuition. It is like the subject looking into the pupils of the other’s eyes where nothing
can be seen but invisibility.70 With regard to the analysis of the icon as the face of the
other person, Marion acknowledges his indebtedness to Levinas’s determination of “the
65
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mode of phenomenality proper to the face”71 that escapes the look, yet it appears as a
voice. Levinas writes: “…the face speaks. The manifestation of the face is already
discourse….primordial sphere, which corresponds to what we call the same, turns to the
absolutely other only on call from the Other. Revelation constitutes a veritable inversion
[of] objectifying cognition” 72 The face as an icon “escapes my look and envisages me in
turn – in fact, it sees me first, because it takes the initiative.”73 So the only way it appears
to the subject is that it shows itself in the silence of the ethical command, “Thou shall not
kill!” It “only appears when I admit – submitting myself to him or her – that I must not
kill.”74 There is no intention involved here but only intuition which immerses all
intention. The saturated phenomenon thus appears not visible, but by excess. Similar to
Levinas, the transition from seeing to speaking – reversed intentionality – is of greatest
phenomenological significance for Marion.75 For both Levinas and Marion, the other, in
the reversed intentionality, is completely actualized in the voice that addresses the
subject. The subject’s self-sufficiency is challenged and questioned by the other’s
look/face. In this regard the manifestation of the face depends on the powerlessness of the
subject to constitute it.
It becomes clear, in our estimation, that each of the saturated phenomena (the
event, the idol, the icon, and the flesh) developed above is characterized by a saturation
of love that obliges the “me” à la Levinas to open up to the other as such. It refuses to let
the “me” be self-centered, precisely because it appears with a multiple and inexpressible

71

Marion, In Excess, 115.
Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 66-67.
73
Marion, In Excess, 116.
74
Marion, In Excess, 115-116; Emmanuel Levinas, Humanisme de l’autre homme (Montpellier : Fata
Morgana, 1972), 47ff.
75
Marion, In Excess, 37, 44, 61, 87, 99, 113-114, 117, 119.
72

195

excess that suspends any effort at constitution. It is at the center of Marion’s rejection of
onto-theology and his articulation of the phenomenology of the other person that gives
the subject his/her subjectivity.76 Here, in explaining how precisely the subject can
experience the human other, Marion, as Horner argues “develops a quasi-Levinasian
intentionality of love that depends, not on seeing the other (and thereby reducing the
other to the scope of my own gaze), but on feeling the weight of the other’s
unsubstituable gaze as it crosses my intentional aim. This weight is experienced as an
always-prior injunction that exposes and obliges me.”77 Love, for Levinas, “designates a
movement by which a being seeks that to which it was bound before even having taken
the initiative of the search and despite the exteriority in which it finds it.”78 Following
Levinas, Marion argues for a non self-centered love, stimulated by the invisible other
who destitutes and exposes the self and directs him/her toward the other in ethical
responsibility. The order which elects the self to become an object of another’s gaze that
is intended at the self and exposes him/her constitutes the initial move toward love
without being.79 This is what Marion calls an “erotic reduction”80 that occurs only in the
context of the counter-intentionality of the face. It makes sense then that Marion would
see his project as being in the mid-way to postmodernity as all thoughts (pre-modern,
modern, and post-modern) are subordinated to the agape/the gift. Furthermore, due to the
76
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saturated love of intuition, the precise meaning of the subject’s love for the other
becomes clear, in Marion’s estimation, when the other whom the subject loves shows
him/herself to the subject in a reversed intentionality of the face as “pure exteriority” à la
Levinas’s ethical command.
Marion’s understanding of love seems to suggest an account of the other
dependent on a phenomenology of love that is eventually nurtured by a theological
analysis of charity. For him, Christian love prevails over both metaphysics and nonmetaphysical thought. He writes that his work “claims in the end to be able to refer to
charity, the agape, properly revealed in and as the Christ, according to an essential
anachronism: charity belongs neither to pre-, nor to post-, nor to modernity; but rather, at
once abandoned to and removed from historical destiny, it dominates any situation of
thought.”81
While Marion acknowledges his indebtedness to Levinas for having established
“for the first time the mode of the phenomenality proper to the face,”82 he, however,
distances himself from Levinas for having limited the notion of the face to an ethical
hermeneutic. For him, Levinas’s ethical phenomenon of the face could certainly “work
here a phenomenological deployment more originary than it, and which would
consequently render possible the description of other phenomena, or other descriptions of
this same phenomenon – the face.”83 Nevertheless, as a particular saturated phenomenon,
this face, Marion argues, stems from a call that originates in the icon and it goes beyond
Levinas’s other person of ethics. And this icon achieves its phenomenality only by
making itself to be seen by being heard. Hence, in his analysis of the face as icon, Marion
81
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describes the face, as “an icon addressing a call… that envisages me” and calls me to
ethical responsibility.84
Besides, Marion finds Levinas’s notion of the face as being too universal and
representing any face of the other as such. Levinas’s face is no one, unnamed and only
leads to unspecified alterity. The notion such as hostage or substitution also describes the
universality of Levinas’s ethical command whereby anyone can take the place of any
other. Thus, he asserts, Levinas’s ethical injunction is unable to account for the
individuation of the other. The face of the other in this sense calls for an infinite
hermeneutic in terms of love without end and makes possible the individuation or
particularity of both the self and the other. He suggests finding this individuation in the
submission to the other and to his/her call as love.85 The subject in his/her commitment to
love allows the other to emerge as phenomenon; hence, in this “erotic reduction” (a
crossing of the gazes) the subject and the other leave the universal, even the ethical
universal, in order to achieve individuation and particularity in a relationship that
concerns only both of them and undoubtedly not the generally forcing neighbor.86 Hence,
love, for Marion, cannot be limited to Levinas’s ethics of responsibility; it makes possible
the subject’s relationship with an individuated and personal other through a crossing of
the gazes.
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Although Marion’s criticisms of Levinas have some relevance, considering that
Levinas’s love dimension is bound by ethical injunction, one still wonders whether
Marion does not overlook some dimension of individuation attached to Levinas’s ethics
of responsibility. Levinas would certainly resist speaking of individuation as Marion
understands it, because such language might, without a doubt, suggest a return to totality.
Yet, there is, we would argue, in Levinas’s insistence on “exclusive singularity without
appearing” of each being in the form of assignation, some degree of individuation that
emphasizes the uniqueness of both the subject and the other.87 This individuation in
Levinas takes a sense of differentiation (absolute alterity) and “extreme singularity” as
necessary conditions for true love of neighbor.88 The subject, Levinas insists, is bound to
the neighbor not on the basis of biological logic (“belonging from the same genus as me
that he/[she] concerns me”) but because of his/her relation of “kinship” with the other.89
In this sense the other person appears to the subject when the subject exposes him/herself
to the other person in responsibility as separate being. Ethical responsibility becomes
recognition of the other person’s singularity. The other in his/her absolute uniqueness
cannot be contained within conceptual categories of representation and consciousness. In
a sense, for Levinas, individuation or particularity is not based on “mutual eroticization”
as it is in Marion, but rather on the acknowledgment of the subject’s and the other’s
singularity which constitutes their uniqueness.
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In conclusion, Marion’s phenomenological approach opens up a possibility of
thinking otherness by way of givenness and saturated phenomena which would guarantee
the primacy of philosophy and the possibility of a genuine theological approach based on
love. In arguing for a phenomenology that remains open to the theological, he joins
Levinas in rejecting onto-theology and proposes a new direction for theology which is
centered on the horizon of “love without being.”90 Marion sees a possibility of dialogue
between Christian theology and Levinas’s thought. Thus, in so doing, he argues for the
relevance of Levinas’s phenomenology for postmodern philosophical and theological
discussion. The question of whether or not Marion has been successful in this new
approach has been, and still is, an issue of heated debate among scholars. Can we really
move away completely from metaphysics’ concept of being? We are inclined to think
that the being of metaphysics can be understood as in Purcell’s being otherwise whereby,
through the dimension of transcendence, human beings are made capable of breaking
inclinations of totality or self-subsistent autonomy.

III. Michael Purcell
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Michael Purcell is a Scottish theologian and a senior lecturer in systematic
theology at the University of Edinburgh, school of Divinity in Scotland. His research
field has been mainly in the area of philosophical and theological studies with special
emphasis on fundamental theology, mostly the relation of French phenomenology and
theology. Most of his writings deal with elements of Levinas’s thought that could
correlate to Christian fundamental and practical theology.
His first attempt at this correlation is found in his book Mystery and Method: The
Other in Rahner and Levinas91 in which he tries to confront Rahner’s theology with
Levinas’s thought. He finds in Rahner’s and Levinas’s understanding of the other
differences that call for complementarity. For Rahner, the other is the incomprehensible
mystery of God who is central for understanding the human other. For Levinas, the other
is the human other whose infinity comes from God. Levinas and Rahner, he concludes,
need each other as they both recognize, each in its own right, the dimension of the divine
in human encounters. Purcell’s most recent book, Levinas and Theology,92 attempts some
connections between Levinas’s thought and Christian theology. The task of this section
will be to present Purcell’s reading of Levinas for theology. Two aspects will be
examined: the correlation between phenomenology and theology and the connection
between the theologies of grace and sacraments with Levinas’s phenomenology of
awakening, desire, and the face.
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The Correlation between Phenomenology and Theology
Ever since the introduction of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology in Europe,
European scholars have been keen to see how Husserl’s phenomenology can relate to
theology. This of course has motivated unrelenting debate and interest among the leading
figures in phenomenological philosophy. French phenomenologists such as Jean-Luc
Marion, Michel Henry, and Jean-Louis Chrétien have been prominent in analyzing a
possible relation between theology and phenomenological thinking along the line of
Levinas’s transformation of Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology.93 Purcell
joined the debate with the publication of his Method and Mystery. His argument that
Rahner and Levinas’s thought, notwithstanding some divergences, should be tackled by
each other was an acknowledgement of a possibility for a relationship between Levinas’s
phenomenology and Christian theology. It is this argument that he attempts to articulate
in his book Levinas and Theology.
What Purcell believes to be of critical significance in the relationship between
Levinas’s phenomenology and Christian theology is their common point of departure,
namely, their concern with human existential experience.94 The human existential as the
central aspect for the correlation between phenomenology and theology presupposes an
existence of a real world in which this human existential can be experienced; hence the
idea of the incarnate existence as a place where human beings exist and where God’s
existence becomes a question for them. For Levinas, Purcell contends, it is in the world
that human beings exist, find fulfillment, and commit themselves to one another. How
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does Levinas understand incarnate existence and how is it significant for the correlation
between Levinas’s phenomenology and theology?
The phenomenology which Purcell refers to is the one that Levinas transforms
from Husserl’s insights and which rejects naive realism that takes for granted the
relationship between meaning and reality.95 Levinas, referring to Husserl, contests the
position of the natural attitude as it fails to account for the link between the world “out”
there and subjectivity.96 He supports Husserl’s view that the way things appear in
consciousness are given as they appear, and their meanings are unpredictable and not
everywhere the same; and this is expressed in terms of intentional consciousness.97
Levinas, however, with respect to the subject does not limit the function of intentionality
to purely representational and theoretical dimensions, like Husserl. He expands the
phenomenological possibilities of intentionality to life in general, most importantly to
human relations with the world, including the transcendental, volitional and affective
dimension of human subjectivity. For Levinas, Purcell argues, phenomenology has to go
beyond abstraction, egological reduction, and theoretical and cognitive dimension toward
an intersubjective reduction that takes place in concrete lived experience in which
“others” are associated.98 Unlike Husserl, who bracketed the existence of the other in the
phenomenological époche, Levinas acknowledges the presence of the other in the
95
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intentional and transcendental dimension of consciousness. He is committed to a
phenomenology of life that takes seriously human existence, both of the subject and the
other.
Levinas finds in Heidegger’s thought, Purcell contends, the most important
potentialities of the phenomenological method, most especially with regard to his
appreciation of incarnate existence. Heidegger was the first, in Being and Time, to open
Levinas’s eyes on this issue.99 Yet, Levinas still departs from Heidegger’s existential
phenomenology for its confused understanding of the meaning of the world and its
neglect of the ethical dimension in his understanding of Dasein. He argues for a positive
view of the world whereby human beings, who exist in the world among other things,
would not be reduced to Dasein’s own self project, but rather would be defined by ethical
responsibility that disrupts ontology. For Levinas, the world of humans is the world of
lived experience in which consciousness finds itself already incarnated (here in the
world) in the everydayness of existence at once opened to both phenomenological and
theological elucidation.100 Here Levinas draws attention to the importance and the
sincerity of everyday actions which characterize human existence. Each everyday
experience is a phenomenon à la Marion, that is, often saturated and excessive which
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from the outset already puts one “in a prevenient ethical situation without” one’s
choosing or knowing.101
Now for Levinas, Purcell argues, the incarnate existence is the point of departure
for any phenomenological inquiry. Such a perspective is not without theological
significance, considering the fact that theology starts as theological anthropology. In the
incarnate existence, the subject’s consciousness is awakened to the reality of the world,
facilitating thus a shift from subjectivity to intersubjectivity. The subject is awakened
from sleep, a mode of refuge or escape from the excessive demands of responsibility, to
the mode of vigilance, fear, and threat that characterizes wakefulness and the insomnia of
there is from which being arises.102 The subject’s consciousness (interiority) finds itself
here already constituted in incarnate existence and geared toward the event of the other
person (exteriority) that provokes his/her conscience. There is here a reconsideration of
subjectivity in terms of ethical responsibility for the other. To be a subject is to exist not
as a pour soi but as a pour l’autre.103 According to Purcell, Levinas leaves the climate of
the Husserlian and Heideggerian ontology to move toward an ethics where “the event of
the other person – which may be described as an ethical awakening – predates the
subject, but is only discovered ‘after the event’ of subjectivity, as it were. For Levinas,
however, such an ethics can also be ‘first theology,’ properly understood.”104 The
question to be answered is how precisely has Levinas made the move from the ethical
awakening of the subject to theological reduction.
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For Purcell, Levinas made this move by seeing in the ethical awakening a new
humanism that echoes the humanism of the Hebrew Bible from which originates part of
Western thought. While Levinas has been critical of Christian theology for its reliance on
a Western ontological foundation, its tendency toward the theoretical, making the
transcendence of the divine accessible to thought, and its neglect of humans, Purcell
argues, he still sees the need for the revitalization of certain themes of theology as it
pertains to holiness. Purcell’s underlying argument is that, for Levinas, ethics is not only
“first philosophy” but also “first theology,” as it addresses the issue of holiness of life
which precedes any ethical question. As long as it is a human person, who in history
raises the question of God, Levinas believes that ethical engagement as opposed to a
purely theoretical approach is an essential component for theological reflection. The
ethical engagement that marked both Levinas’s phenomenology and revealed theology is
motivated by “a first revelation of the other person” and “the ethical intent of
scriptures.”105 The Hebrew Bible is the place where the first things about human life and
meaning are said; things said in philosophy find their meaning from the “Book of books,”
and the principle thing said in the Hebrew Bible is the fundamental human responsibility
for the other person. Because philosophy stems from the “Book of books,” all thinking,
all meaning, and all quests for knowledge are subjected to the anteriority of ethics
inscribed in the Torah. Biblical humanism argues that subjectivity is intersubjectivity as it
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is prescribed in the Torah, the text of divine law. The Torah gives direction by way of
ethical rule to all humans so that human life may prosper. God’s law is written in the face
of the other person and calls humans to ethical responsibility toward the other person. In
keeping God’s law or commandments presented in the Torah, one meets the trace of God
that comes to mind.106 In this sense philosophy, through phenomenology, shares with
theology a concern to articulate the meaning of existence in terms of responsibility for the
other – an ethical humanism which is the main point of Levinas’s philosophical
project.107 And what comes first and defines meaning and understanding in terms of
philosophy is therefore the human person’s original and unconditional acceptance of the
ethical commands of the Law. Without the meaning that philosophy and theology draw
from ethical commands of the Law that surpasses human freedom, their thoughts remain
empty and meaningless. The ethical command of responsibility for the other is now the
central aspect of the correlation between phenomenology and theology. The subject is
awakened to ethical responsibility, to his/her genuine humanity, which is a reflection of
the divine life; and this for Levinas, Purcell argues, is “first theology;”108 it takes its root
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in the biblical humanism of Torah whereby “God arises as the counterpart of the justice
we render to the other person.”109
For Purcell, Levinas’s phenomenology, by emphasizing the ethical engagement,
helps theology achieve its goal of defending the holiness of life through ethics. Levinas’s
phenomenological method “offers theology a new voice, a new grammar of response and
responsibility, a new lexicon for articulating the human in its tendency towards the
divine, which for Levinas, cannot avoid an ethical commitment to the other person here
and now.”110 In a sense, phenomenology and theology should work together and need
each other as they both attempt to answer the same question.
Hence, according to Purcell and following Jeffrey Kosky’s arguments, Levinas’s
phenomenology offers a possibility for a philosophy of religion or fundamental theology
as it opens a religious possibility in a postmodern or post-metaphysical age for a
consideration of the phenomenon of the human subject as responsible for the other
person. Interesting here is “the fact that the religiosity of the subject is discovered by way
of a phenomenological reduction which Levinas pushes beyond its Husserlian limits.”111
Levinas recovers the transcendental dimension of subjectivity bracketed by Husserl as he
understands the reduction to occur through a consciousness that goes beyond itself in the
transcendence of intentionality. Subjectivity is affirmed in terms of exteriority. To be a
subject phenomenologically is to be ethically attentive to the other person. Here for
Purcell, Levinas’s phenomenological perspective is of significance for fundamental
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theology “in reconsidering the subject in terms of ethics and as responsibility for the
other person.”112
The Theologies of Grace and Sacraments and Levinas’s Phenomenology of Awakening,
Desire, and the Face
Purcell continues his inquiry into a possibility of dialogue between Levinas’s
ethics of responsibility and Christian theology by examining aspects of Levinas’s
philosophy that provide a possible rapprochement with the theologies of grace and
sacraments. He seems to find it in Levinas’s phenomenology of Desire, Awakening, and
the Face. For Purcell, Levinas’s understanding of desire and awakening can be translated
into a theology of grace and the notion of the face into a theology of the sacrament.
Levinas’s Phenomenology of Desire and Awakening and the Theology of Grace
For Purcell, Levinas’s phenomenology of desire and awakening constitute two
important existential experiences that could be linked to a theology of grace whereby
consciousness is called upon to become moral consciousness. In Levinas’s
phenomenology, desire and awakening are the fruits of a phenomenological journey that
originates in the existential experience in which the self, caught up in the sleeplessness of
Insomnia (the burden of existence), had no other choice than to flee by ‘getting out of
being by another way’ – the way of exteriority or of the advent of the other person.
What characterizes Levinas’s phenomenology of desire and awakening, Purcell
asserts, has much to do with existence as transcendence or the call of the infinite, the
other person. Existence as transcendence begins in the existential experience of the
subject when he/she escapes a self-enclosed state of being toward an otherwise than
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being. This escape, for Levinas, takes place in the structure of the hypostasis of existence
and existent whereby the subject emerges from the “enchainment of the bare
existence”113 of the there is (il y a) toward subjectivity as ethical responsibility.114 Within
this structure, he identifies two movements: the first is from non-being to being, a
situation of impersonal anonymity of the there is or Insomnia from which being arises
and there is no escape. The second is an ethical journey from being toward otherwise
than being.115 In the first movement, the subject is involved in the kind of selfrelationality to itself. Nothing actually exists or is definite, yet there is not nothing; it is a
state of wakefulness and darkness, a fact of there is (il y a) – a sort of being/existence in
its extraordinary obscurity, unknown to itself except through what it causes, namely
threat, fear, and vigilance. The notion of there is (il y a) as wakefulness without
intentionality is a phenomenon of impersonal or pure being. This non-being is expressed
through sluggishness, weariness, or the incapacity to face Being. The second movement
comes to the rescue of the first. It offers a possibility for the subject to leave the mode of
indetermination of there is (il y a). It is a moment of escape from threat, fear, and
vigilance with the advent of the other person. The arrival of the other person in the form
of transcendental movement disrupts “a subjectivity which is self-closed; it releases the
self from its enchainment to bare existence, and enables the emergence of ethical
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subjectivity.”116 The subject distances itself from itself by way of a transcendental
movement that takes place in the mode of separation. And “separation gives the
possibility of transcendence and a relation to alterity.”117 The threat, fear, and vigilance of
the darkness of the there is, “in which no one may sleep, is overcome by the advent of the
other person who saves the self from itself and its enchainment to solitary existence.”118
The subject withdraws from itself to allow the possibility of another person, other than
itself, opening thus the possibility of ethical existence expressed as responsibility for the
other.
Now, the escape from being or the ‘getting out of being by another way’ – the
way of exteriority – evokes a dimension of transcendence that has ethical implications.
Transcendence for Levinas, Purcell argues, always suggests a move toward the excessive;
it surpasses and goes beyond the aptitude of thought, it is a desire for the infinite.119 The
infinite, the other person “whom thought cannot contain is in the realm of the infinite –
provokes thought, and provokes thought preveniently.”120 The idea here is the possibility
for the self to escape the state of there is or pure being toward the Illeity of the other
person. Illeity is the origin of alterity and opens up the subject as responsible for the
other. To exist as a subject, phenomenologically, is to be awakened to responsibility by
the other’s absolute excess or infinity. And what causes this awakening is the insatiable
desire that the other provokes in the subject. What this means in terms of the theology of
116
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grace is that Levinas’s subject – through the second movement of the structure of the
hypostasis, from being to otherwise than being – awakens to a transcendental graced
existence in terms of desire for the other which is excessive and infinite. This is the
hypostasis of the other in the subject.121
The subject in order to escape the indeterminacy of the il y a enters into a
relationship that is always and already beyond its power and capacity. It is a “graced
relationship” that is always in a transcendental movement toward infinity in terms of the
dynamic of desire. The subject always desires what is beyond, the other person, the
infinite. And because the person is excessive, ungraspable, infinite, and eminently other,
desire is inextinguishable and inaccessible, and does not originate in the subject. Thus,
the dynamism of desire as grace, establishes the subject as no longer “for itself” but as
“for the other.” Thus, within the ethics of desire, the other, “like grace,” remains
antecedent with respect to the subject, “too close to grasp and too far away to reach.”122
Thus, the dynamism of desire as grace in Levinas presents itself in a “paradox of infinity
in proximity.”123
The phenomenology of desire that constitutes subjectivity as intersubjectivity,
takes place in the incarnate existence through the phenomenology of awakening to
alterity. Here the consciousness of the subject is awakened to intersubjectivity as the
hypostasis of the other-in-the subject. This becomes the subject’s original experience as
the one-for-the-other in responsibility.124 This is the definitive meaning of human life.
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For Purcell, Levinas’s phenomenology of desire and awakening can be read in the light
of the theology of grace. What actually facilitated this possibility is a “graced existence”
which could be identified with Irenaeus’ theological conviction that “the glory of God is
the human person fully alive;” and phenomenologically this could be expressed as the
“glory of God is the human person fully awake.”125
To explain his claim, Purcell presents the thought of Aquinas, Maréchal, Rahner,
and De Lubac on desire for God as witness.126 All start with Aquinas’ consideration of
the human subject as having within its being “a natural desire for the beatific vision”
(desiderium naturale visionis beatificae). For Aquinas, Purcell argues, the human person,
in his/her intellect is naturally constituted to desire to see the divine substance. Maréchal,
building on Aquinas, insists that such natural dynamism to see the infinite and absolute
God can only be met by God’s grace freely given to the human subject. This position
suggests, firstly, the existence of an exterior agent that is capable of communicating
itself, and secondly, on the part of the human person, the capacity for receiving this
communication. Rahner agrees with Maréchal’s argument but also insists on the
gratuitous nature of grace. He understands the natural desire for the beatific vision as
coming from human existential experience as a supernatural existential whereby the
dynamic orientation in the finite spirit toward what is other stems from a transcendental
horizon of an absolute (supernatural existential), but not from any lack on its part. In this
sense, for Rahner, in the transcendental horizon, the finite spirit is constituted as
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“openness,” a potentia oboedientialis, to alterity.127 For De Lubac, the desire for God in
the human person is both natural (because it is found in human nature) and supernatural
(because it does not stem from the human person but God), and the human person cannot
on his/her own without God’s grace fulfill his/her goal. Rahner and de Lubac agree that
the desire for God in the human person is stirred by God’s grace freely given.128 The
human person can never fulfill the desire for God for which he/she is not the author. This
desire is beyond the human capacity to bear. Thus, desire as grace in the subject is always
and already opened to a transcendental movement, to exteriority, outside-of-oneself, and
toward God, “the infinite who can never be possessed or consumed by the one
desiring.”129 Purcell sees in this theological perspective on desire as grace a possible
correspondence with Levinas’s phenomenology of desire and awakening. For, what
characterizes desire for Levinas “is insatiable longing for the Other who, on account of
his or her excess, sustains the Desire as radically and always unfulfilled and
unfulfillable.”130
While in the theology of grace it is God who awakens the desire in the human
person, in Levinas’s phenomenology “an understanding of grace as desire and
awakening” is provoked by “the advent of the other person, always prevenient, who
excites

an

insatiable

desire

for

the

other

who

is

always

excessive

and

unencompassable.”131 The theology of grace in Levinas, Purcell contends, can be read in
terms of “the phenomenology of desire which tends to be excessive, and in terms of the
phenomenology of awakening, whereby the glory of God is not only the human person
127
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fully alive (Gloria dei homo vivens), but also the human person fully awake (Gloria dei,
homo vigilans).”132 Levinas offers here a possibility of dialogue with Christian theology
in terms of grace as desire and awakening. Purcell, however, in suggesting that Levinas’s
phenomenology of desire and awakening is close to a theology of grace might still have
to show how one could reconcile the idea of grace as God’s presence and assistance in
Christian theology with Levinas’s God who takes no part in the subject’s responsibility
for the other, except that He only passes by as a trace.
Levinas’s Phenomenology of the Face and the Theology of Sacrament
Purcell sees in Levinas’s phenomenology of the face an affinity with a theology
of sacrament as developed by Karl Rahner. Rahner understands the sacraments in general
in terms of a transcendental relationship between humanity and divinity by which the
sacraments as signs effect grace (what they signify) in as much as grace is bestowed by
being signified. The sacramental sign is intrinsically related to the grace it communicates
by virtue of its created nature and purpose. Hence, the efficacy of the sacraments derives
not from any human capacity, effort or merit, but from God’s gift to humans. Thus,
sacraments as signs are a suitable medium for the manifestation of God’s grace in the
human person.133 The significance of the sacramental sign (sacramentum) comes not
from the signified, but from the symbolic reality or mystery whose presence is caused or
signified by the consecrated material sign. The sacramental sign or sacramentum tantum
by signifying effects the reality of grace (res). The ontological reality of sign guarantees
the effectiveness and objectivity of the sacraments. Rahner calls these material signs real
or intrinsic symbols.
132
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Purcell sees in the relationship between sign and reality in Rahner’s sacramental
theology an affinity with Levinas’s phenomenology of the face. The face is the “way” the
other appears to the subject in a transcendental dimension, exceeding the subject’s gaze
by which he/she would objectify it. It “signifies, beyond signification, a relation with an
absolute absent, an ‘au delà de l’être’” and passes away as a trace.134 In this dimension of
the face as presence (proximity and distance) of that which does not present itself and
who passes away as trace; Purcell sees a Rahnerian sacramental distinction between sign
and symbol. He argues that “to speak of the face as the trace of the other – beyond
representation – is to speak of the sacramentality of the face.”135 In Rahner, according to
Purcell, material elements such as bread, wine, water, etc, can never function on their
own as sacramental signs without transcendental referent. God’s grace is the cause of the
sign, bringing it about and making it present. In terms of the sacramentality of the face,
the face of the other would be the symbolic reality or mystery whose presence-absence as
a trace is signified by the other person’s absolute transcendence. Thus, what the subject is
left with in the absence of the other is the sacramental face as trace (symbolic reality or
mystery) of the other caused by the reality of the other person’s absolute transcendence.
In this sense, Levinas’s face can be read as a sacramental sign. For a face as sign
“signifies something other than itself which is irreducible to itself, and irreducible in view
of the fact of the transcendence of the Other person who gives the sign, an absolute
transcendence which, for Levinas, is ultimately guaranteed by God as ‘the other of the
Other.’”136 For the face of the other as trace to function as sign (symbolic reality or
mystery) it needs a transcendental referent which the other brings by virtue of its
134
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association with God as the other of the other. Thus, Purcell could say that for both
Rahner and Levinas, each in his own right, “exteriority as well as materiality belongs to
the meaning of the sacramental sign.”137 They both “assert the transcendental value of the
signified.”138 There is in a sign an embodiment of God’s grace. For Rahner and Levinas,
Purcell argues, “the relationship between the finite and infinite is expressed symbolically
due to the symbolic nature of reality;” for “there is distance between image and reality,
not confusion.”139 Levinas’s reflection on the subject who is being faced by the face of
the other is expressed in ethical terms enabling, as it were, Rahner’s emphasis on
symbolic reality to be sufficiently humanized.140
There is in Levinas and Rahner, Purcell suggests, a move from sign to the
symbolism of sign as the “other-in-me.” For Rahner, Purcell contends, finite being is
relational in the sense that, as multiple in itself, it realizes itself only in expressing itself
through the conversio ad phantasmata. Levinas’s being also shares the same relationality
in itself, because finite existence is best expressed in terms of reflexivity of the verb ‘to
be’: ‘it is not just that one is, one is oneself (on n’est pas, on s’est)’.141 Because
“existence is primarily reflexive[…], each being forms, in its own way, more or less
perfectly according to its degree of being, something distinct from itself and yet, one with
itself, ‘for’ its own fulfillment.”142 Consequently, the meaning of symbol for both Rahner
and Levinas is the subject’s self-realization in its own intrinsic otherness. The subject
finds itself always and already absorbed in the other, in whom, it finds its fulfillment.
137
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This other-in-me for Rahner is the one spoken about in sacramental sign, yet remains
hidden and excessive in the spoken words of the sacraments.
In terms of the Eucharist, the church remembers Christ’s words and actions. Now,
the words spoken by the church in the sacrament of the Eucharist are in memory of Christ
and make him present. Christ is the one spoken about in the sacramental sign. The
Eucharist makes Jesus Christ sacramentally present in a memorial sacrifice. In Levinas’s
language, this would correspond to the distinction between Saying (le Dire) and the Said
(le Dit), with Saying remaining excessive with regard to what is Said. The Eucharist as
memorial would be situated in the time of the other, that is, the now of the subject. This
Eucharistic time which stems from the other is a liturgical time that calls for diakonia
(service).143 The liturgical theology of the church involves two major aspects: the
glorification of God and the sanctification of humanity. The subject in glorifying God is
invited to act justly toward the other; worship and service are interrelated. Hence, Purcell
asserts, “the theological structure of the liturgy is ‘other-oriented’ just as, for Levinas, the
philosophical structure of liturgy is ‘a movement of the Same towards the Other which
never returns to the Same’.”144 Philosophically, to participate in the liturgy, defined as a
work for the people, is to respond in responsibility for the other in a non-reversible
movement in which the other, “like the work of grace in us, preveniently precedes and
enables the self to move beyond the self.”145 Liturgy is inseparable to the service one
renders to the neighbor. As a result, according to Purcell, the church in celebrating the
mystery of the Eucharistic memorial enters into the time of the other who “gives time”
and makes it meaningful.
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For the subject to respond in responsibility for the other, Purcell argues, is to be
Eucharist in the sense of substitution. Jesus Christ, in the mystery of the Eucharist, gave
himself in substitution for you and for many, in reference to the words of the institution
narrative. Read ethically, the Eucharist is both responsibility and working for justice. The
unique other calls the subject to responsibility. This invitation also opens up to many
other’s (humanity) in such a way that through the face of this one other person, the whole
of humanity appeals for justice in the world.146 Levinas’s incarnation (Man-God), unlike
Christian theology’s (God-Man), centers on the human person’s role and responsibility in
the world. To be a subject is to be incarnate “for-the-other-person.” Incarnation for
Levinas is now the human person’s divine intentionality, in terms of “expiation for
others” or “substitution” “for-the-other-person.” Subjectivity is understood in terms of
kenosis, passivity, and expiation. And God’s proximity manifests itself in the subject’s
ethical responsibility and in the workings of justice.147 The other-in-me as symbolism of
sign derives its surplus of meaning or incomprehensibility from its association with God,
“the other than the other.” Hence, subjectivity is now defined in terms of the “for-theother” or openness to the other human person. For Purcell, Rahner and Levinas affirm the
necessity of love of neighbor as the most important act of the love of God.
Purcell, however, raises some concerns about Levinas’s understanding of
ontology which, in his estimation, creates a rift between being and good, thus provoking
a risk of “a metaphysical responsibility without an ontological commitment.”148 He
suggests a reading of Levinas’s ethical responsibility as a being otherwise instead of an
otherwise than being. For him, although Levinas’s Otherwise than being affirms, “the
146
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absolute uncompromisable value of the other ... offers no way of linking responsibility
with practical commitment to the other;”149 it locates the good, not in being, but rather
beyond being. Purcell argues rather for a possibility of finding the good in being and that
being also has the capacity to actualize it.150
Purcell’s merit, one has to admit, is to have tried to establish some connection
between Levinas’s transcendental ethics of responsibility and Christian theology. He sees
in Levinas’s thought “the possibility for ethical redemption of the ontological which is so
prevalent in theological thinking.”151 Although Levinas has been critical of Christian
theology, he has also expressed the need for the recovering of certain theological themes.
The theology Levinas accepts, Purcell argues, is the one that shows consideration for the
neighbor, that is, the one that takes ethics seriously. It is important to note that theology
cannot be reduced to ethics, yet the insistence on the perfection of charity and the service
for neighbor as a manner of human living, are the characteristics of holiness of life that
Christian theology teaches. Thus, communion with God would be meaningless without
ethical responsibility for the neighbor as it is in Levinas. Hence, Purcell claims that ethics
is both first philosophy and “first theology” could be justified on the basis of a true
Catholic spirituality that connects contemplation with perfection of charity. Levinas,
however, Purcell insists, is not a theologian and it is not theology that he does, yet, what
he proposes can be seen as a preliminary instruction for theology. While Levinas does not
offer a theology of grace, his phenomenology of desire and awakening point in the
direction of the theology of grace. In Levinas’s notion of face, Purcell sees a
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sacramentality of the face of the other which is close to Rahner’s theology of sacraments
and the Church’s doctrine of the mystery of the Eucharist.
Conclusion
This fourth chapter examined Dussel, Marion, and Purcell’s attempt to use
Levinas’s thought for theological discourse. What transpires is a general consensus that
Levinas’s philosophy offers an opportunity for dialogue with Christian theology in the
postmodern world because his philosophical project is guided by a concern for the human
other as the condition of possibility for the human subject’s subjectivity. Subjectivity is
being for the other in affective responsibility that precedes all acts of thinking, knowing,
and willing. Philosophically speaking, a free human person is fundamentally given to the
other in love and responsibility. Dussel, Marion, and Purcell, each in his own right, argue
that Levinas’s focus on a God accessible in love and justice calls to mind Christian
theology’s relating of love of God with love of neighbor.
Dussel’s main argument as it relates to the question of alterity is his desire to
liberate philosophy from the center of colonial power toward the periphery or the
underside of history. He embarks in a task of explaining the uniqueness of Latin
American philosophy as opposed to US-European philosophy. He argues for a
philosophical theology of liberation that takes seriously insights from Levinas’s
philosophy of the other or exteriority.
Marion’s thought as it relates to Levinas is committed to denouncing traditional
metaphysics’ view of being as substance, presence, and causa sui. He questions
traditional metaphysics’ inability to think alterity or otherness, without turning it into
more of the selfsame. He claims phenomenology as first philosophy that opens to the
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theological and acknowledges his indebtedness to Levinas’s philosophy. Like with
Levinas, the concept of reversed intentionality is significant for Marion’s
phenomenology. Givenness and saturated phenomenon result in the displacement of the
transcendental ego, which can no longer be considered the source of meaning. The
subject’s self-sufficiency is put into question by the look of the face of the other as with
Levinas. Marion joins Levinas in rejecting onto-theology and argues for a theology of
caritas/agape in the sense of Levinas’s ethical responsibility.
Purcell attempts a correlation between Levinas’s philosophy and Christian
theology. The point of departure that facilitates this possible connection is their common
anthropological perspective. Human existence, he argues, is the crossing point between
phenomenology and theology. First, phenomenology and theology share the same point
of departure, human existence. They both focus on the human person who is capable of
asking the question of God and/or for whom God can become a possible question.
Second, all meaning and part of Western knowledge come from the Hebrew Bible, in
particular from the ethical commands of the Torah. Hence, phenomenology is empty and
meaningless without biblical humanism. At the same time, theology would also be empty
and meaningless without the natural field of phenomenology that facilitates the
manifestation of the given facts or events of revelation in a particular figure of
phenomenality. Besides, Purcell finds in certain aspects of Levinas’s philosophical
thought some similarities with the writings of some theologians, specifically with regard
to the theology of grace and sacraments. He sees in Levinas’s notions of desire and
awakening something that points in the direction of the human desire for God in the
theology of grace.
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While each of these scholars interprets aspects of Levinas’s philosophy along
different lines; all delineate the importance of his thought for theological anthropology.
They all agree that Levinas is not a theologian, but rather a philosopher of the other, who,
inspired by his experience as prisoner of war (World War II) and by the assassination of
all of his family members by the Nazis, articulates an ethical relation born of
responsibility for the other human person. Dussel, Marion, and Purcell, as this chapter
has shown, see in Levinas an authentic philosopher and a dialogical partner for Christian
theology. In a sense, they argue that his philosophy is a valuable resource that Christian
theology should consider.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Levinas’s Philosophy, Liberation Theology, and Contemporary
Sub-Saharan Africa Socio-Political and Ethnic Conflicts
Introduction
This dissertation ends with a praxis issue. We have shown throughout this work
that Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology reveal that humankind can overcome
the history of the hatred of the other person if each person recognizes a dimension of the
divine in every human person. Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology emerged
within the context of human suffering; they search for the divine transcendence in the life
of commitment to the human person, and view the turn to the other/neighbor as a
prospect for the re-imagining of the world. Levinas, Gutiérrez, and Sobrino, therefore,
describe subjectivity primarily in terms of the one-for-the-other. The goal of this final
chapter is to examine the significance of these two approaches for addressing
contemporary sub-Saharan Africa socio-political and ethnic conflicts.1
Speaking of sub-Saharan Africa, this study is aware of the danger of
generalization because of the obvious historical, socio-political, cultural and ethnic
differences between countries. Nonetheless, it is our argument that these differences are
1
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not sufficient reasons to justify the suffering of any human person; neither are poverty
and economic inequality. The suffering of a human person is always and everywhere the
same no matter the reasons or socio-political and cultural differences. Today, attentive
observers of sub-Saharan Africa share the view that socio-political and ethnic violence
seems to be the characteristic of contemporary sub-Saharan African societies.2 In most
cases, the struggle for political and economic power and the role played by sub-Saharan
political leaders in creating and triggering group identity, have been the cause of most of
these conflicts. The wealth of ethnic differences has been transformed into violent
conflicts.3 It is the same human other whom Levinas, Gutiérrez, and Sobrino speak about
who is poor, marginalized, oppressed and killed in the mass murder in Rwanda, the
Apartheid in South Africa, the civil wars in the two Congos, Angola, Liberia and SierraLeone, the rebel movement in Chad and Central Africa Republic, Somalia, the crisis in
Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Cost), and more recently the political instability in Guinea Conakry,
in Zimbabwe, and of course in the ongoing crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan. The
suffering of the human other that Levinas, Gutiérrez, and Sobrino talk about is real in
contemporary sub-Saharan Africa.
This chapter proposes that Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology’s turn to
the other/neighbor provides a fundamental path toward a flourishing sub-Saharan Africa.
2
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What sub-Saharan Africa needs is a rethinking of the human other as the condition for the
possibility of human subjectivity, a proposition that Levinas, Gutiérrez, and Sobrino
would agree with. This work argues that Levinas’s philosophy’s and liberation theology’s
redefinition of subjectivity in terms of the other (love of neighbor) carries something of
lasting value for addressing the sub-Saharan African socio-political and ethnic conflicts.
In chapter four we demonstrated how Dussel, Marion, and Purcell showed the relevance
of the turn to the neighbor for Christian theology and found in the analysis of the selfother relationship an essential path for a construction of a better world. While Levinas
situates this turn primarily in a non-ontological realm, offering liberation theology a
viable philosophical framework of human intersubjectivity, it nevertheless falls short of
explaining how this asymmetrical turn is played out in history. Liberation theology
rescues Levinas’s thought and bears witness to it in the real time of history through the
concept of conversion to the neighbor. It expresses in history a possibility for every
subject to act with affective responsibility toward the other and functions in the sense of
Purcell’s being otherwise.4 Dussel and Purcell, as shown in chapter four, criticized the
non-availability of Levinas’s ethical responsibility to the real time of history. They
insisted on the fact that it is in history that the subject should recognize the humanity of
the other human being. Liberation theology complements Levinas’s philosophy and
illustrates how his ethical responsibility could be implemented in concrete history.
Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology and its turn to the neighbor calls on each
African and/or African political leader to do what no one else can do for them: to bear the
burden of another person’s existence and supply for his/her wants. The emphasis is on the
turn to the other or love of neighbor that makes the subject fully human.
4
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A concrete experience of a life lived otherwise than being of Levinas’s ethical
subjectivity is impossible. However, in chapter three this work argued for the possibility
to conceive of the human subject as ethically responsible within the time of history in the
sense of Purcell’s being otherwise that breaks any tendency to totality through the
dimension of divine transcendence. As a result, this work points to the lives of those men
and women who rose above their times and their circumstances to live out a life of selfsacrifice and sincere concern for others, be it for religious and/or political reasons, as
concrete experiences that illustrate Levinas’s “ideal of holiness” in the sense of Purcell’s
being otherwise. Among so many examples of saints and heroes, this study focuses on the
stories of Nelson Mandela in South Africa and Jacques Désiré Laval in the Island of
Mauritius because of their connection to the African continent.
I. An Overview of Contemporary Sub-Saharan African Socio-Political and Ethnic
Conflicts
The focus in this section is on sub-Saharan Africa with its multiple socio-political
and ethnic problems. Most traditional sub-Saharan African worldviews acknowledge that
human life is the greatest gift; a gift desired and treasured above all material goods.
Ultimate joy and fulfillment derive from the propagation, promotion and protection of the
life of the other. African philosophical anthropology focuses on relationship, that is, on
the human person as essentially “living in solidarity with.”5 Sadly, the picture of most
sub-Saharan African countries today is an ugly one. The daily violation of the human
person by hunger, unemployment, disease, civil war, unjust socio-political and
economical structures, and environmental degradation scourges the human condition.
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While not denying the existence of conflicts in pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa,
one cannot overemphasize the influence of slavery and colonialization on the African
history.6 The disordering of Sub-Saharan Africa by the Western colonial expansion and
domination reached its apex in the system of apartheid in South Africa.7 Explorers
reported to colonial administrators the existence of lands without owners, uncultured and
uncultivated. Immediately, groups of Europeans were sent to conquer this new continent.
Colonial administrators and missionaries worked hand-in-hand to bring European
knowledge and Christian faith to these indigenous people. Africans learned European
history that laid emphasis on the centrality and primacy of the European subject over and
against the Africans;8 after all, Africa “is no historical part of the World; it has no
movement, no development to exhibit.”9 In addition to the effects of slavery and
colonialization, and even after the so-called independence of sub-Saharan African
countries, Western powers continue to turn sub-Saharan Africa into a favorite field for
their struggle of influence. Without exonerating African leaders for their responsibility in
creating a wretched situation for the people of sub-Saharan African nations, most often,
these leaders are manipulated to the extent that they have no control of their nation’s
natural resources. The establishment of structures of domination and control limit more
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and more the range of choice left to sub-Saharan Africa. As Anna-Maria Gentili
contends,
structural adjustment policies and programmes originating in the 1980s, which
were meant to introduce Africa to a mainstream market economy, have
contributed to the imbalance and dependency of African polities, along with
excessive economic extraversion and unequal access to resources in already very
asymmetrical societies, characterized by weak local entrepreneurship.10
The unjust and unethical programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank also should not pass unnoticed.11
Indeed, most socio-political and economic changes in sub-Saharan Africa today
are influenced by encounters with the realities of modernity and postmodernity. SubSaharan Africa, in one way or the other embraced both the positive and negative sociopolitical, economic, and cultural aspects of the Western world. In the aftermath of the
Enlightenment, contemporary sub-Saharan Africans came to embrace the project of
modern philosophical anthropology which established freedom, self-consciousness, and
self-subsistent autonomy as fundamental features of what it is to be human in the world.
The globalization of the world and the unbalanced changes in socio-political, economic
and cultural relations has created a fuzzy kind of situation in sub-Saharan Africa. All
consistent sub-Saharan African value systems apparently have collapsed as new
meanings are being born rapidly at the meeting of different cultures. The result is a
perceptible fragility of behaviors visible in most contemporary sub-Saharan African
societies for reasons which could be different from one place to another. The fragility of
behavior takes the form of corruption of every kind. These include contempt of human
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dignity, violations of human rights, ethnicity, prostitution, embezzlement of public funds,
wasting of national wealth on prestigious projects, and the poor administration of public
property. Today, most sub-Saharan African countries live in a situation where the will of
one’s self-realization has led to a degrading of the value of the human other. While this
study recognizes the diversity of situations in each country, it is not too difficult to
characterize contemporary sub-Saharan Africa as a place of conflict. In most cases,
groups of self-centered political leaders contribute to this intolerable situation.
It has become standard for thinkers of Third World countries to hold European
nations and the United States responsible for their socio-political and economic hardship.
Obviously, the ascendance of Europe and the United States remains one of the major
causes of privation for most sub-Saharan African countries. This study, however, wishes
to pay more attention to the responsibility of sub-Saharan Africans themselves, especially
the inhumanity of their leaders to their fellow human beings. The leveling of accusations
against several Western nations often provides a source of cover for local politicians who
have implemented “Machiavellian” plans to gain profit at the expense of their own
people. Even in the exceptional cases where an extreme conflict bursts out between two
neighboring countries, the spring of armed violence is always bound to internal political
stakes. It is a question either of preserving or reinforcing an established power, or of
entering into dissidence with it. As a result, the sources of conflict in contemporary
Africa are primarily civil and indigenous. The nature of the state system is thus at the
heart of conflicts.12 Examples of this problem can be found in many sub-Saharan African
countries such as Congo Brazzaville, Central Africa Republic, Gabon, Nigeria,
Cameroon, Ghana, Togo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire,
12
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Somalia, Sudan, Chad, and Zimbabwe to name but a few.13 Political and economical
fragility comes from non-recognition of the human other and to a blind imitation of
foreign models that do not reflect a deeper and real aspiration of the people. The roots of
the current situation of poverty and violence in sub-Saharan Africa are both Western
interference in African politics and the struggle for political and economic power among
Africans elites, who desire to amass wealth.14 To examine this issue, this work provides
three case studies whereby the struggle for political and economic power and the
accumulation of wealth for one’s self realization and/or one’s ethnic group seemed to
have been the source of socio-political and ethnic conflicts. The case studies we focus on
are Congo Brazzaville, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya. It is to these that we now turn.
Congo Brazzaville
The Republic of the Congo or Congo Brazzaville is a heavily forested country
located in central Africa. It shares borders with Gabon on the west, Cameroon and
Central African Republic on the north, and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on
the east and south.15 The country is a multi-tribal society whose members largely belong
13
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to the Kongo, Téké, Bémbé, Mbochi, Kouyou, Vili, and other groups. Within these
groups, one finds subdivisions such as tribes and clans. Unfortunately, this ethnic identity
in the Congo became the “backdrop of all political conflicts.”16 Since the independence in
1960, the country remained relatively peaceful while Albert Youlou served as its first
president. The workers’ unions and rival political parties initiated an uprising that
deposed him in 1963. Youlou’s regime was “best described as mildly corrupt,
directionless in domestic policy, and deferential to France.”17 Immediately after Youlou’s
defeat, the army temporarily took charge of the country. It put in a civilian interim
government headed by Alphonse Massamba-Débat, a Lari similar to his predecessor
Youlou.18 After some six years in office, Massamba-Débat was also forced to give up
power to an officer named Marien Ngouabi, who hailed from the Kouyou tribe in the
northern part of the country. His term in office constituted a shift in Congo’s political
orientation. Marien Ngouabi declared the country a Marxist-Leninist state under the
banner of one-party state, the Congolese Labor Party (Parti Congolais du Travail, PCT).
The PCT controlled the country until June 1991. After the murder of Ngouabi, Joachim
Yhombi-Opango replaced him. He was a northerner of mixed ethnicity.19 Once again,
Yhombi-Opango was forced to relinquish power to Colonel Denis Sassou-Nguesso, from
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the Mbochi tribe. At the center of this turmoil was the struggle for power and the control
of the state for one’s own self-interest. With the introduction of the multiparty system in
1991 and the convening of an all-party national conference to discuss the nation’s
political future, ended the Marxist system and Sassou-Nguesso’s twelve years in power.
Since 1991, Congo has undergone multiple socio-political and ethnic crises. The spark
for most of these conflicts has been electoral disputes, which shook the Congo in the
second half of 1993, 1994 and 1997. This was not surprising for a nation which was
lacking “democratic culture.”
The issue of ethnicity was more pronounced in the 1993-94 civil wars than in
1997. Conflict between political parties led to a disappearance of a central state with
supreme power to use force and restore order. Instead, the Congolese people witnessed
the emergence of violence and hatred of the other along historical tribal fault lines, with
the northern Mbochi ethnic group on one side and the southern pool Lari and Vili groups
on the other. The emergence of ethnic cleansing led to the division of Congo into three
ethno-political groups in Brazzaville, each of them claiming supremacy and control of
territories.20 Every political leader – to seize power – formed his own militia (Ninjas,
Cobras, Cocoyes, Zoulous, Mamba, and Obevillois). Each militia group enlisted young
men to achieve their goal of political domination. The young men who joined these
militia groups mostly were uneducated and unemployed.21 The cessation of hostilities
between these groups came in 1999. Today, Congo is surprisingly peaceful, even though
there is still a rebel group in the southern part of the country. In March 2003, this group
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signed a peace treaty with the current administration. However, the peace remains
fragile.
The years 1993-1994 and 1997-1999 were periods of socio-political, economic
and ethnic unrest in Congo Brazzaville. Political and ethnic violence remains one of the
preoccupations of the Congolese people. The years of civil war showed the people of
Congo that there remain important ethnic and political differences within the nation.
Southerners, dominated by the Lari, believe that the Mbochi controlled north would never
relinquish power. Political theorists claim there are secret documents of the banned
political parties that show how deep-seated are the desire of the north to remain in power
and the goal of the south to capture power. Politics and ethnic rivalry fuel each other.
Ethnicity and politics thus constitute important variables for understanding life in Congo
Brazzaville today. The greatest problem the Congolese people face today is the struggle
for power and wealth. The ministerial posts and civil service jobs in post-war Congo have
become a battleground to loot the treasury and exploit the Congolese population. The
unemployment rate increases daily. Prices of basics commodities are simply unheard of,
and yet billions of Franc CFA from oil revenue and other resources are misused and kept
away in Euro-American banks. At the heart of the socio-political and ethnic crisis in
Congo Brazzaville was a series of violent clashes in the country since December 1993
organized by political leaders for their own self-interest. These events have jeopardized
the country’s socio-economic development and just social order. Today, the Congolese
people seem to have lost hope in political leaders in building the nation.
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Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire is located in West Africa and shares a border with Mali and
Burkina-Faso in the north, the Gulf of Guinea in the south, Liberia and Guinea Conakry
in the west, and Ghana in the east. It remains one of the most prosperous and stable
countries in West Africa. After the death of its longtime president Félix HouphouëtBoigny, Côte d’Ivoire experienced two destabilizing coups in 1999 and in 2001 and a
harmful civil war in 2002.22 According to François Roubaud, the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire is
both economic and political, which can be more or less combined or exclusive. On the
economic front, nearly two decades of mismanagement and structural adjustment led to
the collapse of the nation’s economy. Today, the country remains in a state of
impoverishment that has led to the destabilization of the family and the community
network of solidarity. Côte d’Ivoire’s political turmoil is the result of the violent
competition for power that emerged when Félix Houphouët-Boigny died in 1993.23 His
successor Henri Konan Bédié tried to revive the economy, but this created more problems
politically because his concept of ivoirité24 excluded many opponents from the political
process, among which, Alasane Dramane Ouattara. The dissatisfaction with Bédié’s
administration led a group of unruly soldiers to orchestrate a coup d’état, which forced
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president Bédié into exile in France. After the coup, Général Robert Guei seized power in
1999. In 2000, he organized the elections which he manipulated and won. His political
ineffectiveness caused outrage among the people. The people of Côte d’Ivoire forced
him to step down and Laurent Gbagbo eventually became the democratically elected
president. In 2002, some unruly members of the army, but without success, initiated
another coup. The same year saw the rise of a rebel group called “Les Forces Nouvelles,”
which controlled a large segment of the northern side of the country. Forced by the
international community to negotiate with the rebel group, Laurent Gbagbo and other
political opposition leaders met at Linas-Marcoussis, France to sign a peace accord. The
accord granted the rebel movement a couple of ministerial positions in a unity
government.
For many observers, it is Article 35 of the Ivorian Constitution, which set the
eligibility requirements for the office of president that constituted the catalyst of all the
political confrontations, ethnic and religious.25 Since the early 1990s, the political factor
was crystallized around the conditions of eligibility, the code of nationality, and the
residence permits or the land code. The four presidential candidates (Laurent Gbagbo,
Robert Gueï, Henri Konan Bédié and Alasane Dramane Ouattara) and their respective
clans instrumentalized these issues in their merciless fight for the control of power.26
Hence, politicians of both sides of the socio-political and ethnic divide fuelled, exploited,
and maintained the civil war for their own ends. Today, tensions remain between the
government and the opposition leaders. There remain a number of unknown factors and
obstacles that need to be addressed. More importantly, questions that ignited the civil war
25
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such as identification of illegal immigrants, land reform, the disarmament and control of
equitable elections remain. French and West African soldiers are still in Côte d'Ivoire to
preserve peace and security.27 The socio-political and ethnic crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, since
December 1999, has been the consequence of coup attempts, military and civil by
political leaders. These crises have affected the country’s long period of political
stability. President Laurent Gbagbo and Forces Nouvelles’ leader, Guillaume Soro
recently signed a new peace-accord in Burkina-Faso. It is our hope that this will put an
end to the crisis.
Kenya
The Republic of Kenya shares borders with Tanzania in the south, Somalia in the
east, Uganda in the west, and Ethiopia in the north. This country has been one of the most
economically prosperous and politically stable countries in East Africa. A couple of
months after its independence, the country was en route to democratic culture and held
parliamentary and local elections between 1963 and 1974, in spite of the declaration of a
one-party state, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Two major ethnic groups,
the Luo and the Kikuyu, constituted this one-party state and Jomo Kenyatta served as its
first leader.28 Meanwhile, other smaller ethnic groups came together to constitute another
party, Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), which existed under the leadership of
Daniel Arap Moi, in reaction to the bigger party. The KADU feared the ascendancy of
KANU in the newly independent country. This dynamism continued even after KADU

27

CIA – The World Fact Book – Cote d’Ivoire, Republic of [data base on-line] available from
https://cia.gov/cia//publications/factbook/geos/cf.html, accessed February 26, 2007.
28
David Troup, “Elections and Political Legitimacy in Kenya,” Africa: Journal of the International African
Institute 63, 3 (1993): 371.

237

merged with KANU.29 Jomo Kenyatta, the first president after the independence
appointed Moi as his vice-president. Unfortunately, this did not change reality on the
ground. With the blessing of Jomo Kenyatta, the Luo-Kikuyu alliance still controlled
power in the government and the whole political arena. Thus, before his death, as Abdalla
Bujra explains, Kenyatta “had already secured for his people the state government, a vast
homeland in the Rift Valley and along the Kenya Coast, put commerce in their hands,
inappropriate alliance with Asian and European bourgeoisies, and the brutalizing
apparatuses such as the general service unit.”30 Ethnic violence throughout the 1990s
eventually took place in the Rift Valley and the Coastal Region.
The political situation in Kenya began to deteriorate rapidly with the death of its
first president Jomo Kenyatta in 1978. By the time Arap Moi succeeded Kenyatta, he
immediately tried to remedy the discrimination suffered by his tribe: the Kalenjin ethnic
group and its allies. In 1983 and 1988, he organized elections to get rid of the barons of
the Luo-Kikuyu alliance with members of his ethnic group and their allies; he did the
same in the private sector, taking away business from the Luo-Kikuyu. He later made
sure to build modern schools and universities in the Rift Valley and in the Coastal region
to attend to the educational needs of his ethnic group. Politically, the Kenyan people
forced him to adopt a multi-party system, which produced an important new factor of
political insecurity for him and his party’s power. According to Human Rights Watch,
“since the end of one-party rule in Kenya, election years have been consistently
characterized by political violence. Politicians who have been implicated in past incidents
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of political violence have not been held to account.”31 The improved economy during the
presidency of Arap Moi sharpened social exclusion, marginalization and discontent
among the poor in cities and villages. Intermittent clashes between ethnic groups took
place over land throughout the decade of the 1990s. Thus, as Abdalla Bujra rightly
argues, “it can be safely argued that by 1990, two decades of policies to advance ethnic
and individual economic interest, has created a volatile ethnic situation in Kenya.”32
Today, Bujra continues,
the issue of the distribution between the ethnic groups of the wealth to be
generated from the private sector has not yet been resolved. Clearly, the history of
independent Kenya has been a struggle between [political leaders who use] the
ethnic groups to capture state power in order to siphon off wealth [for their own
interest] or to their region or ethnic group.33
In Congo Brazzaville, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya, the struggle for power, the desire for
self-aggrandizement along with the accumulation of wealth for oneself and/or for one’s
family, tribe, ethnic group, or to use Jean-Francois Bayart’s expression “the politics of
the belly,”34 has been and continue to be the primary causes of conflict in these nations.
The picture of this observable hopelessness, shared both by Westerners and Africans, is
troubling. Yet, not all hope is lost. Sub-Saharan Africa can still enjoy peace and
meaningful life in spite of the continuing socio-political and ethnic conflicts. This would
occur when a human person is placed at the center of all policies. The question becomes:
how can Sub-Saharan Africans, in the context of poverty, injustice, oppression, struggle
for power, dictatorship, and frequent ethnic and civil wars, seek answers to the question
31
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of what it is to be human? How can they find within the intersubjective relation
obligation and responsibility for the other human person? Again, this chapter suggests
that the turn to the other/neighbor in Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology offers
better prospects for a more peaceful and flourishing contemporary sub-Saharan Africa.
II. The Turn to the Other/Neighbor: A Road Map for Better Contemporary SubSaharan African Societies.
The promise of a flourishing and prosperous sub-Saharan Africa cannot come
with the application of Western socio-political and economic models of economic and
political development. Rather, sub-Saharan Africa must take a path that values and
places the human person at the center of its socio-political and economic models. The
study of the conceptual affinities between Levinas’s ethics of responsibility and liberation
theology shows that these two approaches address this issue. Both are characterized by
their rejection of a certain conception of human subjectivity as that which gives an
inadequate meaning to the human other.
Levinas’s philosophy, as it has been argued throughout this work, seeks to
develop a phenomenological alternative to the ontology of Husserl and Heidegger, which
reduces the subject’s relation to the other person to knowledge. His argument is that
ethics, that is, intersubjectivity and responsibility for the other human person, should
replace traditional metaphysics as first philosophy. Indeed, the type of metaphysics
Levinas associates with relates to the world and
centralizes our experience and opens us to the infinite otherness of
transcendence…it endorses the primacy of an ethical philosophy which shows
how man’s relationship to man can transcend the natural rapport of possession,
power, and belongingness, in search of a Good beyond Being.35
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Levinas, therefore, is closer to Plato’s concept of the Good and Descartes’ Idea of the
Infinite. For Levinas, this implies an appreciation of a human subject as fundamentally
ordered toward the other human person who bears the trace of the Good and the Infinite.
The subject’s encounter with the other is expressed in terms of responsibility to the point
of substitution, sensibility, hostage, proximity, and vulnerability. The ethical relation of
infinite responsibility enacts the human person into subjectivity itself. Humanity at its
best is enacted rather than a state of being; to be human is to act ethically.
The struggle for political power among African elites continues to play a major
role in socio-political and ethnic conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa and in its inability to
become politically and economically stable. It substantiates a fragility of behaviors
among most Africans and African leaders in particular.36 In Levinasian terms, this
fragility of behaviors would be an expression of the attitude of the “same.” The same, for
Levinas, suggests a totalizing system in which the subject, not only identifies
himself/herself in opposition to the other, but also displays his/her concrete egoistic
attitude in relation to any exteriority. In this sense, in the subject’s séjour (sojourn) in the
world, he/she “feels” free and in control of everything because he/she is at home (Chez
soi dans sa Maison), in his/her dwelling. This is the way or structure of identification of
the same which is “the concreteness of egoism.”37
In recent years, most sub-Saharan African countries have suffered a greater
degree of violence due to some individuals’ desire for self-realization and misuse of
institutional power. The cause of most national conflicts stems from harmful actions of
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political leaders and people entangled in compound social realities. The desire of some
political elites to gain power, control the ministrations of the state, and accumulate large
sums of personal wealth by killing have led many Africans to embrace an ontological
dexterity of self-enjoyment that consists in the satisfaction of one’s own needs. Everyone
longs to possess, to have a measure of control for himself/herself, for his/her tribe and/or
ethnic group, etc., because of the unforeseeable nature of the future. By so doing, he/she
suspends the independence, the otherness and difference of other human beings. He/she
tries to comprehend, grasp other human beings by the hand and to make sure that they are
under his/her control.38 Ultimately, here we reduced otherness to ourselves, to our desire
to satisfy our needs, because, “needs are in my power; they constitute me as the same and
not as dependent on the other.”39 The relation with the other, for Levinas, is not
characterized by needs. This other, who disrupts my comfort in being at home, “over him
I have no power; [h]e escapes my grasp by an essential dimension even if I have him at
my disposal. He is not wholly in my site. But I, who have no concept in common with
[him], am, like him, without genus. We are the same and the other.”40 The subject’s
relation with the other is desire. In Levinas’s work, desire is always far reaching and can
never be satisfied due to its own structure. It is like goodness, which in its remoteness and
separation from the subject does not fulfill him/her, but further deepens it because it is
“the alterity of the other and of the Most-High.”41 It expresses “the very dimension of
height [that] is opened up by the metaphysical of desire.”42
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Pre-originally, before all freedom, a true human person or subject is commanded
to say hineni (Here I am, me voici), that is, to respond with infinite responsibility for the
other. This prophetical attitude becomes for Levinas an expression of a human person
rightly understood as it is “a moment of the human condition itself [and] the fundamental
fact of man’s humanity.”43 It is a difficult freedom of the individual subject which
constitutes his/her humanity; it has the merit, in history as eschatological infinity, of
breaking any tendency to self-centeredness and calling for infinite commitment to the
other’s well-being in terms of affective responsibility or love of neighbor. Thus, every
human person is responsible for one another, but I more than any other. It is possible to
argue that Levinas might say regarding the situation in sub-Saharan Africa that what
matters is one’s “unlimited responsibility”44 for one’s compatriot regardless of one’s
ethnic group and/or social status for the construction of a lasting peace between people
and nations. The course ahead for sub-Saharan Africa lies in thinking a human other
otherwise. It is vital that the human other receives acceptance into the community. No
person should be allowed to go hungry or be marginalized to satisfy one’s selfish sociopolitical and economic interests. Levinas’s argument suggests that sub-Saharan Africa
could overcome its contemporary history of socio-political and ethnic violence if each
African recognizes in his/her neighbor a transcendental dimension expressed through the
face of the other that cries out: “Do not kill me!” His work offers a significant
philosophical framework for an establishment of a better sub-Saharan Africa. It keeps the
subject everlastingly awake to the humanity of the other in an experience of interruption
that goes beyond human consciousness and freedom. The redefinition of human
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subjectivity in Levinas’s work, as it was argued earlier, provides a philosophical
framework that relegates the subject’s intentional consciousness to the second place. It
aims at keeping the human subject awake to the humanity of others. He/she is constantly
in the state of vigilant insomnia, watching over the needs of the human other that can
never be satisfied. In this way, the subject’s humanity is no longer constituted by his/her
knowing and willing or self-centeredness, but, it is enacted by his/her affective
responsibility or love of neighbor. Levinas’s philosophical rethinking of human
subjectivity offers a possibility for lessening the hatred of the human other that remains
one of the factors for the socio-political and ethnic crisis in nations such as Congo
Brazzaville, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and other sub-Saharan African countries. It offers a
better prospect for dealing with the issues of corruption, excessive power, wealth
accumulation, ethnicity, and civil strife in the continent.
The closest Levinas’s philosophy gets to addressing concrete socio-political
issues is through the introduction of the third party. His view on politics could be said to
be analogous to the entrance of the third party on the scene; as such, it lays the foundation
for a good political practice. He writes:
The extraordinary commitment of the other to the third party calls for control, a
search for justice, society and the State, comparison and possession, thought and
science, commerce and philosophy, and outside of anarchy, the search for a
principle. Philosophy is this measure brought to the infinity of the being-for-theother of proximity, and is like the wisdom of love.45
The third party (le tiers) requires a re-organization within the ethical relation, which he
uses as a basis for political reflection. The duo self-other private relation is interrupted so
as to open up to a relation with other human neighbors. With the arrival of the third party
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comes the necessity for justice and human fraternity in the political sphere. It brings
Levinas’s thought to concrete human societies where justice should be done for the other.
This, however, does not restore reciprocity between the duo self-other as “it arises from
the fact of the third who, next to the one who is an other to me, is ‘another other’ to
me.”46 Levinas calls this moment, “the hour of inevitable justice – required, however, by
charity itself.”47 Levinas is aware of the imperfection of political institution or system;
“left to itself,” he argues, it “bears a tyranny within itself; it deforms the I and the other
who have given rise to it, for it judges them according to universal rules, thus, as in
absentia.”48 Levinas suggests that the multiplicity of human beings, living together in a
society whereby one’s presence necessarily limits the other’s, while a significant factor in
human relationships, is by no means the sole determinant for most wars and violence in
human society.49 Indeed, the tyranny of political systems also plays a substantive role.
Wars and violence do not have a final word in human history. But the only way this
statement would be true is through human subjects whose moral consciousness embraces
the “certitude of peace” over and against “the evidence of war.”50 Hence, “morality will
oppose politics in history and will have gone beyond the functions of prudence or the
canons of the beautiful to proclaim itself unconditional and universal when the
eschatology of messianic peace [prophetic eschatology of peace] will have come to
superpose itself upon the ontology of war.”51 To the logic and “objectivism” of wars and
violence, Levinas opposes “a subjectivity born from the eschatological vision of peace,”
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which everlastingly opens up to the human other.52 The goal of any political institution
should always be a building up of a society rooted in values such as freedom, equality,
tolerance, solidarity, and above all love of neighbor.53 For Levinas, “politics must be able
in fact always to be checked and criticized starting from the ethical.”54 He insists that true
justice for the other would be possible only if it is guided by affective responsibility or
love of neighbor which takes place in a kind of mauvaise conscience.55 Thus, Levinas’s
philosophy challenges real time situations in light of what his philosophical model of true
subjectivity calls the ethically responsible subject to be. Again, it lays the foundation for
a good political practice.
The implication of Levinas’s rethinking of the human other calls for a rethinking
of political practice in sub-Saharan Africa. Levinas’s critique of totality has been a
consequence of his “political experience,” which he was not ready to forget.56 Levinas
referred to his experience of the World War II, where he endured as a prisoner of war.
During the years of Nazi tyranny, humanity was completely discredited because of bad
political choices. Without affirming that Levinas was indifferent to political reflection, it
is important to note that he did not put forward a clear political system.57 To be sure, in
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Levinas’s ethical responsibility, the subject’s responsibility is directed to others – as
particular individuals – and not to others socially and politically localized. This remains
one of the major criticisms of his thought. The crucial issue that his philosophy addresses
has been the issue of true subjectivity – to be for others – which is at the foundation of all
concrete social and political engagement.
Levinas’s concern for the human other, as it has been shown throughout this
work, shares some affinities with liberation theology’s commitment to the love of
neighbor. While Levinas’s ethics of responsibility defines subjectivity in terms of the
encounter with the face of the other that takes in an asymmetrical relation both beyond
and within human experience, and represents a viable philosophical anthropology for
liberation theology, it is, however, never readily available to the real time of history. This
non-intentional consciousness has been questioned. How can his philosophy address the
socio-political and ethnic crisis, in real time, in sub-Saharan Africa? Here, liberation
theology complements what is lacking in Levinas’s ethics of responsibility. It analyzes
the significance of the turn to the neighbor from where Levinas’s thought left it, that is, in
its inability to explicitly translate into the real time of history the transcendental
philosophical category of otherwise than being. Liberation theology emphasizes the turn
to the neighbor in the concrete situation of injustice in the world. Its concept of
conversion to the neighbor, which opens up a possibility for the subject to act with
affective responsibility in history in terms of Purcell’s being otherwise, is the closest one
can get to Levinas’s otherwise than being. Levinas makes reference to liberation theology
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as a concrete example of the application of his thought in history.58 His endorsement of
liberation theology might suggest Levinas’s openness to a transformation of his otherwise
than being into a historicized being otherwise. Liberation theology, in its conceptually
thematized categories of being, analyzes the issue of otherness within the Christian
theological tradition and addresses a reality of poverty, oppression, and marginalization
in the concrete history of Central and Latin America. Gutiérrez and Sobrino take their
distance from theory and metaphysics and confront social systems of distortion and
replace the theoretical cognition of God with personal commitment to the other that leads
to social-political responsibility. Ontologically, it posits the subject as “ethically enacted”
through a “relativization of intentionality.”59
Dussel, Marion, and Purcell are indebted to Levinas’s phenomenology for the
possibility of a relationship between philosophy and theology. Each of these thinkers,
however, engages in a critical use of Levinas’s insights and sees the significance of his
thought for theological anthropology. Marion mirrors Levinas in rejecting onto-theology.
He proposes a theology of agape/caritas, which echoes Levinas’s ethical responsibility as
an event that enacts the human subject in his/her subjectivity. Dussel and Purcell,
however, while insisting on the relevance of Levinas’s turn to the other/neighbor that
reveals God, regret the fact that his otherwise than being is not readily available to the
real time of history. Dussel, who develops his philosophical theology of liberation in
terms of Levinas’s concept of the other, has been critical of Levinas’s reduction of
history to consciousness. He deplores the fact that Levinas’s philosophy does not offer an
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expressive political philosophy that addresses concrete socio-political and economic lived
experiences. Hence, he fears that it might be inadequate for the task of changing
situations of oppressions and injustice in the Third World. Purcell’s dissatisfaction with
Levinas’s ontology of being cannot be overemphasized. He laments Levinas’s inability to
see ethical responsibility, which would correspond to Plato’s idea of the Good within
human beings’ ontological existence. For him, Levinas’s otherwise than being while
asserting “an absolute uncompromisable value of the other offers no way of linking
responsibility with practical commitment to the other.”60 Human beings, notwithstanding
their weaknesses, also are capable of actualizing the good in them. Dussel’s and Purcell’s
observations support this dissertation’s argument that liberation theology historicizes
Levinas’s ethics of responsibility. Liberation theology offers Levinas’s philosophy a
possibility to conceive of the human subject as ethically responsible within the
ontological system of thought. For liberation theology, the spirituality of conversion to
the neighbor is a never-ending turning toward the other human in affective responsibility.
This experience calls for a permanent turning to the other human person with sensibility
and affection in the real time of history.
Levinas’s utopia of conscience corresponds to the being-human of a Christian as
an expression of the utopia of the kingdom of God.61 For liberation theology, the utopia of
the kingdom of God consists in the already and not yet of salvation. It addresses real
problems and the hopes of real men and women who, in spite of the existence of evil in
history, continue to hope for a better life here on earth. The historical evil takes the form
of poverty, injustice, oppression, marginalization, and corruption. Jesus himself in the
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scriptures fought against all kinds of evil; he proclaimed the kingdom of God in words
and service to the neighbor. He directed his ministry to the utopia of the kingdom, that is,
“the triumph of justice over injustice.”62 The historical dimension of the kingdom of God
would be connected to “the triumph of the justice of God, and the practice of that
justice.”63 The utopia of the kingdom of God calls for the recognition of the dimension of
the divine that opens forth in the human other’s face and takes the form of the “practice
of love.”64 Liberation theology, however, is aware that the eschatological nature of the
praxis of salvation, while anticipated in history, takes place definitively at the end of
history. Hope is a requirement to journey forward. The here and now of history has also
to be understood as having a basic orientation toward the future.65 For liberation
theology, the human person realizes him/herself only through love of neighbor in
imitation of Christ. Liberation theology supplements the deficiencies in Levinas’s
philosophy, which lacks the ability to address concrete situations of injustice and
inhumanity in history.
Latin American liberation theology served as a model for the emergence of
African theology of liberation in the 1980s. African theology of liberation emerges from
a desire to condemn structures of poverty, oppression, injustice, and marginalization in
sub-Saharan Africa. These structures, as Jean Marc Ela argues, are not natural or beyond
human beings’ control; they are not a consequence of any human limitations; but rather,
“they are produced by people, by groups in power, and by models of society and
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culture.”66 African theology of liberation calls for a re-reading of the Gospel message of
love through a re-appropriation of African anthropological values. Again, African
philosophical anthropology focuses on relationship and solidarity in the concreteness of
lived experience in time and space. This conception of the human person in sub-Saharan
Africa provides a crucial link between Christian anthropology and Christological
formulation. The gospel of Jesus that the church in Africa preaches is the good news of
the kingdom of God. It is a proclamation of a new social order in which the horizontal
dimensions of the message are expressed: feeding the hungry, visiting the sick, setting
prisoners free etc. Indeed, Jesus’ message takes into consideration both people’s bodily
and spiritual needs. This stance echoes the turn to the other/neighbor in Levinas’s ethical
responsibility and liberation theology.
What sub-Saharan Africa can learn from Levinas’s philosophy’s and liberation
theology’s turn to the other/neighbor is the recognition of the dimension of otherness and
difference in the human other. The other human person should be seen and appreciated in
his/her uniqueness as a human other that bears the trace of God’s transcendence, but not,
according to people’s ethnic groups. In Congo Brazzaville, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya, the
human other is more than just a “Mbochi,” “Lari,” “Batéké,” “Vili,” “Bémbé;” “Baule,”
“Akan,” “Anyi,” “Akye,” “Dan,” “Senufo,” “Aowin;” “Kikuyu,” “Luo,” and “Luhyia.”
Wherever the human other is seen just according to his/her socio-political and ethnic
identity, this penchant has often led into economic and/or physical violence that is still
very much present in today’s twenty-first century sub-Saharan Africa. The regionalism
that is connected with the politics of ethnicity has in many cases given birth to corruption,
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contempt of human dignity, wasting of national resources, embezzlement of public funds,
and the killing of the human other. This characterizes a concrete egoistic attitude of
Levinas’s “same,” preoccupied by his/her self-enjoyment. Sub-Saharan Africans should
appreciate ethnic difference without hostility or violence by seeing in a human other what
is absolutely transcendent. The transcendental dimension Levinas, Gutiérrez, and Sobrino
speak about is that of the face of the other as he/she reveals him/herself to the subject in
his/her absolute otherness and difference; it opens a dimension of height that goes beyond
being and knowledge. The face of the other is what disturbs the subject’s good
conscience and provokes his/her ethical movement; the subject is not an I unto
himself/herself, but an I standing before the other who commands him/her and gives
meaning to his/her existence.
As we have argued throughout this chapter, rethinking human subjectivity is the
necessary direction toward a construction of more flourishing sub-Saharan African
societies. It calls for an appreciation of an authentic human other. The turn to the
other/neighbor in Levinas’s ethics of responsibility and liberation theology puts forward a
hopeful way for rethinking the place of the human neighbor in contemporary sub-Saharan
Africa. Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology need each other to present a
balanced perspective to an intersubjective approach that would prove meaningful to
address socio-political and ethnic conflicts in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. For
Levinas, Gutiérrez, and Sobrino, as it has been argued, subjectivity rightly understood is
substitution, responsibility, and expiation for others. It is a road map to help sub-Saharan
Africa find its way back to an African philosophical anthropology that focuses on human
relationships and solidarity with one another. This way of thinking offers an opportunity
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to alter its policies and rewrite its future by placing the human person at the center of all
socio-political and economic concerns. This dissertation formulates a hope that one day
things will be different in sub-Saharan Africa. Our hope is not in vain because history is
replete with examples of people, who have turned toward their neighbors in love and
responsibility during moments of crisis. It is a mark of admiration that the community of
faith calls these people saints; for others, they are heroes and/or models of what it means
to be human. In a world where various socio-political, economic, religious, and cultural
powers seek to exercise total control over human life, these “great souls”67 teach us that it
is possible to live our lives otherwise than in the sense of Purcell’s being otherwise, that
is, to center it on a truth (“the divine ground”) which is beyond all human powers and
which calls humans to love and solidarity.68 At this point, this study would give two
examples of the turn to the other/neighbor in Levinas’s ethics of responsibility and
liberation theology that take place in the real time of history.
III. Two Examples of the Turn to the Neighbor in the Real Time of History
This dissertation concedes that a direct applicability of Levinas’s otherwise than
being is not possible unless a human being first exists. In chapter three, we argued that
for Levinas’s ethical responsibility to be more meaningful, it must be translated into a
real time of history in terms of Purcell’s being otherwise. Levinas articulated his ideas in
writing, as it was shown, because of his experience of unjust suffering and death of the
human other during the World War II. He never turned his eyes away from violence,
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oppression, and marginalization that he saw throughout his life. He saw in liberation
theology an embodiment of his ethical responsibility, aware that it is in history that
justice should be done. Our view is that it is possible to find in contemporary history
people who model Levinas’s ethical responsibility or utopia of conscience.69 Recent
history has many examples of “great souls” who arose above their times and their
circumstances and tried to live out Levinas’s “ideal of holiness” and liberation theology’s
conversion to the neighbor through a life of courage, self-sacrifice, and sincere concern
for others, be it for religious and/or political motivations. Their lives historicize Levinas’s
otherwise than being in terms of being otherwise through affective responsibility. Among
so many, two of the most poignant contemporary examples are Jacques Désiré Laval,
C.S.Sp (religious motivation) and Nelson Mandela (political motivation).
Nelson Mandela
Nelson Mandela was born on July 18, 1918 at Qunu, Umtata.70 His life of struggle
against apartheid in South Africa presents an example of affective responsibility in the
real time of history. Here, this affective responsibility takes the form of political protest
for the establishment of justice, freedom, and peace in South Africa. The necessity for
justice and human fraternity in the political sphere, for Levinas, is an imperative,
considering the reality of the arrival of the third party on the scene. Mandela’s
involvement in politics (political awakening) began in 1942 when he joined the African
National Congress (ANC) while studying in Johannesburg. After some years, he became
69
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the leader of the movement and together with others, elaborated a peaceful plan for
political actions in defense of his people from many years of dictatorship, domination and
exploitation by the white minority. South African blacks during the apartheid era were
denied any political and civil rights. Mandela called for boycotts and strikes. He
understood his leadership role as an opportunity to serve his people and make his own
contribution to the struggle for freedom. In 1962, the ruling South African government
arrested him. They charged Mandela with instigating a strike and protest against the
ruling National party’s government. At the infamous Rivonia trial in 1964, the South
African government sentenced him to life imprisonment with some of his colleagues.
While in prison, he continued his struggle by rejecting any concession for his liberation.
The South African government released Mandela on February 11, 1990. In 1991, the
people of South Africa elected him president. After four years in power, he stepped
down and retired from politics.
Mandela’s personal struggle to gain independence led him to become a leader to
free all people of color to live as dignified human beings. Gradually, this freedom for
himself and the people who looked like him was transformed into a hunger for the
freedom for all people, white and black.71 His closing remarks at the Rivonia trial
eloquently express what it means to be human, that is, to be for the other. He said,
During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to the struggle of the African people.
I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black
domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which
all persons live together in harmony with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which
I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am
prepared to die.72
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When he was released from prison at age seventy-two, he pledged to continue to serve all
South Africans, white and black, and liberate them all “from the continuing bondage of
poverty, deprivation, suffering, gender, and other discrimination.”73 Mandela sought to
transform South Africa into a new nation; “never, never, and never again [he argues]
shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by
another…The sun shall never set on so glorious a human achievement.”74 Mandela
recognized that with freedom comes responsibility for himself and for all. He insists that
his long walk is just a first step toward a full humanity for all. The road is still long, it is
not yet ended. He invites people perpetually to keep their eyes wide open toward the
needs of all.75 Since his retirement from politics, Mandela remains critical of some
African leaders. He criticizes those who despised their people by changing their
constitution to remain in power and those who initiate public programs that do not aim to
meet everyone’s basic needs.
Mandela, therefore, is a symbol of Levinas’s utopia of conscience. His struggle
for freedom and liberation is a call to see in every human person a dimension of
transcendence that cries out for ethical responsibility. Mandela’s political struggle was a
fight for the recognition of the human other and political values. What matters is the other
human person, not his/her color and/or his/her status as a person. The story of this
ordinary man reminds people that it is possible to be a being in the world otherwise than;
and only through this way of being can we build up a society rooted in values such as
freedom, equality, tolerance, solidarity, and above all, love of neighbor.
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Jacques Désiré Laval
Throughout the Catholic Church’s long history of evangelization, its concern for
the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the abandoned continues to serve as a source of
inspiration for men and women to found religious congregations to work to meet the
needs of these people. It has led them to take action through service to others. This is true
for the founder and reformer of the Holy Spirit Congregation, Poullart des Places (18th
century) and Libermann (19th century), respectively, who committed their lives to
educating the poor students and marginalized people mainly in poor black communities.76
Many Spiritans, including Jacques Désiré Laval, followed their example and became
servants to the poor and downtrodden.
Jacques Désiré Laval’s story provides an example of an affective responsibility
based on religious motivation. Laval, born in Croth, Normandy, on September 18, 1803,
learned at an early age from his parents to have a concern for others, especially for the
less fortunate. At the age of seventeen, Laval joined the seminary-college of Evreux. He
did not stay long because of poor academic performance. When he returned home, his
father made him work at a strenuous job that required manual labor, which motivated the
young Laval to go back to school. After high school, Laval went to Paris to study at Saint
Stanislaus, where he graduated with a bachelor’s degree in 1825. He later earned a
doctoral degree in medicine at Sorbonne in Paris.77 As a medical doctor, people admired
him in his village “because he was not in the least concerned about payment for his
services. Instead, he preferred to live on the income of the legacy his deceased parents

76

Congregation of the Holy Spirit, Information Documentation (i/d), no. 60, February 2007, 14.
Henry Koren, To the Ends of the Earth: A General History of the Holy Ghost Congregation (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1983), 226.

77

257

had left him.”78 Spiritually, the young doctor was no longer strictly adhered to the
practices of the Catholic Church; yet, his conscience gave him no peace. After a
prolonged spiritual crisis, he re-converted to the practice of the Catholic faith. Eventually,
Laval expressed a desire to enter religious life as a priest. In 1835, he joined the seminary
of St. Sulpice in Paris. Laval received ordination to the priesthood in 1838. After
ordination, he returned to work in his native Normandy. After two years of pastoral work
in his diocese, Laval joined the project of his old friends, Le Vavasseur and Tisserant, to
start a religious order with the main purpose of working for the emancipation of the
ignored slaves in the colonies. The French medical doctor by profession joined the Holy
Spirit Congregation and went on his first mission to the Island of Mauritius.79
Motivated by the example of Jesus Christ and by the suffering of so many, Laval
spent twenty-three years of his life as a missionary in multi-racial, multi-lingual, and
multi-religious Island of Mauritius. He identified himself with the recently freed African
slaves by sharing lodging, food, and other conditions with these people. In the wake of
the abolition of slavery in 1835, there was a need to guarantee freedom and equality
among citizens. Jacques Désiré Laval dedicated his life to serve the emancipated slaves
by defending their dignity and rights against those who wanted to maintain the status quo.
Laval sought in his personal ministry to love and care for the black people of Mauritius,
whom nobody wanted to give this kind of treatment. Laval’s affective response to the
poor emancipated slaves of Mauritius expressed his faith in the life, death, and
resurrection of Christ. He translated his faith into concrete commitment. He spoke their
language (Creole) and committed himself completely to their service. The people of
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Mauritius recognized Laval as a “national saint” and they called him, “Apostle of the
Blacks.” For people of Mauritius, he is a symbol of Christ’s love and compassion for
others. Pope Jean-Paul II beatified him on Sunday April 29, 1979 in the Basilica of SaintPeter’s in Rome. In Mauritius, Christians and non-Christians, including Hindus,
Buddhists, Confucianists, and Muslims, see in his commitment to the poor and
marginalized blacks an example of a life lived for the sake of others.80 In Levinas’s
terms, Jacques Désiré Laval understood the nature of what it meant to be a human being
otherwise than being through affective responsibility.
In Jacques Laval’s and Nelson Mandela’s life, this study finds “great souls” who
express what Levinas and liberation theology say of human subjectivity and Jesus Christ
respectively. Here human responsibility or the turn to the other human person is
motivated essentially by the transcendental dimension of the human other.
Conclusion
It is our contention in this chapter that the re-imagining of sub-Saharan Africa
requires a redefinition of human subjectivity as the one-for-the-other by using the work
of Levinas and liberation theology. The socio-political and ethnic conflicts that affect
most sub-Saharan African nations today is the result of a philosophical anthropology that
establishes freedom, self-consciousness, and self-subsistent autonomy as fundamental
aspects of what it is to be human. This philosophical anthropology reflects itself in the
relationships between the Western world and sub-Saharan Africa and among Africans
themselves and their political leaders. It is sad to see that after almost fifty years of
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independence of many sub-Saharan African nations many of them remain politically
unstable. The non-recognition of the human other receives expression through greed,
corruption, dictatorship, and ethnic violence. The totalizing effects of these discordant
elements have generated circumstances that deny sub-Saharan African nations a chance
to live a meaningful life together in peace. We presented in this chapter the turn to the
other/neighbor in Levinas’s thought and in liberation theology as a possible path toward a
more flourishing sub-Saharan Africa. We also argued that liberation theology historicizes
Levinas’s ethical responsibility as it provides a more concrete example of the affective
responsibility in tangible ethical acts of concern for the poor and the oppressed.
Liberation theology has also been instrumental in the emergence of African liberation
theology.
What Africans, more importantly African leaders, need is Levinas’s and liberation
theology’s redefinition of human subjectivity. It is our conviction that Levinas’s ethics of
responsibility and liberation theology both put forth, each in its own right, a hopeful way
for the articulation of human subjectivity as the one-for-the-other in love and
responsibility. The ability to rethink human subjectivity in sub-Saharan Africa calls for
an appreciation of the human other as the condition of possibility for the subject’s
subjectivity both philosophically and theologically.
A commitment to good political leadership that promotes values such as integrity,
honesty, justice, and peace calls for responsibility for the other without reciprocity. The
leader remains the one who supports the people because he/she always has “one
responsibility more than all the others.”81 The lives of Jacques Désiré Laval (religious
motivation) and Nelson Mandela (political motivation) exemplify Levinas’s utopia of
81

Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 99.

260

conscience in the real time of history. Affective responsibility in terms of Purcell’s being
otherwise than self-centered, is an attitude required of all Africans, especially of their
political leaders. A commitment to this project would, hopefully, lessen the hatred of the
human other already experienced in a number of sub-Saharan African nations.
At this point we are left with one of question: how do we get people to follow this
pathway or intersubjective model? How do we convince people to be otherwise? This
challenging question calls for existential, concrete and as many practical answers as
possible. We saw in the lives of Nelson Mandela and Jacques Désiré Laval concrete
attitudes of an enactment of love of neighbor and justice. The articulation of this
intersubjective model into the contemporary real time of history passes through education
in families, schools, churches, and the larger society. In this regard, the continuing
commitment of the Catholic Church toward the less privileged and suffering sub-Saharan
Africans cannot be overemphasized. Her practice of solidarity, hospitality and justice,
bears witness to ethical responsibility which can serve to promote social, political, and
even legal change.
In contemporary sub-Saharan Africa examples of individuals and/or groups that
serve as role models and educational resources can be multiplied. Suffice it here to
mention the work of Missionary Congregations and some non-governmental
organizations (NGO). Their concern and commitment toward the poor, the despised and
exploited people and/or communities in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa would be one
of the ways we could get people to act otherwise and work for social justice. They offer
credible examples of enactment of the turn to the neighbor or ethical responsibility. For
these groups, ethical responsibility or love of neighbor is a manifestation of God’s love,
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mercy, and compassion. Most of these missionaries and people of good will leave behind
their countries, families, friends, and/or comfortable life style to work in difficult rural
areas in solidarity with local people. Their unwavering commitment to the needs of other
human beings exposes people around them to situations of the degradation of the lives of
other human beings and invites them to respond with affective responsibility by attending
to their needs and taking a position against any intolerable plan to oppress, marginalize,
and/or murder the other person. The major strength of these groups is that it educates
people in their respective fields of work to serve as leaders and mentors for the concern
of the other human person within their own local communities and within the larger
socio-political and economic structure of nations.
The work of the members of the Holy Spirit Congregation (Spiritans) in SubSaharan Africa and throughout the world testifies to it. For three hundred years plus, the
Spiritans have been engaged, on behalf of the Gospel, in fighting poverty, injustice and
the degradation of the human other. For the Holy Spirit Congregation, mission is not only
about converting people to Christianity, but more importantly, it is about affective
responsibility and solidarity toward “… those whose needs are the greatest, and to the
oppressed”82 so that they will live in full dignity as human beings. Constitutive of this
mission is the promotion of justice and solidarity among people, the education and
formation of committed and responsible leaders that would work for the respect of the
human other and the promotion of social change.
In most Spiritan missions, the turn to the other/neighbor is about setting the
standard of moral obligation on behalf of Jesus Christ for the triumph of love over hatred,
justice over injustice, peace over violence, so as to influence people’s socio-political
82
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actions. In Eastern Cameroon, for instance, Spiritans have been instrumental in bringing
to an end the mistreatment of the Baka Pygmies by the Bantus.83 The Baka Pygmies and
the Bantus are peoples who live in the heart of the equatorial forest in Eastern Cameroon.
The Baka are semi-nomadic and hunter-gatherers; they are estimated to be around 60.000
in a population of 400.000 Bantus and rely mainly on the forest for their food and other
necessities. Bantus are mostly farmers and rely mainly on agriculture for foodstuffs. For
centuries, these two ethnic groups have been living in a kind of alliance of blood pacts.
Over the years, the Baka have been marginalized by the Bantu population. The Baka
strongly believe in the blood pact to the point of thinking that they are the Bantu
headmen’s natural slaves. The Bantus treat them as slaves, hire them to work on their
farms for insignificant salaries, and exclude them from any form of development and
justice.84 Spiritans, working in this area, are committed in changing the mentality and
improving the relationship between them. They put in place a structure of development
called “Activities for the self-development of the populations of Eastern Cameroon”
(AAPPEC) that serves as a forum for the education of both the Baka and the Bantus on
issues of rights and dignity of the human person, solidarity, social justice and
development. Today both groups understand better their duties and rights as full citizens
of the country, and are encouraged to acquire official documents such as birth certificates
and national identification cards. Positions of leadership and responsibility in different
activities (health care, primary education, agriculture, justice and peace, formation,
communication and catechetic) are shared among them. For instance, in the area of

83

The Bantus here refers to an ethnic group that lives next to the Baka in Eastern Cameroon as opposed to
the linguistically related group of tribes located in central and southern Africa.
84
See Spiritan Life, no. 15, January 2006, 3-4, 6.

263

healthcare, Baka and Bantu nurses and assistants travel together by motorcycle or by car
to give treatment to patients in the Bantu and Baka villages.85
In conflict and post-conflict situations such as in Congo Brazzaville, Congo
Kinshasa, and Sierra-Leone, Spiritans are promoting affective responsibility, using basic
Christian communities, youth ministry, education and human formation, as media for
national reconciliation and the rebuilding of interrelationships. In these various
communities and activities, they try to awaken in people a sense of service to one’s
fellow human person and the capacity to be critical and to condemn all types of injustice,
whether cultural, religious, political or economic. They are also involved in social
outreach in areas of education, heath-care, orphanage, and personal care of the displaced
refugees.86
In Congo Brazzaville, the Spiritans run two centers of formation for children and
youth. The first is “Le Centre Espace Père Jarot” in Brazzaville that serves as a home and
training center for street children. The stress is on their reintegration in the society
through school and job-training. The second is called “Centre de Formation
Professionelle de Sala Ngolo” in Dolisie. Established in 1996, this center was partly
plundered and destroyed in 1999, at the time of the civil war. Its main goal is human
formation and job-training center for youth who have dropped out of the school system.
In Congo Kinshasa, from the year 2000 up to the present, Spiritans are healing
wounds of years of civil war through attentive presence to the displaced people and the
education and formation of children and youth. Today, Spiritans are assisting the
displaced population in Lubumbashi, Kinshasa, and Kongolo. With regard to education,
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in the Kongolo region, they have established primary and secondary schools to give poor
children an opportunity for education. A new school will open this year in the Manono
region.87
In Sierra Leone, Spiritans are participating in the country’s reconstruction
program through humanitarian works and education. In Freetown, they are working with
the UN in the rehabilitation program for war-affected children and in the structure of
distribution of food aid to refugee camps in Kissi, Waterloo, Bo, etc. In the area of
education, they established “Pre-school” programs for refugee children in Freetown and
around the country. Small Christian communities are serving as places for healing,
reconciliation, and discussion on the peace process. It is also there that people come to
seek information about their displaced family members and friends.88
Worth mentioning also is the ministry of some Spiritan confreres in the refugee
camps in the diocese of Kigoma, Tanzania where they continue, along with other groups,
to defend and assist refugee communities. They are in constant dialogue with the
Tanzanian government so that it facilitates the return home of some of the refugees from
Burundi or to give legal status to those who have been on Tanzanian soil for more than
thirty years if they so wish. Efforts are being made to get the Burundian government to
change the land laws that would allow refugees who return home to reclaim their land.89
We make no claim to have exhausted here all aspects of Spiritan commitments toward the
other human person in sub-Saharan Africa. These few examples are representative of
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their dedication to the values of love, justice and peace in imitation of Jesus Christ and
their founders that constitute examples of an enactment of the turn to the neighbor.
Many people have joined the Spiritans in this mission. Today, Spiritan lay
associates as well as members of Spiritan fraternities in sub-Saharan Africa, share in this
noble service to the human other. The participation of the laity in this mission offers a
chance of getting more people on board and stimulates in them attitudes of affective
responsibility toward other humans. These laywomen and men are themselves living
examples of ethical enactment and symbols of inspiration in their various milieus. Their
closer ties with families, friends and the wider society, gradually create a network of
people convinced of the need for justice, hospitality, and solidarity. Whether or not these
friends and families identify themselves as Christians and/or believers, their concrete
commitment toward the other person’s needs contribute more directly and in various
ways to an effort of encouraging awareness on the centrality of the issue of ethical
responsibility. And progressively, more people in the society would be exposed to stories
and situations of degradation of the lives of human others, and would feel the need to
respond with affective responsibility in the real time of history. The key attitudes are:
respect for human life, human freedom, human dignity, solidarity, hospitality, and social
justice. What is demanded of believers and non-believers today are concrete acts of
respect of the sanctity of every human life, especially of the lives of those others who are
poor, marginalized, and oppressed.
It is our conviction that the missionary groups, non governmental organizations,
and people of good will who work daily in difficult situations in sub-Saharan Africa are
living examples of an enactment of ethical responsibility or love of neighbor. They offer
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a possibility to build communities where every human person will flourish. Again, in the
context of sub-Saharan Africa, the defense of the human person will be of no relevance
unless it can be translated into concrete situations. A better socio-political and economic
future is possible in sub-Saharan Africa and it passes through recognition of the face of
the neighbor who bears the trace of the divine and begs us not to kill him/her.
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Conclusion
This dissertation has been an analysis of Emmanuel Levinas’s conceptual
affinities with liberation theology as presented by Gustavo Gutiérrez and Jon Sobrino. It
has been carried out with a presupposition that the twenty-first century in which we live
is a postmodern world, characterized by the obvious reality of the degradation of the life
of the human other in history; hence, the questioning of modernity’s overemphasis on the
human subject’s self-subsistent autonomy. Our intention was to show that Levinas’s
transcendental ethics of responsibility, which conceives God as the goodness that is
beyond being and calls humans to responsibility for the neighbor, is a pertinent and
adequate philosophical approach compatible to one of the truths of Christianity: the
concern for humanity of the neighbor as articulated in liberation theology.
We began this dissertation by providing, in the first chapter, a survey of Levinas’s
transcendental ethics of responsibility, situating it within the phenomenological tradition
of continental philosophy. We argued that while Levinas remains indebted to Plato,
Descartes, Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger, he was nevertheless displeased with Western
philosophy’s inclination to base all knowing, willing, and meaning on the intentional
consciousness of the subject. In a specific way, he takes issue with Husserl’s and
Heidegger’s

phenomenology

for

not

explicitly

addressing

the

question

of

intersubjectivity and responsibility for the other. His effort was geared toward replacing
metaphysics with ethics as first philosophy. The face of the other is what determines
one’s subjectivity and reveals the trace of the infinite God. God is encounter in the ethical
command of love of neighbor. For Levinas, subjectivity rightly understood is always a
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state of wakefulness or insomnia. It is defined in terms of ethical responsibility to the
point of substitution, proximity, obsession, sensibility, hostage, and maternity.
Chapter two discussed Gutiérrez’s and Sobrino’s theological project. It was
argued that their theologies emerge in the context of socio-political and economic
oppression of the poor, the exploited, and the marginalized of Latin America. Their main
theological focus is an invitation to Christian theology to take the turn to the subject to its
ultimate level, that is, to a commitment to one of the truths of Christianity: concern for
the human neighbor created in God’s image. The human neighbor’s humanity is seen as a
fundamental aspect for theological reflection.
The third chapter centered on the point of affinities between Levinas’s philosophy
and liberation theology. We established the following affinities: Levinas’s philosophy
and liberation theology emerged as a response to the twentieth century’s tragic human
situation, search for the divine transcendence in the life of commitment to the other
human person, find in the Judeo-Christian wisdom a distinct way of thinking of the
subject-other relationships, and call for love of neighbor and justice. They both view the
turn to the other/neighbor as a power of genuine love, opening new avenues for the
radical re-imagining of the world. For Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology, the
creation of a better world requires a “prophetic-ethical” attitude from every human person
in his/her daily encounter with the other human. This attitude values and protects the
other and opens up a dimension of the divine in history. The affinities noted do not,
however, suggest a perfect matching between these two approaches. While the neighbor
in liberation theology is an image of God, in Levinas, he/she, only manifests the height in
which God reveals God’s self as a trace. Levinas’s God is not the omnipotent God of
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liberation theology. Besides, Levinas situates his philosophy on the asymmetrical level
while liberation theology is historically based. Levinas has been suspicious of Christian
theology in general for its dependence on Western philosophical tradition. Yet, he has
been sympathetic to liberation theology for its emphasis on the human other’s humanity.
Levinas’s

philosophy,

this

dissertation

argued,

enhances

liberation

theology

philosophically through the concept of vigilant insomnia. This concept keeps the human
subject everlastingly awake to the needs of others. Liberation theology, on its part,
historicizes Levinas’s transcendental ethics of responsibility in terms of conversion to the
neighbor. It functions in history as Purcell’s being otherwise or affective responsibility
and interrupts the subject’s tendency to totality.
The fourth chapter examined three Christian scholars’ use of Levinas’s
philosophy for Christian theology. For these scholars, Enrique Dussel, Jean-Luc Marion,
and Michael Purcell, each in his own right, Levinas’s thought offers a possibility for
dialogue with Christian theology. Dussel argues for a philosophical theology of liberation
that takes seriously Levinas’s turn to the other or exteriority. Jean-Luc Marion argues for
the demise of traditional metaphysics by means of phenomenology as first philosophy
that remains open to the theological in terms of agape, echoing Levinas’s ethical
responsibility or the subject’s love for the other. Purcell sees in Levinas’s
phenomenology some elements such as holiness, infinite, awakening, desire, love, and
justice, that could fruitfully engage Christian theology. For him, Levinas’s notions of
awakening, desire, and face point to the direction of the theology of grace and
sacraments. For these scholars, Levinas’s philosophy is worthy of consideration by
Christian theology.
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The fifth and last chapter examined the contribution Levinas’s philosophy and
liberation theology could offer to contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa as it faces
unprecedented socio-political and ethnic conflicts. The struggle for political and
economic power and the non-recognition of the human other, through whom God’s trace
passes, have been the major reasons for most of these conflicts. This chapter argued that
Levinas’s thought and liberation theology’s turn to the other/neighbor offer a possibility
for lessening the hatred of the human other through a redefinition of human subjectivity
as the one-for-the-other; hence, a rethinking of the place of the other.
Levinas, Gutiérrez, and Sobrino, writing from the perspective of philosophy and
theology, bring forth one fundamental element, namely, the in-breaking of the dimension
of the divine opens forth in the human face. They call all humans to embrace a
“prophetic-ethical sense for the other, especially the preferred other of the prophets, the
poor, the marginal, and the oppressed.”90 What we have here is an exemplification of a
significant and positive parallel between Christian theology and postmodern philosophy.
The common ground between these two apparently opposing areas of thought is that they
both takes issue with modernity’s certain conception of the subject as independent and
secluded self. They posit an “uncompromisable value” of the human other as the
possibility of the subject’s subjectivity. The stress is on a subject’s movement toward
exteriority, the other, not a self-sufficient subject, but rather the one, who finds its
identity or humanity in relation to the other who bears the trace of, or carries the image of
God. This analysis of the subject is one that sits comfortably with postmodernity and
Christian theology. It is a path which contemporary philosophy and theology should
consider in addressing the issue of inhumanity in the world. It is our hope that both the
90
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thought of Levinas and liberation theology would advance the recognition of the
neighbor, who is both God’s mystery and the human other, as the precondition for peace,
justice and good order in today’s world. The radical transcendence of the other stands
over and above the subject; this is a revalidation of one of the truths of Christianity and
Christianity’s vision of human life and existence that constitutes a central response to the
question of human existence and authenticity. Obviously, this dissertation does not have
the pretention to have exhausted this topic; it is only one among many contributions to
the ongoing conversation between Christian theology and postmodern philosophy.
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